



## Security & Covid-19: WEEKLY SECURITY REPORT

Country: Libya & Tunisia


Period: 10/09/2021 – 16/09/2021

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### SECURITY SITUATION OVERVIEW

#### 1. Key developments

- Unmitigated Stabilisation Support Agency (SSA) - 444th Fighting Brigade inter militia tensions in Tripoli.
- Armed clashes in Fezzan between Libyan National Army (LNA) Tariq Ibn Ziyad and Fighters of the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT).
- Continuous calls for systematic withdrawal of mercenaries from Libya
- The speaker of House of Representatives (HoR), declared that the Presidential electoral Law passed from the HoR
- House of Representatives (HoR) interviews the GNU Prime Minister on 08/09/2021; GNU challenged with calls for no-confidence vote amid ongoing debates on 24/12/2021 elections, government budget and allegations for illegal spending.
- Libya/Tunisia travel disruptions
- Tunisia security update



Source: Libya Heat Map \_ Intelyse 10/09/2021 – 16/09/2021

#### 2. Findings

##### 2.1. Unmitigated Stabilisation Support Agency (SSA) - 444th Fighting Brigade inter militia tensions in Tripoli.

Against a backdrop of inter-militia clashes and fluid alliances over the past month, is expected in the next few weeks the Ghneiwa-dominant Stabilisation Support Agency (SSA) to consolidate to counter Misrata's influence across the capital. Skirmishes between the 444 Fighting Brigade (444 BDE) and SSA units remain likely across Tripoli, drawing a picture of unmitigated tensions.



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Reportedly, of the Presidential Consul (GNU PC) Military Committee have completed the investigation report into the 03/09/2021 armed attack and resulting clashes in the Takbali Military Camp (444 BDE Headquarters) and in Salah Al-Din area, between SSA, and 444 BDE allies. As a consequence of Tripoli Military Region Commander, Major General Abulbasit Marwan taking responsibility for the armed attack commentators claim that findings will hold Tripoli Military Region leadership accountable for the “armed attack”.

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), keeps calling for cessation of hostilities, appealing to the involved parties to ensure the protection of all civilians and public and private. In the aftermath of the attack, SSA conducted several arrest operations against 444 BDE affiliated personnel triggering accusations against the Tripoli Military Region commander General Marwan of conspiring with TRB commander Haytham Al-Tajouri and the Ghneiwa-dominant SSA to topple the 444 BDE. Late have been concluded from reports that allegedly, on 16/09/2021, units belonging to the 777th Brigade, affiliated with Haythem Tajouri, have mobilized their forces. Hostilities between SSA and Al-Far militias In Al-Zawiya remained and several armed confrontations have been reported.

Sequence of events:

- 16/09/2021 –SSA units are conduct arrests against members of the 444 BDE in Salah Al-Din.
- 11/09/2021 – 444 BDE reported to the GNU Military Prosecutor accusing SSA of abduction of 11 of 444 BDE members from their houses in Tripoli’s Abu Salim area, following SSA raid on the Brigade’s Al-Tekbali Camp HQ on 03/09/2021 and abduction of three civilians whose relatives are affiliated with the brigade.
- 10/09/2021 – Clashes erupted between the SSA and Al-Far militia in the follow up of the killing of 3 SSA member on 09/09/2021.
- 09/09/2021 - Al-Far militia (Al-Zawiya’s Criminal Investigation Department) shot dead three SSA affiliates in a house raid in Al-Zawiya’s Al-Qardabiya area.
- 08/09/2021 - the 444 BDE raided the Ministry of Health HQ secured by the Stabilisation Support Agency (SSA). 444 BDE disarmed and released of SSA personnel detained during the raid and handed over the HQ to the Ministry of Interior (MoI) Tripoli Security Directorate.

**SDCD COMM:** *The incident is the second involvement of SSA into major clash in Tripoli after the confrontation with Nawasi military convoy at the Administrative Control Authority (ACA) HQ, which was identified as indicator that inter-militia relations in Tripoli may be going towards a phase of acute confrontation. Parallely to the late a protracted tension exists between SSA and Al-Far affiliated militias in the areas of Zawiya, Sabratha, Zuwara and al Ajaylat. The SSA offensive against 444 BDE and the following hostilities are a consecutive sign of growing controversy and animosity within the western region over GNU PC promoted military reforms.*

*The SSA offensive on 444 BDE will likely affect negatively the SSA, which continues to be relatively wayward, affirming the likelihood of similar attacks targeting bases/camps across the western region, in the next few weeks, as is expected the GNU to engage in military reforms. There is presumed likelihood of further combat engagement and skirmishes due to Misrata’s Counterterrorism Force deployment across Yarmouk camp. It is reasonable to assume that the 444 BDE units will mobilise to strengthen their posture in Tripoli.*

*444th BDE Commander, Mahmoud Hamza responded to the allegations by accusing General Marwan of treason and non-compliance with military laws. As such, the results of the IPC Military Committee report may serve, or be interpreted, more as a positioning towards either the 444 BDE or the SSA, rather than as an objective investigation of the armed attack itself. Given the sensitivities surrounding military/ security actor and armed group competition, results of the IPC Military Committee report, including potential issuance of accountability, could reignite hostilities in the Tripoli area.*

*The confrontations between the SSA and Al-Far militias In Al-Zawiya are likely to continue with tit-for-tat drive-by shootings and other targeted attacks. END COMM*

## 2.2. Armed clashes in Fezzan

The LNA carried out a military operation targeting alleged foreign mercenaries and Libya-based Chadian rebel factions e.g. Fighters of the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), in Tarbu located in the Murzuq district.



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Heavy clashes erupted between the LNA Tariq Ibn Ziyad Brigade's Special Task Force and FACT, which resulted in the death of a Tariq Ibn Ziyad member and two deaths among FACT affiliated personnel. LNA claimed the destruction of several FACT armoured vehicles in retaliation for the killing of one of its members and Derna resident, Arif Al-Hassi.

In addition, the LNA's Air Force conducted a series of airstrikes targeting FACT positions in Tarbu, which were followed by desert patrols to rummage the area. Reinforcements from the LNA's Sabha Military Region arrived at the Libyan-Chadian border area to participate in the military operation, according to reports.

Sequence of events:

- 14/09/2021 – early morning hours, the operating on the side of the Chadian Government Sudanese armed group Toroboros, attacked a forward base of Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), located north of Aouzou on Libyan territory (Libya/ Chad border region). FACT claimed to have forestall the attack, resulting in armed clashes and numerous casualties.
- 14/09/2021 - afternoon, LNA Tariq Bin Ziyad forces and the LNA Air Force intervene, leading to continued armed clashes.
- 14/09/2021 – afternoon, LNA Moral Guidance Department Director, Brigadier General Khaled Mahjoub confirms a military operation carried out by the LNA Southern Operations Force, supported by various LNA units and the LNA Air Force, eliminating dozens of mercenaries who practice criminal activities on Libyan territory, and forcing remaining opposition forces to withdraw.

**SDCD COMM:** *This development illustrates the vulnerability of Libyan South to unresolved conflicts in neighbouring countries and in the region, which impacts the security environment in Fezzan north of Libya – Chad border. The August 30-31 Ministerial Meeting in Algiers, Algeria, which took place in the presence of the IGNU, and Chad, addressed border protection and security, as well as external force presence on Libyan territory, and activated the quadripartite agreement between Libya and neighbouring countries to secure common borders. However, the fragmented status of Libyan military and security actors, who allegedly use foreign mercenaries, increases the security concerns regarding establishing control over Libya southern border regions. Related incidents of same kind are likely in the coming period.*

*It is expected the LNA to continue its strategic extension in South-Western Region, as well as counterterrorism operations in the area. The LNA's presence in the South-Western and Southern Region is also likely to follow political agenda at demonstrating willingness and ability to address cross-border security threats, including, but not limited to fight foreign para-military groups, terrorist presence and activities related to human trafficking and smuggling of goods, building an image of LNA in the eyes of key international and regional actors of indispensability, improving the LNA's chances of gaining support for taking an integral if not leadership role in the announced unification and reform of armed and security forces.*

*Nevertheless, the incident has the potential to backfire and undermine the LNA's posture in the south at a critical time ahead of elections. Some reports indicate the LNA suffered heavy losses in the initial engagement. It is of reasonable concern that the LNA could be stretched too thin considering the penetrable borders and difficult terrain. The asymmetric nature of combat operations in the area is evident by the fact that the Tarik Ibn Ziyad unit, a relatively well-trained unit led by Haftar's son, failed to neutralise the FACT forces.*

*The FACT claims that LNA units were supported by French special forces were rejected by observers asserting the LNA forces heavy losses in the initial engagement. Allegedly, LNA units were supported by Sudan-based mercenaries. According to commentators, the LNA losses in the clashes are at least eight Sudanese mercenaries and two Libyans. Reportedly some Chadian members of the now-dissolved 116 Battalion based in Sabha mobilised in support of FACT. Unconfirmed reports allege a military convoy affiliated with Misrata's 166 Battalion arrived in the village of Tmassah in support of Tariq Ibn Ziyad Brigade in the evening on 14/09/2021. While the reports are unconfirmed, the 166 Battalion's mobilisation could be considered an assumption following the recent joint force comprising the two battalions tasked with securing the Great Man-Made River (GMMR). Considering that joint offensive operations do not fall under the mandate of the GMMR joint force, possible 166 significant level of coordination with LNA units is unlikely.*



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*Looking back to recent past, Chadian opposition forces became active in Libya's Fezzan region filling the power vacuum after the 2011 uprising against the Gaddafi regime, asserting control of lucrative smuggling routes. Since then, numerous reports alleged various Chadian factions carrying out attacks on southern residents, including kidnappings on ransom, human trafficking, smuggling of migrants and theft. on 11/04/2021 at the day of general elections in Chad, groups aligned with FACT staged an incursion into Chad's Tibesti region via Libya's south, to protest another mandate by President Idriss Deby, killed in the course of the attack. During the 11/04/2021 developments LNA units deployed along the Libyan-Chadian border area have been on high alert to prevent the entry and exit of Chadian armed personnel. On the other side, the LNA has a history of utilising the lack of law enforcement in Libya's south to reinforce its military position. In periods such as planned elections, LNA command is likely increasing efforts to boost its reputation of Libya's security guarantor most recent example of it being the still ongoing military operation which started in June 2021, targeting suspected terrorists affiliated to Daesh and Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb and mercenaries in southwest Libya, as a follow up to SVBIED attacks against Sabha CID check-point. Operation is considered ongoing with LNA conducting frequent raids and arrests in Libya's South. **END COMM***

### **2.3. Continuous calls for systematic withdrawal of mercenaries from Libya<sup>1</sup>.**

The international community, the Libya neighbours Algeria and Tunisia in particular and Libyan Officials expressed their positions that the withdrawal of foreign fighters is crucial to ensure fair elections, free from outside influence so that Libya will regain its independence and sovereignty, stressing that the process must be carried out under the strict supervision of the Libyan state, in a structured manner to mitigate potential negative effect on the stability of neighbouring countries.

Turkey has defended the military presence in Libya, legitimising it with the agreement with Libya was made at the request of the former Government of National Accord (GNA), stressing that Turkey intends to continue in its training and advisory role, according to the MoU.

Russia declared support for total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Libya, describing the foreign forces continued presence in the country to undermine the efforts of the 5+5 Joint Military Committee for the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement.

### **2.4. The speaker of House of Representatives (HoR), declared that the Presidential electoral Law passed from the HoR.<sup>2</sup>**

On 09/09/2021, the speaker of House of Representatives (HoR) Aqila Saleh, declared that the Presidential electoral Law passed from the HoR. The HoR forwarded the law to the High National Elections Commission (HNEC) for implementation and draft an electoral calendar. Embassies of France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US issued a joint statement in support the UN Envoy's recent call for elections to be held on schedule. The statement was read by many observers as a tacit endorsement of Saleh's electoral law. Expectations are the UN Support Mission in Libya's (UNSMIL) court to give greater legitimacy to the process and ensure the HCS accepts the HoR's electoral law as the legal basis for elections. In the absence of an alternative roadmap for moving forward, UN Special Envoy Jan Kubis hinted at the fact that imperfect elections may be better than no elections, addressing the UN Security Council on 10 Sep. Meanwhile, the law has already been rejected by the High Council of State (HCS) - Libya's senate equivalent, on the basis it was passed unilaterally and in violation of the constitutional declaration, its amendments,

<sup>1</sup> Media reference: <https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/lamamra-calls-systematic-withdrawal-mercenaries-libya-says-tripoli-red-line>  
<https://www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/cavusoglu-presence-turkish-military-libya-completely-legitimate-and-according-official-mou>  
<https://www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/al-sunni-complete-exit-mercenaries-must-be-achieved-under-official-supervision-libyan-state>  
<https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/moscow-continuing-presence-mercenaries-undermines-ceasefire-agreement>

<sup>2</sup> Media reference: <https://almarsad.co/en/2021/09/09/document-full-english-translation-of-the-election-law-for-the-head-of-state-issued-by-the-libyan-parliament/>  
[https://liainstitute.com/PDFs/HoR\\_Law\\_No\\_1\\_2021.pdf](https://liainstitute.com/PDFs/HoR_Law_No_1_2021.pdf)  
<https://almarsad.co/en/2021/09/09/libyan-political-parties-and-movements-welcome-issuance-of-the-election-law-for-the-head-of-state/>  
<https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/kubis-stalemate-libya-affects-security-situation>  
<https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/22-hor-members-refuse-draft-law-election-future-president>



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political agreement and internal regulations of the HoR. The Head of the Libyan High Council of State (HCS) said in a session for the HCS on Sunday that the House of Representatives (HoR) is obligated by the Libyan Political Agreement to consult with the HCS in preparing the elections law, which it said must be approved with consensus. The second deputy head of the HCS, Omar Bushah, said a unilateral method to shape the upcoming political process in Libya via this elections law increases animosity, asserting that the feasible way out for Libya to remain stable and stop military conflicts is to expand consensus on enacting elections laws and the constitutional basis. The National Commission of the Tripolitania Region has also announced its total rejection of the unilateral issuance of a law to elect the Libyan Head of State by the Speaker of the House of Representatives (HoR), Aqailah Saleh, describing his act as fraud and violation of the provisions of the constitutional declaration. The member of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) Abdelrazzak Al-Erradi, resigned in protest of attempts to pass the presidential elections law that was approved by the Speaker of the House of Representatives Aqila Saleh stating that not committing to the UN-brokered political agreement will take Libya back to political division.

Sequence of events:

- 09/09/2021 - Libya's eastern-based parliament speaker on Thursday signed a law allowing a presidential election to take place in December, though another body of state rejected the move, saying the legislation was flawed.
- 12/09/2021 - The HoR forwarded the law to the High National Elections Commission (HNEC) for implementation.
- 12/09/2021 - Embassies of France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US issued a joint statement calling for elections to be held on schedule.

**SDCD COMM** *The Presidential election law is largely considered a major milestone towards the elections scheduled for 24/12/2021. Even though the UN Special Envoy for Libya and some foreign actors praised this long-awaited development, it was met with excruciating criticism following no known quorum and dragged-out negotiations regarding the presidential law, it is declared by Saleh that the law is passed. The procedure the election laws to be discussed with the consultation body - High Council of State (HCS) was not respected as well. The text of the presidential election law declared by Agila Saleh is arguably comprehensive and the foreseen candidacy rules or the responsibilities of the president are reasonable. The law will initiate disputes contesting the legitimacy of the elections and mandate of an elected President, a scenario that should have been prevented, because discussions around the legitimacy of the election processes was the main reason for the failure of the previous peace processes and the formation of parallel government. It cannot be excluded that HoR Speaker follows his own agenda initiating a legitimacy problem on purpose, led by the same motives, other internal actors or Libyan elites —who do not want to lose their current privileged position to an elected administration.*

*The HCS has more than once rejected the unilateral work of the HoR in enacting the elections law, reiterating the need for keeping the Libyan Political Agreement as the legal framework for any legislations for elections. The general expectation is the situation to escalate and it is likely to trigger political protests across Libya. END COMM*

**2.5. House of Representatives (HoR) interviews the GNU Prime Minister on 08/09/2021; GNU challenged with calls for no-confidence vote amid ongoing debates on 24/12/2021 elections, government budgeted and allegations for illegal spending.**

On 08/09/2021 the GNU PM responded to the invitation of the House of Representatives (HoR) when the HoR convened for a questioning session. On 13/09/2021 the HoR reviewed the questions and answers session recently held with Prime Minister Dbeibah, however despite the several calls from the MP from the East, vote of no confidence was not undertaken. Summarising the proceedings, the HoR spokesman, Abdullah Blehaq, that were undertaken during the session, announcing that the 45 members call for a vote of no confidence in the GNU is still under consideration.

**SDCD COMM:** *The HoR, and in particular Speaker Saleh, have ostensibly avoided the motions for vote of no confidence in the GNU, which have been raised several times, but being discussed only as a proposal and not as an*



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*intention. A successful vote of no confidence is likely to be damaging to the HoR on several reasons. First it will put the blame on HoR for the entangled current political process, raising allegations that the vote was conducted out of imprudent reasons. It is likely is that the vote to be ignored by the GNU who would continue in their role under the premise that they were working towards an election while the HoR would be framed as openly attempting to derail the vote. **END COMM***

## 2.6. *Libya/Tunisia travel disruptions*

The Director of the International Health Office at the Libyan-Tunisian Ras Ajdir border crossing point (BCP), Mukhtar Al-Mansouri, confirmed that the BCP will remain closed in both directions and that no orders have been issued to resume traffic as of 12/09/2021. Al-Mansouri stated that Libyan and Tunisian authorities are expected to meet to agree on a joint health protocol in order to reopen borders.

Meanwhile, on its official Facebook page, Tripoli's Mitiga International Airport (MJI) issued a follow-up to confusion caused over its previous post with regards to Libyan passengers travelling to Tunisia on 12/09/2021. MJI's administration stated that it received complaints of Libyan passengers being denied entry into Tunisia despite having all the required documents, noting that this issue emerged after Libyan authorities closed their borders with Tunisia in light of a worsening epidemiological situation in Tunisia.

On 13/09/2021 The Tunisian Ambassador to Libya, denied that his country imposed a ban on Libyan passport holders entering Tunisia, noting that the latest measures against Libyan travellers are not politically-motivated but due to health concerns as a result of the COVID-19 epidemiological situation in Libya. Al-Ajili stated that communication between the Libyan and Tunisian Foreign Ministers is ongoing with regards to reopening the borders, noting progress in this regard.

***SDCD COMM:*** *Libyan travellers are advised to avoid travelling to Tunisia during this period until the the country's two COVID-19 scientific committees meet on 14/09/2021 to assess the epidemiological situation and prepare a joint health protocol reach a solution in this regard. **END COMM***

## 2.7. *Tunisia security update*

On 13/09/2021, Tunisian Security Forces arrested two individuals reportedly belonged to the Hizb ut-Tahrir group<sup>3</sup>, in the Ksour El-Saf and El-Sawasi districts of Mahdia on accusations of inciting rebellion for distributing leaflets that called on civilians to support the implementation of Sharia rule.

Also, on 13/09/2021 a nonrelated video on social media purportedly showed military vehicles parading in the Boumhel district of Ben Arous. No consequent reports of arrests nor casualties were issued afterward's. Tunisian authorities assured that the movements were a routine military exercise with the National Guards.

***SDCD COMM:*** *While deadly terrorist attacks in Tunisia have been rare over recent years, the current political instability may encourage ISIS-linked Jund Al Khilafah and Uqba Ibn Nafi Brigades to stage symbolic attacks against security installations, specifically in the eastern governorates. Anti-terrorism campaigns are likely to continue and possibly increase in the coming weeks. Heightened security operations may likewise prompt sleeper cells that remain active in the country to attempt to ramp up capabilities in anticipation of upcoming operations. Boumhel borders the Jebel Bokornine, which is used as a hideout by terrorist elements. **END COMM***

## 3. Situational Awareness for EUBAM-Libya

### 3.1. *Armed conflict*

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<sup>3</sup> Hizb ut-Tahrir group is a fundamentalist political organization whose aim is to establish a transnational Islamic caliphate.



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**Libya-Tripoli**

▪ The armed conflict *remains underlying concern to the political developments focused on expected 24 December elections.*

▪ **Inter-militias' clashes:** *Likelihood of skirmishes and Small Arms Fire (SAF) in Tripoli and the western coastal area (main cities) and southern area (Tripoli's belt) remains high with tendency to increase further considering the continuous hostilities between SSA and 444 BDE. The security situation can be described as highly volatile with continuous inter-militia's tensions and coalitions in the capital Tripoli greater area and on the western flank of Tripoli, particularly on the Al Ajaylat, Az Aziziyah, Wershiffana. In a scenario of heavy clashes in Tripoli and on the western coastal areas, obstructions of movement are likely to affect traffic towards the Mitiga Int. Airport and the western coastal highway, including an expansion closer to Tripoli western neighbourhoods including Janzour (location of the EUBAM Libya HQ offices) with potential impact Mission's operational freedom of movement and relocation/evacuation capabilities.*

**Tunisia-Tunis**

The main threat categories for the capital are **terrorism, criminality, and hazards** (especially road traffic accidents). Threats related to armed conflict are assessed as **non-existent**.

**3.2. Terrorism**

**Libya-Tripoli**

The New York Times reports claims that the USA is upgrading its presence in the African desert, by expanding an alleged CIA secret base deep in the African desert, to monitor Islamist extremist groups, including Al-Qaida and Daesh (ISIS), thought to be operating from Libya.

The newspaper report indicates that the US had established partnerships with local partners in Libya, asserting that the US forces participated in the operations, either directly or through proxies in 12 countries, including Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan.

According to the newspaper, the US has the legal authority to conduct special operations in four countries, including Libya, and has carried out airstrikes in Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen.

**SDCD COMM:** *Radicalized individuals and informal cells in western and eastern regions could pose a threat with limited capabilities for medium lethality incidents in the Libyan capital. In southern Libya, it is evident the group retains the personnel and facilities to be able to produce the explosives and, given the recent attacks (06/06, 14/06 and 22/08), it raises the awareness on their lethality and potential intent to continue their attacks. The active semi-structured and small terrorist-cells could be operating in Southern Libya (Fezzan Region) and some active elements in the western coastal area near Sabratha (Tripolitania Region). END COMM*

**Tunisia-Tunis**

- The Security Services in Tunisia continue with the counter-terrorist operations to tackle the terrorist threat.
- Radicalized individuals and informal cells could pose a threat with limited capabilities for low-medium lethality incidents in the Tunisian capital.
- **Special attention in displacement towards/throughout:**
  - **Southern area:** Southern desert area formed by Bir Rijm Maatoug - Borj Bourguiba - Ben Guardane, due to terrorist threat at Libyan border with terrorist infiltrations.
  - **Saharan area bordering with Libya and Algeria:** terrorist skirmishes against security forces. Military exclusion area created since 2013.
  - **Western Central and Northern West region of Tunisia:** relevant and continuous counter-terrorist activities against jihadist elements in the mountain areas of Kasserine, Siliana, Kairouan et du Kef.



### 3.3. Criminology

#### Libya-Tripoli

- High levels of criminality continue to be reported with acts of **looting, carjacking, conflicts over private property, assassinations, and kidnappings for ransom.**
- Criminal incidents have been reported in numerous areas of Tripoli suburbs with **special attention to the southern belt surrounding the capital and main roads/venues.**

***SDCD Comment:*** *The security environment was marked by continued acts of violent crimes (murders, targeted killings, kidnapping, carjacking, thefts), random/unaccounted and celebratory shooting incidents resulting in collateral victims through stray bullets incidents.*

#### Tunisia-Tunis

- The Tunisian security forces maintain their **operations to tackle organised criminality.**
- **Burglary, car break-in, petty theft, financial scams, blackmail, homicides.** Most dangerous scenario, the violent assault targeting EUBAM assets and personnel.

### 3.4. Civil unrest

#### Libya-Tripoli

- Civil unrest, during the assessed period, has declined, most likely influenced by the COVID-19 extra-restrictive measures imposed by the Libyan authorities. Of note, on 01 August, the GNU Interior Minister, Khaled Mazen, called for strict measures against violators of the current preventive measures in place aimed at curbing the spread of COVID-19 across the country, with fines and/or prison sentences for unruly citizens.
- Ad-hoc demonstrations and potential violent encounters with security forces have the potential to create temporary movement restrictions, thus impacting a mission operational moves in the city.

#### Tunisia-Tunis

- There have been no further civil unrest/disturbances in the assessed period. It is yet unclear whether in the coming weeks, gatherings, both for and against President Saïd, could resume. Nevertheless, there is a potential opposition calls for protests in the near to medium future cannot be ruled out, particularly after the Presidential decree for extension the Parliament suspension. While, President Saïd has taken several steps in reappointments to certain positions as he seems to prioritize fighting the COVID-19 crisis and improving the government's fiscal situation, further civil unrest remains linked to the level of popularity and support that he draws so far from a majority of Tunisians.
- Civil unrest remains sensitive to the future political and social developments.

## 4. COVID-19 Update<sup>4</sup>

Country	Cases in the last 7 days	Cases in the preceding 7 days	Weekly Case % Change	Cases in the last 7 days/1M pop	Deaths in the last 7 days	Deaths in the preceding 7 day	Weekly Death % Change	Overall Covid cases
Libya	8,235	8,931	-8%	1,179	95	111	-14%	327,803
Tunisia	8,958	12,356	-28%	749	381	455	-16%	697,421

Libya's land and air borders with Tunisia remain closed. GNU PM instruction open land borders and resume air traffic with Tunisia effective 19/08/2021 have not been implemented on the Tunisian side, reopening being conditioned on the approval of Tunisian COVID-19 scientific committee (Ministry of Health).

<sup>4</sup> Data from WorldOMeter. Source: <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/> [online]. Last updated: 16/09/2021 12:30GMT





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**LIST OF ACRONYMS / ABBREVIATIONS**

AQ - Al-Qaeda  
AQIM - Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb  
BCP – Border Crossing Point  
BDB – Benghazi Defense Brigade / Saraya Defend Benghazi (SDB) (Al Qaeda-aligned – AAS and RSCB associated/umbrella group)  
CBL – Central Bank of Libya  
CNI – Critical National Infrastructure  
DACOCT - Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism  
DDR - Disarmament, demobilising and reintegration  
DPF – Derna Protection Force (an amalgamation of all militias in Derna, including the MSCD)  
GECOL – General Electricity Company of Libya  
GNA – Government of National Accord (UN-backed)  
GNC – General National Congress  
GNU – Government of National Unity (2021)  
GTUC - Greater Tripoli Union Council (Tripoli militias and others, established in June 2020)  
HNEC – High National Elections Commission  
HoR – House of Representatives (Tobruk-based)  
IDF – Indirect Fire (mortars/rockets)  
IDP - Internally Displaced Persons  
IED - Improvised Explosive Device  
IOC - International Oil Company  
IS/DAESH - Islamic State  
LNA – Libyan National Army  
LNG – Libyan National Guard  
LPA – Libyan Political Agreement (2015)  
LPDF - Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (2020)  
LROR - Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room  
MoD - Ministry of Defense  
MoF - Ministry of Finance  
MoFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
MoHE - Ministry of Higher Education  
MoI - Ministry of Interior  
MoJ - Ministry of Justice  
MoO - Ministry of Oil  
MoT - Ministry of Transportation  
MSCD – Mujahideen Shura Council of Derna (AQ aligned)  
NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation (aid/charity)  
NOC – National Oil Company  
NSG – National Salvation Government (GNC)  
PC – Presidency Council (GNU)  
PFG- Petroleum Facilities Guard  
RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade  
RSCB - Revolutionary Shura Council of Benghazi  
RTA - Road Traffic Accident  
SAF - Small Arms Fire  
SDF – Rada Deterrence Force/ Special Deterrence Force/ Rada  
SSA - Stability Support Agency  
**Technical** - An improvised weapon-mounted pick-up truck  
TPF – Tripoli Protection Force (TRB, Nawasi 8 Force, Bab Tajoura Brigade and Ghneiwa umbrella group, established in December 2018)  
UNSMIL – United Nations Support Mission in Libya  
UXO - Unexploded Ordnance

*Disclaimer: This report is based in security incidents reports from multiple sources, including international partners and open sources, whose accuracy may not always be fully verified. It cannot be assumed that all security incidents in Libya and Tunisia were reported to and/or tracked by EUBAM Libya. The Security and Duty of Care Department (SDCD) emails a daily security update (DSR) which includes a full description of the incidents that serve as the basis for this report.*