



Intelyse



LIBYA


Weekly Political Stability,
Economic And Security
Threat Assessment

6-12 MAY 2023



COUNTRYWIDE OVERVIEW

FIGURE 1: INCIDENT ACTIVITY IN LIBYA, 6-12 MAY 2023



KEY DEVELOPMENTS

- GNU PM Dbeiba, Khalifa Haftar and other key political players do not want to alienate their political backers and currently have limited options to improve the status quo based on their specific priorities.
- Multiple sources have reported large militia mobilizations happening in Zintan in the last week.
- The security environment in Fezzan remained unchanged over the past weeks.
- On 9 May, the Cyrenaica-based branch of the Libyan Intelligence Service (LIS) released an announcement regarding the operations of international and local governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

OUTLOOK

- There are no domestic or international factors indicating that the current countrywide political and military balance will be disrupted in the short term.
- The mobilizations are part of the efforts to consolidate separate armed groups and militias in Zintan, including the forces under Osama Juwaili. These efforts aim to favor a stabilization of Tripolitania via a consolidation of and de-escalation between local armed components.
- The situation in Fezzan will remain stable in the coming weeks. There are no signs of simmering tribal or political tensions. The arrival of Sudanese refugees or groups affiliated to the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces to population centers in the region might cause localized tensions.
- Initial reports from informed sources say that a potential crackdown would mainly focus on NGOs and other organizations conducting unspecified activities and motivated by real national security concerns. Private security providers would reportedly not be involved.

COUNTRYWIDE OVERVIEW

COUNTRYWIDE SITUATION REMAINS UNCHANGED

There are no domestic or international factors indicating that the current countrywide political and military balance will be disrupted in the short term. International stakeholders need stability in Libya, especially after the start of the Sudan crisis. GNU PM Dbeiba, Khalifa Haftar and other key political players understand this and do not want to alienate their political backers; moreover, they currently have limited options to the improve status quo based on their specific priorities. Thus, they support a preservation of the status quo.

The above provides context to the political efforts to proceed with the HoR-HCS process. In the last few weeks, the rhetoric mentioning the need for elections in Libya seems to have lost traction. The US and other international stakeholders officially want elections; however, the fact that the election-related rhetoric is losing momentum suggests that there is the recognition that holding successful elections before the end of 2023 is increasingly unrealistic.

As already stated, and based on the above, trying to implement elections in the current conditions would likely be a trigger for a destabilization. Instead, without external interference, the relatively stable countrywide status quo might last well into Q3 and possibly Q4 of 2023.

Below is a summary of the most recent developments related to the political process. It should be noted that, historically, HoR-HCS engagement has yielded very limited results, and currently keeps dragging.

- **8 May:** The HoR-HCS 6+6 Joint Committee, tasked with preparing the new electoral law, met with the High National Elections Commission (HNEC), Imad Al Sayeh. HoR spokesman Abdullah Blehaq announced that the 6+6 Committee discussed with Al Sayeh "the Commission's technical notes on the presidential and parliamentary electoral laws, in order to take the notes into account in the work of the Committee."

This indicates that the work of the Committee is still in the very early stages, and not breakthroughs are expected in the foreseeable future.

- **10 May:** HNEC official Abdul Hakim Al Shaab stated that HNEC is in constant communications with the 6+6 Committee to prepare the electoral laws. Al Shaab said that HNEC had provided technical remarks on the electoral law, adding that depending on its design and the timeframe, the election might be held in 2023 or in 2024.


This reinforced the idea that holding an election in 2023 is not realistic at this point.

FIGURE 2: PICTURE OF THE 8 MAY MEETING (LEFT); ABDUL HAKIM AL SHAAB (RIGHT)



TRIPOLITANIA

FIGURE 3: INCIDENT ACTIVITY IN TRIPOLITANIA, 6-12 MAY 2023



MOBILIZATIONS IN ZINTAN ARE UNLIKELY TO BE HOSTILE TO TRIPOLI

Multiple sources have reported large militia mobilizations happening in Zintan in the last week. Some unconfirmed sources claimed that the mobilizations are preparations for an offensive military operation, fueling concerns of an imminent destabilization. However, this is unlikely for the following reasons:

- It would upset the American and Turkish administrations. The Turkish military can deploy armed drones from Mitiga airport and Watiyah airbase.
- Zintani militias have not enough resources to fight Tripoli-based groups by themselves.
- The LNA is unlikely to provide any support to the Zintanis because Egypt would not allow it, and the LNA has no efficient logistical networks in place to support such effort.

More credible sources reported that the mobilizations are part of the efforts to consolidate separate armed groups and militias in Zintan, including the forces under Osama Juwaili. These efforts are likely backed by the US and the UK to favor a stabilization of Tripolitania via a consolidation of and de-escalation between local armed components.

However, it remains that a unification of forces in Zintan might be perceived as a medium and long-term threat by militia groups in Misrata and Tripoli. If the consolidation of armed groups in Tripolitania remains incomplete and the international context changes, several large militia blocs will resume in competition for power and resources in Tripolitania.

The developments below support the idea that the unification of Zintani militias is currently not hostile to Tripoli:


- **6 May:** More military commanders from Zintan announced that they joined the Union of Libyan Revolutionaries (see 10 February Weekly Threat Assessment for more details).

New steps to consolidate the militia environment in Tripolitania would be consistent with the analysis included in the 10 February Weekly Threat Assessment, anticipating the start of such efforts backed by the UK in parallel with the holding of the Extraordinary Forum of Libyan Revolutionaries.

- **8 May:** Osama Juwaili publicly denied to be preparing for a military offensive.

As already stated in the 5 May Weekly Threat Assessment, Juwaili will likely limit himself to keep leveraging his relationship with the LNA and the GNU to benefit politically. It is likely that Juwaili will ask the GNU for concessions, but he is unlikely to directly antagonize the GNU due to the reasons explained above.

FIGURE 4: INCIDENT ACTIVITY IN FEZZAN, 6-12 MAY 2023



THE SITUATION IN FEZZAN REMAINS UNCHANGED


The security environment in Fezzan remained unchanged over the past weeks. The region remains affected by a deep security vacuum, with the LNA conducting sporadic counter-crime operations.

Below is a summary of the LNA's operations recorded in the region in the last week:

- **9 May:** Security authorities recovered a stolen transport truck in Hun, Al Jufra. The truck was previously reported stolen in Al Khums. The operation was conducted jointly by the Hun and Al Khums police departments.
- **8 May:** The LNA 110th Infantry Battalion announced a 72-hour deadline for illegal occupants to vacate state-owned properties in Central Sabha. This is part of a planned handover of buildings to the to the Public Property Authority.
- **7 May:** A local was reportedly injured following an LNA 128th Brigade operation in the Gargara area, east of Ubari. The incident has reportedly caused unrest in the area, but the tension de-escalated soon.

The situation in Fezzan will remain stable in the coming weeks. There are no signs of simmering tribal or political tensions. The arrival of Sudanese refugees or groups affiliated to the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces to population centers in the region might cause localized tensions which are unlikely to affect Sabha or oil-production sites in the region.

FIGURE 5: INCIDENT ACTIVITY IN CYRENAICA, 6-12 MAY 2023



LIS ANNOUNCES POSSIBLE CRACKDOWN

On 9 May, the Cyrenaica-based branch of the Libyan Intelligence Service (LIS) released an announcement regarding the operations of international and local governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Cyrenaica. The LIS stated that some of these organization have agendas which are hostile to the safety and security of Libya.

According to the LIS, some of these organizations and institutions receive funding or support from foreign actors, they do not disclose their financial or administrative data and their activities, and require their employees to carry out suspicious movements. The LIS stated that it will take all the necessary legal and security measures to deter such hostile activities and protect the national identity, values and principles of the Libyan society.

The LIS's announcement is relevant because it follows the recent disruptions in the private security sector in Tripolitania. Notably, the western branch of the LIS was involved in the crackdown on private security providers alongside Rada and the FSA.

Initial reports from informed sources say that a potential crackdown would mainly focus on NGOs and other organizations conducting unclear activities, because motivated by real national security concerns. Private security providers would reportedly not be involved.

However, it cannot be excluded that the crackdown on private security providers witnessed in Tripolitania will also happen in Cyrenaica in the future. If that happens, the paperwork required by eastern authorities to private security companies operating in Cyrenaica would likely be different from the one required in the west. A potential crackdown in Cyrenaica might even be more impactful and swift than the one seen in Tripolitania, because the eastern security apparatus is more efficient.

INFORMATION AND ADVISORY SERVICES

Intelyse believes timely and actionable information is fundamental to a resilient, informed and effective organization.

We specialize in providing critical information, data led analysis and advisory services to businesses, NGOs, governments and their partners.

Clients choose Intelyse to get in-depth situational awareness from an accessible and reliable source who truly understands the complexity of the environments in which people operate.



Incident Alerts | Spot Reports | Daily Updates | Threat Assessments | Bespoke Reporting

INTELYSE SOLUTIONS

Information and Analysis

24/7 Global Assistance Center

Business Resilience Services

Mass Communications and Emergency Notification System

Travel Risk Management

Emergency Response Services