

## Security & Covid-19: WEEKLY SECURITY REPORT


Country: Libya & Tunisia

Period: 24/09/2021 – 30/09/2021

### SECURITY SITUATION OVERVIEW

#### 1. Key developments

- Security atmospherics in Tripoli
- Demonstrations against House of Representatives (HoR) withdrawal of confidence in Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) in Tripoli and other major cities likely to continue in the short term
- External actors' movements: Defenses at Jufra reportedly dismantled; Intensified Turkish air movement at Al-Watyah Airbase, and Mitiga Airbase
- ISIS has claimed an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack against an LNA in Sabha, Fezzan
- Tunisia security update - Protests continue in Tunisia



#### 2. Findings

##### 2.1. Security atmospherics in Tripoli

Overall the security landscape in Tripoli registered a decline in militia clashes with a concentrated focus on the political arena divisions. The tensions between the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) and the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) are currently occurring in the public realm and materialised in civil unrest on 26



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Sept in Tripoli (Martyr's Square) and Benghazi (Al Keesh Square). The uncertainty of the election's deadline creates the scenarios of increased levels of instability which are likely to manifest in targeted murders and kidnappings of armed group members/ affiliates, kidnappings/ detention of mid-level political actors, and armed clashes between groups.

Relevant to note, a Tripoli activist, the head of the National League for Youth Support, Emad Al-Haraty, was reported kidnapped on 26 Sept<sup>1</sup>, increasing the likelihood of political-driven attacks against representative figures, sites and political-connected institutions. The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) expressed concern about the kidnapping of Emad Al-Haraty, stressing the importance of the freedom of expression and assembly.

Other targeted kidnappings, unidentified armed men abducted Rida Faraj Fraitis, Chief of Staff for the First Deputy Prime Minister of the IGNU, with his colleague on 2 Aug 2021, following Mr Fraitis' visit to IGNU premises in Tripoli.

**SDCD COMMENT**

*The previous assessment stands with wider Tripoli area, Warshefana, and Western Coastal Region prone to military/ security actor and armed group tensions and activity, with the rapid development of armed confrontations and the subsequent impact on respective security environments, including potential effects on transit/evacuation routes.*

*Although levels of kinetic engagements were relatively stable this week, the Western Region hostile activity levels and security volatility in the current political instability and polarisation are likely to increase in the fluid allegiance structures. Considering the security/ military actor, armed group competition, uncontrolled availability of weapons in Libya, the trust and reliance in the political process, and attempted governance reform play a decisive role.*

**2.2. Demonstrations against HoR withdrawal of confidence in IGNU in Tripoli and other major cities likely to continue in the short term**

On 21 Sept, the HoR withdrew its confidence in the IGNU, led by Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah, ending the approximately six-month-long period of relative political stability in Libya. The HoR's withdrawal of confidence is likely to represent another destabilising factor impacting Libya's political situation in both the short and the long term. It is likely to fragment Libyan society, forcing them to side with the HoR or the IGNU.

A large demonstration was held as expected in Martyrs Square during the afternoon/evening of 24 Sept with people calling for the dissolution of the HoR and local reports of busses with participants being laid on from outlying areas of Tripoli. Reports have suggested that the prime minister partially funded the demonstration, including paying for the buses, with questions raised over the level of grassroots support which the protest appeared to show.

In his speech, Prime Minister (IGNU) Abdulhamid Dbeibah thanked everyone for attending, claiming they came from across the country and showed a "united Libya", while stating his commitment to the Libyan political process, economic development, and national reconciliation and rejecting the HoR vote.

Meanwhile, with Hajar Al-Qayed, a member of the LPDF, claim that there were reports which discussed the prime minister's intention to postpone the elections for the next two years, a protest was held in Keesh Square, Benghazi on 24 Sept which called for elections to be held on time while showing support for the HoR election laws.

HoR President Saleh continues his defensive posture, seeking to justify the vote of no confidence by claiming that the vote was done in the interest of Libya, claiming responsibility for the publicly supported programs that Prime Minister Dbeibah is currently funding, as well as addressing other allegations, such as non-approval of the national budget and non-collaboration with the HCS.

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<sup>1</sup> Al-Haraty was recent involved in creating a youth committee in Tobruk that was reportedly backed by the HoR while the National League for Youth Support was due to hold a protest at 1200hrs on 28 Sep calling for elections to be held on schedule in front of HNEC in Tripoli.

### **SDCD COMMENT**

*While the battle for elections is now in its final stage and the fault lines have been clearly defined following this latest development of withdrawing confidence from the IGNU and its reverberating consequences, the risk of anti-HoR protests across Libya in the coming days persists. Unrest within Tripoli is directly linked with political developments and calls raised by political interests with the possibility to materialize in LNA-controlled territory, including Benghazi. However, such protests are unlikely to develop into a prolonged nationwide movement in the coming months.*

*The prime minister's speech was less inflammatory than feared following his reaction on 21 Sept at an impromptu demonstration following the HoR's decision; his stance depicted usual rhetoric of unity and progress with plenty of promises to the people as he pursues a strategy of populism<sup>2</sup>. It is this latter point that has concerned Dbeibah's opponents as they worry that Dadaiba used his access to state authority and funds to build a popular support base for himself and his camp and that he may seek to stay in power past the expiration of the IGNU's mandate on 24 Dec 2021, by obstructing the timely holding of elections or by running for President in elections.*

*The tensions between the IGNU and the HoR are currently occurring in the public realm with likely ulterior motives and coalitions behind the scenes, despite both sides claiming their actions are in the interests of the Libyan public. At the same time, the demonstrations in Tripoli and Benghazi highlight the growing political divisions between east and west, reflecting the tensions between the HoR and GNU.*

*HoR formed committee of 13 members to prepare the Parliamentary Election Law as requested by UNSMI and set to discuss the law on Monday 27 Sept, has been postponed for next week. With the committee's members hailing from different regions and tasked with collecting any proposals that could be included from the rest of the HoR, this postponement and the law creates the possibility of another breaking point of civil unrest.*

*In the current state and the short term looking ahead, this development might not directly impact the risk of militancy in Libya. In contrast, the risk of direct armed conflict is also not very high in the coming days and weeks. However, in the long-term, this development could be a catalyst for armed conflict and potential acts of militancy should a power vacuum emerge in Libya. Considering the expiration of the IGNU mandate and the high likelihood that forced election without a multiple actor's consensus would most likely be strongly contested. This could lead to the emergence of rival alliances in Libya as different armed actors align themselves with one or the other political body based on their interests.*

### **2.3. External actors' movements: Defenses at Jufra reportedly dismantled; Intensified Turkish air movement at Al-Watyah Airbase, and Mitiga Airbase**

Localised sources issued conflicting reports concerning the alleged Russian Private Military Contractor (PMC), Wagner Group movement in the Central Region on 26 Sept. Some sources posted images<sup>3</sup>, claiming to depict demobilisation of equipment, including radar and air defence systems from Al-Jufra, and Ghardabiyah Airbase, Sirte, eastwards.

Furthermore, localised sources report on 27 Sept renewed arrival of a Turkish Military cargo plane (Airbus A400) and buses, allegedly carrying Syrian external forces (estimated number at 250), at Al-Watyah Airbase.

### **SDCD COMMENT**

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<sup>2</sup> On 26 Sept, the prime minister has formed a committee to receive requests to grant Libyan citizenship. The committee will receive requests from Libyan women married to foreigners, the children of naturalized citizens, and those who cannot prove their Libyan origin. The policy is part of a suite of policies driven by the prime minister in a bid to build support amongst the electorate.

<sup>3</sup> Social media reference: <https://twitter.com/metesohtaoglu/status/1442405252616052736>

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*The potential scale of dismantling the most strategic airbase Al-Jufra in Libya is currently unknown. This might be motivated by optics to give an impression of a drawdown on the LNA/ Russian side, and it comes as reports indicate an uptick in Turkish airlifts to Libya over the last week or so. Despite national efforts to affect implementation of the 5+5 JMC ceasefire agreement, external force withdrawal remains very much external actor driven, and dependent.*

*It may be assumed as a genuine move by Russia to further reduce tensions along the Sirte-Jufra frontlines and increase pressure on Ankara already under pressure over its military presence in Libya asked to justify it to both the US and Italy the UN General Assembly meeting last week in New York. Wagner Group demobilisation from Al-Jufra would be surprising, especially considering seeming Russian Government military/security expansion on the African continent, including possible deployment to Mali.<sup>4</sup>*

*The deployment in Al-Jufra, Al-Jufra Airbase and Ghardabiyah Airbase carry strategic importance, serving as connection hubs for forces and equipment to the Western and Southern Regions and creating buffer zones to the Oil Crescent.*

*Further deployment or re-deployment of equipment could be seen as potential scenarios, including possible strengthening of positions in the Southern and Southern Border Regions. However, if Russia is making a strategic move, it could have an impact on militias in Tripoli where external actors are looking to influence some armed groups against those that support the ongoing Turkish military presence.*

*Overall, despite growing reports of a withdrawal, recorded data is inconclusive, and unconvincing of an overall withdrawal process taking place. This is especially the case when considering the extent of external force and equipment deployment in Libya.*

***While the withdrawal of external forces remains a complicated process, with seemingly conflicting preferred approaches towards this critical issue between domestic and external actors, it remains a key provision and a deterrent to the successful holding of “free and fair” national elections while tied to conflict resolution efforts.***

*In recent sequence of events:*

- Media sources allege that IGNU Foreign Minister, Najla Mangoush announces that the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) will reveal a plan for the withdrawal of external forces. The announcement is said to have come during a September 23 virtual roundtable on the “pursuit of sustainable peace” in Libya organised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)*
- On 28 Sept, the United States (US) House of Representatives passed the Libya Stabilisation Act by 386-35 votes in favour. The Bill would allow the President to “sanction those who deploy mercenaries, support militias, violate the UN arms embargo and commit human rights abuses” (US Representative of Florida (Democrat), and Sponsor of the Bill, Ted Deutch). IGNU Prime Minister Dbeibah expresses support for the Libya Stabilisation Act, stating that “US Congress showed its support for stability in Libya”, and that “the Bill lays the groundwork for sanctions against bad actors, and establishes that Libya's stability is a US national interest”.*
- Meanwhile, Russian President, Vladimir Putin meet with Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Sochi, Russia today, stating that “in the international arena, we are cooperating quite successfully, I mean both Syria and our contacts to coordinate positions on Libya”.*
- On 29 Sept, the 5+5 JMC reportedly agreed to withdraw foreign forces and mercenaries by the end of Oct 2021, according to Russian news agency TASS<sup>5</sup> citing LNA officials on 29 Sep. JMC members agreed on the timeline during their latest meeting in Tripoli on 28 Sep attended by US Africa Command (AFRICOM). It remains to be seen how feasible the timeline is, though recent movements of Russian private military contractors (PMCs) in Al-Jufrah airbase would corroborate the reports. Still, a full withdrawal of mercenaries is unlikely as both Russia and Turkey view their foothold in Libya as a strategic pillar of their presence across the entire African continent.*

<sup>4</sup> Social media reference: <https://www.theafricareport.com/127421/mali-russia-bamako-to-sign-contract-with-wagner-group/>

<sup>5</sup> Social media source: <https://tass.com/defense/1343887>



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*Therefore, a 5+5 JMC plan to withdrawal external forces is likely to face hurdles as competing actors seek to influence the process. The successful withdrawal is likely to be tied to external actors gaining concessions which are favourable to their strategic and geopolitical ambitions.*

#### **2.4. ISIS has claimed an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack against an LNA in Sabha, Fezzan**

In a posted claim, ISIS has claimed an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack against Checkpoint 17, a Libyan National Army (LNA) manned position south of Sabha. According to the claim, the attack caused material damage but no casualties. No LNA official statement was released with further details or acknowledgement. The checkpoint controls the road south out of the city, which leads to Murzuq and Obari.

##### **SDCD COMMENT**

*This is the fourth attack conducted by ISIS since June and strongly suggests they might have moved back into an operational phase. The attacks have targeted the LNA with a Suicide Vehicle Borne IED (SVBIED) on 06 June approx. 20km north of Sabha, an IED against a patrol on 14 June in the Harouj Mountains, another SVBIED (assessed as failed) against an LNA checkpoint in Zillah on 22 Aug, and the IED on 27 Sept south of Sabha.*

*Although ISIS has previously released a set of photos/videos showing the 06 June attack as they sought to increase their visibility, they lacked more details on the last claimed attack. In addition, security forces (mainly the LNA) have conducted several operations, including airstrikes and arrests against the group. As previously shown, this last incident would likely trigger a series of search security operations in the area of Sabha.*

*Whether these attacks or attempts are related to a global campaign is still to be ascertained; however, given the very rapid and detailed claim of the SVBIED on 06 June, it can be assessed that the Islamic State Central leadership valued the attack, intending it to carry significance and relevance of their presence in Libya.*

*To be noted that the non-Kinetic approach seen before July 2021 has prevented substantial counter-terrorism pressure from being brought to bear against ISIS operatives in Libya itself while using their access to tribal and smuggling networks in the porous South to assist their group. Moreover, though most attacks have been low-impact, the rise in frequency in the past three months suggests that the group is increasing its operations and will likely conduct more in the short to medium term.*

#### **2.5. Tunisia security update - Protests continue in Tunisia**

On 26 Sept, a large gathering of civilians rallied on Tunis' Avenue Habib Bourguiba in a mass demonstration organized by political parties and civil society groups were held in Tunis against the points in President Saied's speeches whereas counter-protests later held to display support for President Saied. The protesters called for the retraction of Saied's declaration on 22 Sept, when he announced that the extraordinary measures he put in place on 25 July would continue indefinitely. Despite the scale of Sunday's protests, regular polls suggest that Saied enjoys the vast support of the majority of the population, although this has declined slightly since he announced to rule by decree.

Further reports in social media stated that several journalists covering the protests were assaulted and verbally attacked by anti-Saied demonstrators, who accused the reporters of "working for foreign parties" and calling them the "media of shame".

The last protest follows a small rally on 18 Sept, anti and pro-Saied demonstrations in the same part of Tunis. Although no violence between protest groups was recorded on both occasions, the repeated incidents show the increasing polarization of the Tunisian public's opinion over the controversial measures. It also shows the political opportunism of parties seeking to capitalize on growing opposition to Saied and galvanize support for a return to parliamentary politics

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In a positive development, President Kais Saied's named Najla Bouden Romdhane as the country's new prime minister on 29 Sept. Romdhane, who will be the country's first female prime minister, has been tasked with forming a new government as soon as possible.

### **SDCD COMMENT**

*Looking ahead on a short term:*

- 1) Despite the political volatility and unpredictability, the security situation in Tunisia remains stable, and it is expected for this status quo to be maintained in the coming weeks.*
- 2) The initial support of the military and security leadership given to the President's decisions on 25 July is still maintained. It has been reinforced in the last two months by nominating new figures like heads of MoI, internal intelligence strategic departments and last with the new prime minister's nomination. Currently, the risk of the country's security apparatus shifting its support away from the President's 'roadmap' is assessed as being low.*

*Authorities will almost certainly maintain a heightened security posture over the coming days and weeks. Security personnel could deploy to additional locations as new demonstrations materialize. Protests may impact major road routes, including access points to ports of entry and exit. Transport and business disruptions are probable near any future demonstrations.*

*If Saied maintains the status quo or cannot improve Tunisia's economic conditions, protests will continue in short to medium term as tensions increase amongst political factions. On the other hand, if Saied can improve the financial situation, he will likely retain the majority of support from the public, who increasingly feel as though the democratic experiment they embarked on a decade ago has not borne fruit. As such, many Tunisians would be willing to forgo democratic institutions for better opportunities and incomes.*

## **3. Situational Awareness for EUBAM-Libya**

### **3.1. Armed conflict**

#### **Libya-Tripoli**

- **The armed conflict remains underlying concern to the political developments focused on expected 24 December elections.**
- **Inter-militias' clashes:** *Likelihood of skirmishes and Small Arms Fire (SAF) in Tripoli, the western coastal area (main cities) and southern area (Tripoli's belt) remain high with tendency to increase further considering the continuous hostilities between militias coalitions. The security situation can be described as highly volatile with continuous inter-militia's tensions and coalitions in the capital Tripoli greater area and on the western flank of Tripoli, particularly on the Al Ajaylat, Az Aziziyah, Wershiffana. In a scenario of heavy clashes in Tripoli and on the western coastal areas, obstructions of movement are likely to affect traffic towards the Mitiga Int. Airport and the western coastal highway, including an expansion closer to Tripoli western neighbourhoods including Janzour (location of the EUBAM Libya HQ offices) with potential impact Mission's operational freedom of movement and relocation/evacuation capabilities.*
- *Tripoli's areas under particular focus include contact lines between opposing alliances across the Southern Tripoli belt – Abu Salim, Alhadba, Salah Al-Deen, Ain Zara, as well as in Central Tripoli – border areas between Bab Ben Ghashir, Ben Ashour, and Dahra.*
- *On the southern front border, fighting between the LNA and FACT appears to have calmed after the LNA attack on September 14, however, further attacks/confrontations remain possible with the LNA reportedly carrying out combing operations.*

#### **Tunisia-Tunis**

The main threat categories for the capital are **terrorism, criminality, and hazards** (especially road traffic accidents). Threats related to armed conflict are assessed as **non-existent**.

### 3.2. Terrorism

#### Libya-Tripoli

Ahead of elections, the terrorism threat can be perceived as high across all major urban centres, despite the fact both Daesh and AQIM have been degraded in Libya. The latest IGNU-LNA Joint Force engagement in several counterterrorism raids is likely to trigger tit-for-tat drive-by shootings and other targeted attacks against IGNU and LNA positions.

***SDCD Comment:*** *Radicalized individuals and informal cells in western and eastern regions could pose a threat with limited capabilities for medium lethality incidents in the Libyan capital. In southern Libya, it is evident the group retains the personnel and facilities to be able to produce the explosives and, given the recent attacks (06/06, 14/06, 22/08 and 27/09), it raises the awareness on their lethality and potential intent to continue their attacks. The active semi-structured and small terrorist-cells could be operating in Southern Libya (Fezzan Region) and some active elements in the western coastal area near Sabratha (Tripolitania Region).*

#### Tunisia-Tunis

- The Security Services in Tunisia continue with the counter-terrorist operations to tackle the terrorist threat.
- Radicalized individuals and informal cells could pose a threat with limited capabilities for low-medium lethality incidents in the Tunisian capital.
- ***Special attention in displacement towards/throughout:***
  - ***Southern area:*** Southern desert area formed by Bir Rijm Maatoug - Borj Bourguiba - Ben Guardane, due to terrorist threat at Libyan border with terrorist infiltrations.
  - ***Saharan area bordering with Libya and Algeria:*** terrorist skirmishes against security forces. Military exclusion area created since 2013.
  - ***Western Central and Northern West region of Tunisia:*** relevant and continuous counter-terrorist activities against jihadist elements in the mountain areas of Kasserine, Siliana, Kairouan et du Kef.

### 3.3. Criminality

#### Libya-Tripoli

- High levels of criminality continue to be reported with acts of **looting, carjacking, conflicts over private property, assassinations, and kidnappings for ransom.**
- Criminal incidents have been reported in numerous areas of Tripoli suburbs with **special attention to the southern belt surrounding the capital and main roads/venues.**

***SDCD Comment:*** *The security environment was marked by continued acts of violent crimes (murders, targeted killings, kidnapping, carjacking, thefts), random/unaccounted and celebratory shooting incidents resulting in collateral victims through stray bullets incidents. Meanwhile law enforcement efforts conducting arrests and security operations against organised crime gangs continued.*

#### Tunisia-Tunis

- The Tunisian security forces maintain their **operations to tackle organised criminality.**
- ***Burglary, car break-in, petty theft, financial scams, blackmail, homicides.*** Most dangerous scenario, the violent assault targeting EUBAM assets and personnel.

### 3.4. Civil unrest

#### Libya-Tripoli

- Civil unrest, during the assessed period, caused by the deteriorated political context, increases the risk of destabilization actions at the institutional and security levels, notably through demonstrations of force affiliated to



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political parties or personalities. Social and financial grievances continue to trigger protests demanding better conditions.

- Increasing civil unrest tied to political instability, including demonstrations against the HoR. Speculation exists around domestic and foreign actor involvement in encouraging protests, with alleged aim of obstructing the timely holding of planned December 24, 2021 national elections
- Ad-hoc demonstrations and potential violent encounters with security forces have the potential to create temporary movement restrictions, thus impacting a mission operational moves in the city.

**Tunisia-Tunis**

- In light of the recent extension of the presidential executive powers, the opposition calls for protests in the near to medium future cannot be ruled out. While, President Saied has taken several steps in reappointments to certain positions as he seems to prioritize fighting the COVID-19 crisis and improving the government’s fiscal situation, further civil unrest remains linked to the level of popularity and support that he draws so far from a majority of Tunisians.
- Civil unrest remains sensitive to the future political and social developments.

**4. COVID-19 Update<sup>6</sup>**

Country	Cases in the last 7 days	Cases in the preceding 7 days	Weekly Case % Change	Cases in the last 7 days/1M pop	Deaths in the last 7 days	Deaths in the preceding 7 day	Weekly Death % Change	Overall Covid cases
Libya	5,220	6,246	-16%	747	76	91	-16%	339,269
Tunisia	3,811	6,224	-39%	318	188	212	-11%	706,314

<sup>6</sup> Data from WorldOMeter. Source: <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/> [online]. Last updated:30/09/2021 15:00GMT



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**LIST OF ACRONYMS / ABBREVIATIONS**

AQ - Al-Qaeda  
AQIM - Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb  
BCP – Border Crossing Point  
BDB – Benghazi Defense Brigade / Saraya Defend Benghazi (SDB) (Al Qaeda-aligned – AAS and RSCB associated/umbrella group)  
CBL – Central Bank of Libya  
CNI – Critical National Infrastructure  
DACOCT - Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism  
DDR - Disarmament, demobilising and reintegration  
DPF – Derna Protection Force (an amalgamation of all militias in Derna, including the MSCD)  
GECOL – General Electricity Company of Libya  
GNA – Government of National Accord (UN-backed)  
GNC – General National Congress  
IGNU – Interim Government of National Unity (2021)  
GTUC - Greater Tripoli Union Council (Tripoli militias and others, established in June 2020)  
HCS - High Council of State  
HNEC – High National Elections Commission  
HoR – House of Representatives (Tobruk-based)  
IDF – Indirect Fire (mortars/rockets)  
IDP - Internally Displaced Persons  
IED - Improvised Explosive Device  
IOC - International Oil Company  
IS/DAESH - Islamic State  
LNA – Libyan National Army  
LNG – Libyan National Guard  
LPA – Libyan Political Agreement (2015)  
LPDF - Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (2020)  
LROR - Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room  
MoD - Ministry of Defense  
MoF - Ministry of Finance  
MoFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
MoHE - Ministry of Higher Education  
MoI - Ministry of Interior  
MoJ - Ministry of Justice  
MoO - Ministry of Oil  
MoT - Ministry of Transportation  
MSCD – Mujahideen Shura Council of Derna (AQ aligned)  
NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation (aid/charity)  
NOC – National Oil Company  
NSG – National Salvation Government (GNC)  
PC – Presidency Council (IGNU)  
PFG- Petroleum Facilities Guard  
RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade  
RSCB - Revolutionary Shura Council of Benghazi  
RTA - Road Traffic Accident  
SAF - Small Arms Fire  
SDF – Rada Deterrence Force/ Special Deterrence Force/ Rada  
SSA - Stability Support Agency  
**Technical** - An improvised weapon-mounted pick-up truck  
TPF – Tripoli Protection Force (TRB, Nawasi 8 Force, Bab Tajoura Brigade and Ghneiwa umbrella group, established in December 2018)  
UNSMIL – United Nations Support Mission in Libya  
UXO - Unexploded Ordnance

*Disclaimer: This report is based in security incidents reports from multiple sources, including international partners and open sources, whose accuracy may not always be fully verified. It cannot be assumed that all security incidents in Libya and Tunisia were reported to and/or tracked by EUBAM Libya. The Security and Duty of Care Department (SDCD) emails a daily security update (DSR) which includes a full description of the incidents that serve as the basis for this report.*