


SECURITY AND DUTY OF CARE DEPARTMENT

Security & Covid-19: WEEKLY SECURITY REPORT

Country: Libya & Tunisia

Period: 08/07/2022 – 14/07/2022

SECURITY SITUATION OVERVIEW



Key developments

- Tripoli – Renewed threats of GNU entry in Tripoli
- Other Security Developments
  - GNU reshuffle of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) Board of Directors – Armed groups surround NOC HQ
  - The Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) reports on Turkish-supplied Syrian fighters adjoining western Libyan armed groups
- Tunisia security update - Continued boycott calls of the 25 July Referendum

1. Tripoli- Renewed threats of GNU entry in Tripoli

Security activity levels decreased significantly in the cessation of protests and the onset of Eid Ad Adha; however, the GNS PM Fathi Bashagha's public declarations of his intention to make a third attempt to enter Tripoli "in the coming days" projected another high tense episode on the capital.

The decrease in protest activity might only be temporary as the issues driving the protests are far from being resolved, i.e. political crisis, oil blockade and its consequences. As such, on 07 July, the head of Libya's Civil Society Commission (CSC), Ibrika Beltmar, attributed the loss of momentum of the recent youth-led protests to negotiations and pressure from security forces on the movement. Beltmar clarified that protest organisers may have entered into negotiations with

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security forces or were subjected to pressure. Meanwhile, localised calls for protests were claimed by civilian and military residents of Souq Al-Jumaa to continue demonstrating peacefully to press for the dissolution of all legislative and executive political bodies whereas committing to peace manifestations and refraining from acts of vandalism. At the time of reporting, no protests were organised except for a small group of medical sector workers demanding their outstanding salaries in front of the office of the Prime Minister in Tripoli on Friday, 8 July. The source added that the demonstrators were dispersed by security units guarding the PM's office.

In a likely attempt to sustain his political relevance, GNS-PM Fathi Bashagha renewed his claims on a third attempt to enter Tripoli and take over the executive seat. The statement was published in a foreign press article<sup>1</sup> on 09 July, where GNS PM Fathi Bashagha is quoted as stating that he planned to take office in Tripoli "in the coming days". Further on, Bashagha continued that "All the roads are open into Tripoli [...]" and that "some armed forces have changed their position and have nothing against us entering the capital". Bashagha asserted that for elections to occur, "the only condition is that Libya only has one government. Two governments are not acceptable". He also warned of continued demonstrations which he expects to continue after Eid but added that he believed the demonstrators' concerns were warranted.

Given the two failed attempts, the threat of GNS's renewed intentions to enter Tripoli triggered a state of alertness within the pro-GNU armed actors:

- On 10 July, units from the 51<sup>st</sup> Infantry Brigade (commanded by Brigadier General Abdul-Fattah Al-Khabouli) and the Rahba al-Duru Battalion (commanded by Bashir Khalaf Allah ((aka) Al-Baqarah)), entered and controlled Al-Naa'am Military Camp in Tajoura, forcing a withdrawal of Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB) units, who reportedly maintain allegiance to 777<sup>th</sup> Combat Brigade Commander, Haitham Tajouri. A build-up of forces was recorded in the aftermath of the incident as the 777<sup>th</sup> Brigade readied forces to regain control of the camp whereas Gharyan forces led by Nasser Shteiba mobilized in support of Bashir Al-Bugra; however, no armed confrontations were reported.

*Amid increased speculations on the takeover of the Al Naa'am Camp including orders of GNU Chief of Staff (CoS) Mohamed Al-Haddad, a likely reason was GNU's armed support efforts to impede pro-GNS aligned forces attempts to expand activity in the Ain Zara-Tajoura border area, thus to counter any GNS entry and governance takeover.*

- On 12 July, in the late evening, several Tripoli and Western armed groups leaders held a meeting in Abu Sitta after receiving reports of GNS-PM plans on entering west Tripoli through the support of Zintani commander Osama Juweili.

- The meeting concluded with a **public made statement**<sup>2</sup> refusing to allow Bashagha to enter the city, describing it as a "red line" and calling for prompt Presidential and Parliamentary elections under the slogan "Yes to the elections, no to transitional extensions". It should be note, that those in attendance were known pro-GNU armed group's commanders, as Stabilisation Support Agency (SSA) commander Abdulghani Al-Kikli, Zawiyyan Commander Mahmoud Bin Rajab, Zawiyyan commander and head of the Western region Intelligence Muhammad Bahroun (aka al-Far), Zintan General Security Apparatus commander Emad Trabelsi, Misrata's 301 Battalion commander Abdussalam Al-Zoubi, Nawasi Brigade Special Force Commander, Mohamed Abu Draa, Al-Zawiya's 52nd Brigade commander Mahmoud Bin Rajab and representatives of the Lions of Tajoura amongst others.



<sup>1</sup> The News Arab <https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/libyas-bashagha-says-enter-tripoli-coming-days>

<sup>2</sup> Social media footage <https://www.facebook.com/FebruaryBN/videos/730217438256097>



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- This statement coincided with the movement of armed formations from the pro-GNU Constitution and Election Support Force (CESF) from Misrata, which included several main battle tanks (alleged T55 tanks). No kinetic engagements were recorded.

### SDCD COMMENT

*The fact that GNS Bashagha is willing to make another attempt despite the adverse circumstances suggests his imperative need to keep his political relevance amid the wave of alternative initiatives by other key players exploiting the space of the legitimacy crisis. For example, the Presidency Council's (IPC) "plan to solve the political impasse in the country", and Saif Islam Gaddafi's two political proposals.*

*Furthermore, after four months of sustained efforts to garner local backing and international recognition while pressuring with alternative forms to undermine Dabaiba, the GNS coalition support would likely look for other options, especially amid moves by GNU-PM Dabaiba and Haftar, among others, to establish a power-sharing deal.*

*Although showing confidence in his statements over the armed groups' support, the question of whether the GNS has been able to garner enough support amongst armed actors to guarantee entry but also capability to maintain his presence in Tripoli raises doubts.*

*The announcement of his intent does show a degree of confidence that might be based on some form of guarantee from key groups in the capital that they will not interfere or attempt to block his entrance. However, which groups have changed their stance and movements is not known, and reinforcements are possible in the coming days from groups that oppose the GNS. Nevertheless, the latest public statement of western armed groups refuting his arrival in Tripoli and the rapid deployment of the CESF on 12 July expose a unified stance against any armed support that he might expect.*

*The support base for both the GNU and the GNS within the capital has remained fluid since the creation of the GNS, with significant units, such as the 444th Brigade, being at lengths to maintain their neutrality. So far, Bashagha's armed group support in and around the capital is mostly centred around the Nawasi Brigade (north-east of Tripoli), Zintani Commander Osama al-Juwaili's forces and Zawiyyan forces linked to the Abu Zuriba clan (west and south-west of Tripoli). Conversely, Dabaiba is believed to maintain still the support of many armed groups in the capital and the surrounding regions, which showed a willingness to mobilise on his behalf. Most notably, Support and Stability Apparatus (SSA) forces aligned with Abdul-Ghani al-Kikli (Ghinaywa), Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB) Commander Ayoub Abu Ras, and Zawiyyan Commander Muhammed Bahroun—though Dabaiba has increasingly limited ability to provide these groups with additional fiscal and status incentives to ensure they remain loyal to him.*

*The recent takeover of the Naa'am Camp in the southeast Tajoura-Ain Zara border would likely align with GNU-PM enforced actions of securing the entry points of Tripoli against any possible adversary infiltration.*

*In case of materialisation, Bashagha's arrival would also likely elevate the chances for militia mobilisation and clashes within and around Tripoli, particularly with the recent warning that western militias have publicly indicated on Tripoli's "red line".*

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### 3. GNU reshuffle of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) Board of Directors – Armed groups surround NOC HQ in Tripoli

On 12 July, a GNU decision No. 642 of 2022<sup>3</sup>, dated 07 July, circulated on social media and claimed that the GNU PM Dabaiba appointed a new National Oil Corporation (NOC) Board of Directors. The decision appointed Farhat bin Qadara as Chairman, replacing Mustafa Sanallah, and other members namely Khalifa Rajab Abdulsadeq, Hussein Safar, Masoud Suleiman Moussa and Ahmed Ammar.

Several observers have claimed that Sanallah's dismissal is part of a power-sharing arrangement brokered by Dabaiba's representatives and Saddam Haftar in a meeting in the UAE. In contrast, other sources have claimed that Dabaiba independently instigated the move to appease Haftar, while Haftar is yet to sign off on the agreement and is hedging his bets.

Negotiations surrounding a potential power-sharing deal between Dabaiba's camp and Haftar have been circulating, with more details revealed by an Africa Intelligence report<sup>4</sup> which indicated that "Haftar has been offered the opportunity to choose Sanallah's successor as head of NOC in return for his support on the extension of Dabaiba's term as head of the government", during several weeks of talks in June-July 2022. Dabaiba's offer to Haftar was clearly intended to break-up the "eastern alliance" formed around Fathi Bashagha, where Haftar is one of the alliance's principal backer, along with the HoR Speaker Aguila Salah Issa. Dabaiba's recent decision surfaced in the context of renewed threat of Bashagha's arrival to Tripoli, enforces the scenario of a Dabaiba-Haftar camps agreement.

As several observers pointed out<sup>5</sup>, bin Qadara held the position of governor of the Central Bank of Libya during the rule of the late leader Muammar Gaddafi between 2006 and 2011 while also considered one of the most prominent close associates of Khalifa Haftar, working as an economic advisor to Haftar in the period from 2018 to 2020.

In a chain of immediate reactions, the NOC has told media outlets that it has not formally received any decision to dismiss the board, reiterating that rumours on this issue have been circulating for days, and stressed that as of 12 July, Sanallah remains the NOC Chairman.

However, on 14 July, the pro-GNU Constitutional and Election Protection Force (CEPF) and Misratan Joint Force (JOF) under the command of Omar Boughadada mobilised and cordoned off the National Oil Corporation (NOC) headquarters in Tripoli, allegedly upon the orders of GNU PM Dabaiba. According to various reports, as many as 20-40 armed vehicles surrounded the building.

The mobilisation of armed groups followed a 40-minute live broadcast from NOC Chairman Mustafa Sanallah at the NOC headquarters on 13 July evening. Sanallah stated he would remain in his position and accused Dabaiba and the GNU of corruption and "handing over Libya's sovereign oil company to the UAE". Among Sanallah's key claims<sup>6</sup> are outlined below:

- The GNU received 165 billion LYD from the NOC but it is unclear what this money has been spent on.
- The NOC is neutral according to Libyan law and is not affiliated with Dabaiba or anyone else.
- Dabaiba closed the oil fields when global oil prices reached \$120 per barrel. Sanallah suggested this was a conspiracy favouring a particular country".
- Sanallah held discussions with Dabaiba about the UAE and its relationship with the GNU. On multiple occasions, Dabaiba informed Sanallah that the UAE was his ally.
- Dabaiba appointed Farhat bin Qadara as the Chairman of the NOC to satisfy the UAE and ensure that he would remain in his role as GNU Prime Minister.

<sup>3</sup> Social media GNU decision <https://twitter.com/LibyaDesk/status/1546874650155786243>

<sup>4</sup> Africa Intelligence article [https://www.africaintelligence.com/north-africa/2022/07/01/dabaiba-and-haftar-in-secret-negotiations-to-replace-noc-boss-mustafa-sanallah\\_109796406-art](https://www.africaintelligence.com/north-africa/2022/07/01/dabaiba-and-haftar-in-secret-negotiations-to-replace-noc-boss-mustafa-sanallah_109796406-art)

<sup>5</sup> Media analysis post <https://www.noonpost.com/content/44641>

<sup>6</sup> Social media reference <https://twitter.com/MahmudM27830556/status/1547324215195586561>



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- Dabaiba requested that an Emirati company be assigned an oil construction contract. The company asked for a \$300 million USD payment increase – which the NOC refused.
- Farhat bin Qadara is seeking to give the UAE \$600 million USD annually.
- Sanallah insisted that the NOC would not permit attempts to please the UAE at the expense of the Libyan people. From now on, the NOC would coordinate with the Governor of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), Sadiq al-Kabir, but there would be no contact with Dabaiba.
- Dabaiba attempted to change the NOC board while Sanallah was away from Libya performing the Hajj pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia.
- Dabaiba would not be able to change the board of directors of the NOC; the decision is void and has no effect.
- Sanallah will stay in his role as NOC Chairman, and no one can attack the headquarters.

Some reports claimed that Sanallah remained at the NOC until negotiations saw him escorted to Mitiga Airport by the Special Deterrence Force (Rada). Other reports claim he returned to the NOC headquarters, where he currently remains.

Meanwhile, Farhat bin Qadara arrived at NOC headquarters to take up his position as Chairman, delivering a speech that he would restore Libya's oil and gas capabilities within one week, raise salaries for oil sector workers within two months, and preserve all pre-existing agreements with foreign partners. According to reports, a minor altercation occurred between Mustafa Sanallah and Dabaiba's security details when bin Qadara arrived at the NOC HQ. However, Sanallah is understood not to have been present at the time. At the time of writing, the NOC HQ is being heavily guarded by the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) members.

The US Embassy in Libya declared it was following current developments with "deep concern" and confirmed that the NOC has remained politically and technically independent under Sanallah's leadership. In a statement published on the morning of 14 July, the US Embassy claimed that the reported NOC board's replacement may be contested in court but must not be the subject of armed confrontation. The UK Embassy also shared the statement.

### **SDCD COMMENTS**

*Dabaiba pledged to reshuffle the NOC board in late June in response to the Ministry of Oil and Gas Aoun's criticism of Sanallah and the NOC – in particular related to the NOC's reluctance to share up to date production figures as well as the ongoing issue of the NOC refusing to release any more funds to the GNU after it disbursed 08 billion USD in return for its emergency budget back in April.*

*This decision signals that Dabaiba has used the enduring contest over NOC as a political bargaining chip to set a base for negotiations with the LNA, which has always wanted to exert control over the NOC. This could see Haftar use his influence to end the oil blockades in eastern Libya, likely in return for the new NOC chairman and ally, bin Qadara, ensuring that oil revenues are channelled to the LNA via the GNU. The timing of this move would also be designed to remove any momentum behind Bashagha's planned move on Tripoli later this week and would indicate the fracturing of the GNS alliance, or at least Haftar's support for Bashagha.*

*It is important to note that the current configuration of the reshuffled board of directors will likely lead to renewed institutional divisions, with more extensive political, economic and operational repercussions on the Libyan oil sector, creating an even more unstable operating environment in the short term. Similarly, it will create a significant international concern – from western governments and international oil companies – on the instability likely to be created in light of the global energy crisis.*



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### 4. The Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) reports on Turkish-supplied Syrian fighters adjoining western Libyan armed groups

A report<sup>7</sup> released on 07 July by the Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ)<sup>8</sup> has quoted several first-hand testimonies by Syrian mercenaries detailing their involvement in looting and civilian property seizures in the Tripoli area while taking part in western armed groups actions.

The STJ report examines the relationships between Turkish-supplied Syrian fighters and western Libyan armed groups, quoting three interviewees with personal experience of adjoining the armed groups in armed clashes and various interventions, including armed robberies and theft against civilians. The nominated armed groups are the *Nawasi Brigade*, Support and Stability Apparatus (SSA) and the 444th Fighting Brigade.

According to one of the testimonies, participating with some armed groups in their actions, “several fighters are paid monthly salaries by these groups and bonuses. They perform tasks such as armed robberies and partaking in clashes against other Libyan armed groups.” In addition, the motivation of the Syrian fighters is linked to deductions and delayed salaries “fighters started joining the ranks of armed Libyan groups after our salaries were deducted and delayed”.

On this issue, several reports have previously revealed sporadic tensions between the Syrian Turkish-recruited fighters and their employers/commanders regarding the late payment, low rate or even non-payment of salaries. In Jan 2022, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR)<sup>9</sup> has reported on the escalation of tension between the Syrian mercenaries and their commanders inside the Tripoli camps due to the poor living conditions, and the deduction of large amounts of their monthly salaries. In a more recent event, a dispute occurred between several Syrian fighters inside Al-Yarmouk Camp (south of Tripoli) on 22 June 2022 as their leaders continued to steal their salaries and did not offer food allowances<sup>10</sup>.

#### **SDCD COMMENT**

*Accurate validation of the testimonies is not possible due to limited reporting on specific details of the incidents; however, the report does indicate that the motivation of several Syrian fighters to join Libyan armed groups because of the financial gain repeated reasons of Syrian fighters’ disputes.*

*Of note, the SOHR report<sup>11</sup> released on 14 July informed of resumed operations of the back-and-forth transfer of Turkish recruited Syrian mercenaries operating in Libya after information in late June indicated a suspension of the transfer process until the end of 2022.*

*Overall the impact on the Tripoli armed group dynamics is believed to be low but might develop over the longer term with other conflicts frequently seeing such individuals turning to armed crime in a post-conflict society.*

### 5. Tunisia update - Continued boycott calls of the 25 July Referendum

On 7 July, members and supporters of the Free Destourian Party (PDL), headed by party president Abir Moussi organised a demonstration rejecting the political roadmap outlined by President Kais Saied. The demonstrators marched towards the Independent High Authority for Elections Council (ISIE) headquarters, where they were blocked by police, resulting in a scuffle<sup>12</sup>. PDL leader Abir Moussi was reportedly rushed to the hospital after injuries from the incident.

<sup>7</sup> The Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) <https://stj-sy.org/en/syrian-mercenaries-involved-in-looting-and-civilian-property-seizures/>

<sup>8</sup> The Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) is a Syrian-based Human Rights group described as an ‘independent, nongovernmental organization whose members include Syrian human rights defenders, advocates and academics of different backgrounds and nationalities’ and who have been speakers at numerous EU and UN Human Rights meetings on Syria over recent years.

<sup>9</sup> Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) <https://www.syriahr.com/en/233076/>

<sup>10</sup> Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) <https://www.syriahr.com/en/258098/>

<sup>11</sup> Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) <https://www.syriahr.com/en/259469/>

<sup>12</sup> Local media reporting <https://www.webdo.tn/2022/07/08/tunisie-abir-moussi-hospitalisee-en-marge-dune-manifestation-du-pdl/>; <https://news-tunisia.tunisienumerique.com/tunisia-video-clashes-between-pdl-and-police/>

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With less than two weeks away from the planned vote, the parties associated with the anti-referendum campaign filed two complaints with the public prosecutor at the Court of First Instance of Tunis for "reporting of crimes". The Workers' Party, the Democratic Current, Al Joumhouri, Ettakatol and Al-Qutb have decided to take the head of government, Najla Bouden and the entire government team to justice. Najla Bouden and her ministers are prosecuted for having participated in the overthrow of the constitution, for attempts to change the form of government, for squandering of public funds and for prejudice against the administration. The second complaint was filed against the president and members of the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE)<sup>13</sup>.

As opposition to Saïed's proposed constitution is mounting, the prosecution campaign against Ennahda movement persists with the first investigative judge in Office 23 of the Judicial Pole for Combating Terrorism decision to question Ghannouchi as a defendant in the investigative case relating to the Namaa Tounes association. Ennahda vigorously denied the allegations against Ghannouchi, accusing authorities of targeting him for Ennahda's opposition to President Kaïd Saïed's 25 July constitutional referendum.

Available information claimed that Rached Ghannouchi is expected to appear on 19 July as an accused in the case. Authorities accuse the group of involvement in money laundering in relation to an NGO called the Namaa Tounes association. Ex-Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali was arrested on money laundering charges in the same case on 23 June. He will appear before a terrorism court on 20 July, one day after Ghannouchi is scheduled to do so. To note, on 05 July, an anti-terrorism judge ordered a freeze on the financial assets of former Speaker of Parliament Rached Ghannouchi, ex-Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali, and eight others.

On a positive development, the Algerian-Tunisian land border crossings were announced to be open on 15 July. After more than two years of border closure due to the coronavirus pandemic, this development is expected to result in a surge of Algerian tourists in the country in short to medium term.

*Although, there have been fewer demonstrations during the assessed week, likely due to the opposition camp using the time to review the draft's content and plan for potential countering movements. However, the PDL's protest on 07 July indicates the ability of opposition parties to mobilise their supporters. More demonstrations are expected in the 25 July referendum as most opposition parties, including Ennahda and the Democratic current, have called for a boycott or vote no to the Constitution vote.*

### 3. COVID-19 Update<sup>14</sup>

Country	Cases in the last 7 days	Cases in the preceding 7 days	Weekly Case % Change	Cases in the last 7 days/1M pop	Deaths in the last 7 days	Deaths in the preceding 7 day	Weekly Deaths % Change	Overall Covid cases
Libya *	<b>100</b>	51	<b>+ 96%</b>	14	0	0	<b>0 %</b>	502.289
Tunisia **	<b>17.941</b>	14.941	<b>+20%</b>	1.485	64	60	<b>+ 7%</b>	1.087.030

<sup>13</sup> Local media reporting <https://www.tap.info.tn/en/Portal-Politics/15370974-anti-referendum>

<sup>14</sup> Data from WorldOMeter. Source: <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/> [online]. Last updated: 14/07/2022 17:00GMT  
As of 04/04/2022 The National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) of Libya is publishing only weekly COVID-19 related statistics

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LIST OF ACRONYMS / ABBREVIATIONS

AQ - Al-Qaeda  
AQIM - Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb  
BCP – Border Crossing Point  
BDB – Benghazi Defense Brigade / Saraya Defend Benghazi (SDB) (Al Qaeda-aligned – AAS and RSCB associated/umbrella group)  
CBL – Central Bank of Libya  
CNI – Critical National Infrastructure  
DACOCT - Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism  
DDR - Disarmament, demobilising and reintegration  
DPF – Derna Protection Force (an amalgamation of all militias in Derna, including the MSCD)  
GECOL – General Electricity Company of Libya  
GNA – Government of National Accord (UN-backed)  
GNC – General National Congress  
IGNU – Interim Government of National Unity (2021)  
GTUC - Greater Tripoli Union Council (Tripoli militias and others, established in June 2020)  
HCS - High Council of State  
HNEC – High National Elections Commission  
HoR – House of Representatives (Tobruk-based)  
IDF – Indirect Fire (mortars/rockets)  
IDP - Internally Displaced Persons  
IED - Improvised Explosive Device  
IOC - International Oil Company  
5+5 JMC – 5+5 Joint Military Commission  
IS/DAESH - Islamic State  
LNA – Libyan National Army  
LNG – Libyan National Guard  
LPA – Libyan Political Agreement (2015)  
LPDF - Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (2020)  
LROR - Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room  
MoD - Ministry of Defense  
MoF - Ministry of Finance  
MoFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
MoHE - Ministry of Higher Education  
MoI - Ministry of Interior  
MoJ - Ministry of Justice  
MoO - Ministry of Oil  
MoT - Ministry of Transportation  
MSCD – Mujahideen Shura Council of Derna (AQ aligned)  
NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation (aid/charity)  
NOC – National Oil Company  
NSG – National Salvation Government (GNC)  
PC – Presidency Council (IGNU)  
PFG- Petroleum Facilities Guard  
RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade  
RSCB - Revolutionary Shura Council of Benghazi  
RTA - Road Traffic Accident  
SAF - Small Arms Fire  
SDF – Rada Deterrence Force/ Special Deterrence Force/ Rada  
SSA - Stability Support Agency  
Technical - An improvised weapon-mounted pick-up truck  
TPF – Tripoli Protection Force (TRB, Nawasi 8 Force, Bab Tajoura Brigade and Ghneiwa umbrella group, established in December 2018)  
UNSMIL – United Nations Support Mission in Libya  
UXO - Unexploded Ordnance

**Disclaimer:** This report is based in security incidents reports from multiple sources, including international partners and open sources, whose accuracy may not always be fully verified. It cannot be assumed that all security incidents in Libya and Tunisia were reported to and/or tracked by EUBAM Libya. The Security and Duty of Care Department (SDCD) emails a daily security update (DSR) which includes a full description of the incidents that serve as the basis for this report. These documents may not be copied, forwarded or reproduced, manual, electronic, photographic to any other person or organization outside EU Institutions and EU Members States without further approval from the originator.