

Libya weekly security analysis report

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary	3
Outlook	4
Short Term Outlook	4
Medium to Long Term Outlook	4
Threat Matrix	5
Weekly Assessment	5
HoR Sessions Fail	5
Bathily Comments on Delays	6
Northwest Mountains Protest Mol Security Plan	6
Russian Diplomatic Mission Increases Tempo	7
Oil and Gas Sector Sees Significant Disruption	8
Weekly Statistical Overview	11
Weekly Significant Incidents	13
Tripolitania	13
Cyrenaica	15
Fezzan	16
Acronym List	17

Executive Summary

- The much anticipated HoR sessions on Jul 10 and 11 to debate the election laws and a roadmap for elections were postponed following altercations between HoR Speaker Aqila Saleh and HoR members on the issue of the Jun 26 session which saw the naming of a President of the Constitutional Court and a new Chairman for the Administrative Control Authority. A later statement from the HoR spokesperson, Abdullah Belhaq, announced that the session had been postponed and would reconvene on Jul 25. It is becoming increasingly clear that the decisions issued on Jun 26 have rendered the HoR incapable of even convening to debate key topics. While this may have been by design by those wishing to delay or derail the election process, it also may see the HoR being sidelined at a later date should some form of reconciliation not be possible.
- Bathily also released a statement on the current situation following the HoR sessions' failures. Bathily drew attention to UNSC resolution 2656 (2022) which urged Libyan stakeholders "to agree on a roadmap to deliver elections as soon as possible across the country." He expressed his hope that the relevant Libyan institutions will work with him to reach a compromise on the contentious issues and also called on the HoR and the HCS to work with the HNEC to resolve the technical shortcomings of the 6+6 outcomes. Bathily has continued his shuttle diplomacy, meeting with the President of the PC, Mohamed Menfi and LNA Commander Khalifa Haftar. To date such shuttle diplomacy has had little impact, with meetings resulting in positive election statements, but no subsequent action.
- During a meeting with the mayors and elders of the Western Mountains municipalities on Jul 10, PM (GNU) Dbeibah agreed to defer the recent decision of the Minister of the Interior, Emad Trabelsi which would have seen the security directorates in the area reorganised. Protests were later reported throughout the northwest mountains' regions on July 14, with several towns seeing road closures. In response to the protests, Trabelsi announced the temporary suspension of the plan until the work of a committee commissioned by PM Dbeibah has completed its work. In reality, despite protestations to the contrary, the planned security restructuring is very much a political decision. The region, a large amount of which is Amazigh controlled, or under the influence of Northwest Mountain Military Commander Osama Juweili is largely autonomous from a security perspective. Therefore the plan announced by Trabelsi is an intentional move to stamp GNU MoI control on an area which is largely autonomous from a security perspective.
- Following the arrest of the former Minister of Finance in the GNA, Faraj Boumtari, members of the Azawiyah and Maghariba tribes closed Sharara and El-Feel oilfields and also threatened to cut off water supplies to Tripoli. The group also announced their intention to close all exporting ports should their demands not be met. The Head of the Supreme Council of the Azawiyah tribes, Al-Senussi Al-Haliq announced that "The tribes in solidarity with us closed the Sharara and Al-Feel fields. We will close more fields within hours until the Dbeibah government is overthrown, even if Boumtari is released. The ceiling of our demands has risen, and the oil will not be reopened except by overthrowing Al-Siddiq Al-Kabir and changing the Dabaiba government."
- The closures saw some resolution with the release of Boumtari on the evening of Jul 15. Initial reporting indicates that production restarted on both Sharara and El Feel, however, the closing of major fields with such ease will have rattled the confidence of foreign investors and once again highlight the fragility of Libyan oil production. Reliability of supply is crucial to the strategic plans of oil majors moving forward and that one illegal detention potentially would result in the closure of the entirety of oil production in the south and east is likely to cause concern.

Outlook

Short Term Outlook

- The HoR/HCS track appeared to flounder during the week with the HoR becoming unable to convene a session to even discuss the election laws and the roadmap. The disruption appeared to be orchestrated by a section within the HoR that is attempting to oust Speaker Saleh and place him with the second Deputy Speaker, Misbah Douma. Such developments are likely to see significant delays and may derail the ongoing attempt by Mishri and Saleh to create a new unified government favourable to their plans. SRSB Bathily has continued in his meetings with numerous political and security actors, however, it remains unclear what, if anything, the continued meetings will achieve.
- Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar has once again positioned himself well with influence over both the HoR/HCS track and the competing power-sharing talks between his family and the Dbeibah clan. The recent events in the HoR, which have been linked to Belqasim Haftar certainly favour the Haftar clan and may result in them gaining significant direct influence within the HoR
- The threat of an oil blockade or GNS control of NOC accounts both represents a further threat to the GNU and would see funding cut off for the GNU's cash-heavy projects. While this week saw stoppages on Sharara and El Feel due to the detention of former Minister of Finance, Faraj Boumtari, the overarching threat derived from the legal actions taken by the GNS remains extant.
- The outbreak of violence in Sudan has the potential to cause conflagration across the region and destabilise the southern border areas with Libya. Speculation continues to suggest that the Libyan National Army (LNA) is providing material support to the Rapid Support Force (RSF), one of the belligerents of the Sudanese conflict. Convoys heading south from Libya have been targeted by the Sudanese Armed Forces, an activity which may well have encroached on Libyan territory. While the border has allegedly been closed on both sides, local reports suggest traffic is moving normally at this time.

Medium to Long Term Outlook

- The solution to Libya's political impasse remains elections for many stakeholders with UNSMIL attempting to develop a new pathway. Realistically, the path to elections in 2023 will be fraught with difficulties however, there is a real chance that much-needed groundwork could be achieved whether elections are held or not. While UNSMIL heads efforts towards elections, other international stakeholders are prioritising more short-term objectives as they look to shape not just Libya, but regional and global issues.
- The resurgence of Jihadist Salafism in Tripolitania remains a potential source of destabilisation with indications of renewed tensions between adherents and those of Madkhali Salafism. This competition between the opposing ideologies seeps into the political as well as the military spaces and is expected to slowly intensify as the Jihadist Salafi adherents gain strength in the region. This could increasingly become a defining factor for various groups involved in the political and military spaces.
- While the political process continues to falter, armed groups are exploiting the situation to increase their strength, influence and power across Libya which will likely have a longer-term negative impact on the political situation.
- Terrorist groups remain active but contained in Libya. Islamic State (IS) will continue to present a threat to security forces, primarily in the south, and may re-establish the capability to mount sporadic attacks along the coastline in the future. The group continues to suffer from years of attrition and is more likely focused on providing support for more active IS theatres in sub-Saharan Africa. Al-Qaeda-aligned groups remain active in the country with their integration into societies in the south and some armed groups in the Tripoli area potentially posing a longer-term issue for Libya.

Threat Matrix

Region	Political	Terrorism	Militancy	Crime	Kidnap	Civil Unrest
Tripolitania	High	Moderate	High-Extreme	High	High	High
Tripoli	High	Moderate	High-Extreme	High	High	High
Cyrenaica	High	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Benghazi	High	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Fezzan	High	High	High-Extreme	High	High	Low-Moderate
Sabha	High	Moderate	High	High	High	Moderate

Threat Scale

Minimal	Low	Moderate	High	Extreme
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Weekly Assessment

HoR Sessions Fail

The much anticipated HoR sessions on Jul 10 and 11 to debate the election laws and a roadmap for elections were postponed following altercations between HoR Speaker Aqila Saleh and HoR members on the issue of the Jun 26 session which saw the naming of a President of the Constitutional Court and a new Chairman for the Administrative Control Authority. The HCS session, which was intentionally planned to coincide with the HoR session and was also to discuss the election roadmap was postponed following an inability to form a quorum. An HCS session was convened with initial reporting indicating that the roadmap had received preliminary support from the Council.

Coverage from the HoR session on Jul 10 showed a heated discussion on the legitimacy of the Jun 26 session, leading to its postponement after only several minutes. However, unconfirmed reporting indicates that bringing the session to the point where no debate was possible, may have been intentional. Unconfirmed reporting claimed that in an earlier meeting between Belqasim Haftar and several HoR members agreed to disrupt and postpone the discussion of the 6+6 election laws and any discussion on the replacement of the head of the HNEC, Imad Sayeh. During the alleged meeting, the allocation of positions in the proposed new unified government was also discussed. Notably, the second deputy of the HoR, Mesbah Douma, chaired the Jun 26 session and he has previously reported as being

‘close’ to Belqasim Haftar. The failure of the HoR to be able to even hold a session to discuss key legislation and planning will come as a disappointment for many and highlights the ongoing desire by many within the political elite to prolong the status quo until they can shape any progression in on the election path in their favour.

Reporting on the subsequent HoR session on Jul 11 was contradictory, with some HoR members stating that the session discussed the decisions reached in the Jun 26 session, and others claiming it was abandoned after HoR Speaker left the building and returned to Qubba. Later it was reported that several HoR members had attempted to assault Saleh outside the HoR building. While it is unclear what did happen, it is clear that the matters of the election laws and the election roadmap were neither discussed nor agreed upon. A later statement from the HoR spokesperson, Abdullah Belhaq, announced that the session had been postponed and would reconvene on Jul 25. It is becoming increasingly clear that the decisions issued on Jun 26 have rendered the HoR incapable of even convening to debate key topics. While this may have been by design by those wishing to delay or derail the election process, it also may see the HoR being sidelined at a later date should some form of reconciliation not be possible.

The dysfunctionality of the HoR on Jul 10/11 then saw further developments and highlight the issue of Speaker Saleh and the Second Deputy Speaker, Misbah Douma.

The Saudi media outlet, Asharq al Awsat reported that Saleh will resign his position under pressure from LNA Commander Khalifa Hatar's sons. The story also claimed that HoR sessions are to be indefinitely suspended. While an earlier report of his resignation was refuted by the Media Advisor to the HoR, Fathi al-Mirima the later report followed the debacle of the attempted HoR sessions, which also saw an attempted assault against Saleh. Unconfirmed reporting indicates that the failed HoR sessions had been orchestrated by Belqasim Haftar with the intention being to replace Saleh with the Second deputy speaker Misbah Douma. Douma has been described as being close to Belqasim and his appointment would result in the Haftar clan gaining direct influence in the HoR. In addition, numerous reports have indicated that there is a degree of tension between the sons of Haftar, as each proceeds on his own path to garner additional power and influence.

Belqasim appears to be becoming increasingly visible in his role after having remained in the background for many years and allowing Saddam Haftar to take the public limelight. Therefore this move by Belqasim would give him unparalleled political influence greater than any of his siblings, who have primarily concerned themselves with military and business matters.

Bathily Comments on Delays

Bathily released a statement on the current situation following the HoR sessions failures. Bathily drew attention to UNSC resolution 2656 (2022) which urged Libyan stakeholders "to agree on a roadmap to deliver elections as soon as possible across the country." He added that in line with the UNSC guidance he has continued to engage with all "Libyan political and security leaders, relevant institutions, civil society, women and youth, as well as notables, municipalities, political parties, and other parts of Libyan society to discuss how to create a pathway to successful, inclusive and credible elections as soon as possible in a secure environment and on a level playing field."

Bathily then repeated his previous point made at the UNSC briefing in June when he noted that the current election laws will not enable elections. He then proposed to "convene key Libyan institutions and stakeholders, or their trusted representatives, to reach, through inclusive negotiations and compromise, a final settlement on the most contentious issues."

He expressed his hope that the relevant Libyan institutions will work with him to reach a

compromise on the contentious issues and also called on the HoR and the HCS to work with the HNEC to resolve the technical shortcomings of the 6+6 outcomes. Finally, Bathily added that "In the meantime, it is imperative that all Libyan stakeholders draw lessons from the pitfalls and mistakes of 2021 and 2022, and refrain from any actions, including unilateral or non-inclusive decisions, that could precipitate a crisis and divert attention from our common goal of enabling successful elections in keeping with the wishes of the Libyan people."

Bathily appears to be attempting to once again move the process forward following the continued delay by both the HoR and the HCS on amending the election laws more than one month from their release. The continued division within the HoR has also seen the laws yet to even be discussed with the body now not due to sit until the end of July, although Aqila Saleh has already raised points to which the HoR object. It is unclear if Bathily intends to convene a physical body of a collection of the relevant parties, or if he is to continue his shuttle diplomacy. To date, the shuttle diplomacy appears to have had little impact, with each meeting purporting to discuss the elections and agree on resolving the outstanding issues, while no subsequent resolution is ever forthcoming.

Northwest Mountains Protest Mol Security Plan

During a meeting with the mayors and elders of the Western Mountains municipalities on Jul 10, PM (GNU) Dbeibah agreed to defer the recent decision of the Minister of the Interior, Emad Trabelsi which would have seen the security directorates in the area reorganised. Dbeibah insisted that the decision by Trabelsi was technical and had no political motives.

Before the meeting with Dbeibah, the notables and mayors of the Western Mountain municipalities announced that they would stop dealing with the GNU unless planned security reorganisation was abandoned. The proposed plan divides the mountain region into three security zones, including the eastern mountain with its HQ in Gharyan, the western mountain with its HQ in Nalut, and the central mountain zone with its HQ in al-Rayyana.

The Minister of the Interior, Emad Trabelsi, then met with the heads of police stations from the East, Central and Western Mountain security directorates. During the informal meetings, Trabelsi explained the support that would be

provided by the Ministry following its reorganization and integration process.

Protests were later reported throughout the northwest mountains' regions on July 14, with several towns seeing road closures. The demonstrations are against the Western Mountains security restructuring. Although this had been deferred by PM Dbeibah, reporting had indicated that the Minister of the Interior, Emad Trabelsi had proceeded with the plan, as evidenced by his series of meetings in the region. In a probable reaction to the increasing level of discontent in the region, Trabelsi announced the temporary suspension of the plan, until the work of a committee commissioned by PM Dbeibah has completed its work. While this saw the protests subside and routes reopened the issue is far from resolved, with Dbeibah having only deferred the decision and Trabelsi then announcing a temporary suspension.

In reality, despite protestations to the contrary, the planned security restructuring is very much a political decision. The region, a large amount of which is Amazigh controlled, or under the influence of Northwest Mountain Military Commander Osama Juweili is largely autonomous from a security perspective. Therefore the plan announced by Trabelsi is an intentional move to stamp GNU MoI control on an area. However, as demonstrated this week, any future attempts to impose GNU authority on the local security actors are likely to be strongly rejected.

Russian Diplomatic Mission Increases Tempo

On Jul 11 the Chairman of the HNEC, Emad Sayeh, met with the Russian Ambassador, Ayder Aganin. The meeting discussed the latest developments in the electoral processes, the Commission's preparations and the level of its readiness to implement them, and discussed what support and expertise can be provided in the field of managing and implementing the elections. It also reviewed ways to support proposals and endeavours that ensure their success in accordance with international standards.

Later in an interview with the Russian State News Agency, TASS, Aganin warned of the danger of smuggled arms from the ongoing war in Ukraine to sub-Saharan Africa and the use of Libya as a "transit corridor" for those weapons. Aganin added that "the proliferation of firearms from Ukraine has become a hot topic today...and these weapons are appearing in some countries now and can fall into the hands of extremist and terrorist groups."

The comments appear unwarranted at this time with weapons more likely to flow towards Ukraine than from it. Therefore the claim appears to me more a case of propaganda in painting a negative image of Ukraine and its control of weapons flow to foreign extremist groups.

“the proliferation of firearms from Ukraine has become a hot topic today...and these weapons are appearing in some countries now and can fall into the hands of extremist and terrorist groups.”

Russian Ambassador to Libya – Ayder Aganin

The Minister of Oil, Mohammed Aoun also met with the Aganin. Aoun expressed his desire to see more participation from Russian oil companies and praised Russia's role in OPEC + "to maintain balance in the global oil markets." Aoun also discussed the activation of the Libyan-Russian ministerial committee after suspension, stressing the need for more meetings, visits, conferences, seminars and workshops for Libya to benefit from Russian technology and

experience.

Later Aganin met with Libya's Minister of Justice, Halima Abdel-Rahman. During the meeting, they discussed strengthening cooperation with the Russian Justice Ministry. This is with a particular focus on legal realms, expertise exchange, and training, especially in judicial policing and judicial expertise.

Aganin has become particularly active in Libya and despite Russia's closeness to LNA Commander Khalifa Haftar the Russian diplomatic mission appears to have been warmly welcomed. Furthermore, the upcoming Russia-Africa conference on Jul 27/28 in St Petersburg will see African leaders, including the President of the PC, Mohamed Menfi attend. The conference is a key opportunity for the Kremlin to address concerns regarding the status of Wagner Group in African nations

following the mutiny in Russia. The conference will therefore likely see Russia reconfirm their continued commitment to nations where they currently support the incumbent or opposition leaders with security support. While this confirmation would not be sought by Menfi, as Wagner supports the LNA, their continued presence, or potential removal from the country is likely to be discussed.

Oil and Gas Sector Sees Significant Disruption

The Ajdabiyah court issued a ruling imposing judicial receivership on Libyan oil revenues. Commenting on the ruling PM (GNS) Osama Hammad stated that the decision will prevent the GNU from disposing of the Libyan State's resources. He added that the Libyan judiciary is reinforcing its authority, protecting financial resources and oil revenues, and placing them under judicial receivership.

The ruling reinforces the previous ruling from the Benghazi Appeal court which rejected the NOC's motion to have the ruling placing the revenues under judicial control overturned. However, it remains unclear if the Libyan Foreign Bank, into which all revenue from foreign sales is paid, will comply with the ruling. Furthermore, the recent forming of the Supreme Financial Committee by the PC, with the cooperation of the GNU, CBL and ACA was a clear attempt to negate the requirement for the imposition of judicial receivership of revenue and may indicate that the CBL will use this as a justification not to comply.

In an unrelated disruption to the Oil and Gas Sector Faraj Boumtari, the former Minister of Finance of the Government of National Accord was arrested by Internal Security at Mitiga on Jul 11. This prompted angry demands from the Azawiyah tribe for his release. Mr Boumtari had been identified as a possible successor to CBL governor Sadiq Kabir and had previously been outspoken about corruption and the abuse of letters of credit facilitated by the CBL. Unconfirmed reporting claims that during a recent meeting, Sadiq Kabir had complained about reports of his planned replacement with Boumtari to both the President of the PC, Mohammed Menfi and PM (GNU) Dbeibah

The Committee for Justice and National Reconciliation in the HoR then condemned the detention of Boumtari, naming him as the candidate for the position of Governor of the CBL, threatening an escalation. The statement asserted that "The kidnapping and detention of Boumtari is a crime that violates the law and is an infringement of freedoms and human rights."

Oil Blockade Imposed

In a subsequent escalation of their protest against the detention of former Boumtari, members of the Azawiyah and Maghariba tribes closed Sharara and El-Feel oilfields and also threatened to cut off water supplies to Tripoli. The group also announced their intention to close all exporting ports should their demands not be met. The Head of the Supreme Council of the Azawiyah tribes, Al-Senussi Al-Haliq announced that "The tribes in solidarity with us closed the Sharara and Al-Feel fields. We will close more fields within hours until the Dbeibah

government is overthrown, even if Boumtari is released. The ceiling of our demands has risen, and the oil will not be reopened except by overthrowing Al-Siddiq Al-Kabir and changing the Dbeibah government." The blockade was not believed to be related to the threats of closures made by both PM (GNS) Hammad and LNA Commander Khalifa Haftar, however, it is likely viewed as a positive development by both.

Neither has commented on the development, however, there is a requirement for at least complicity from the LNA to close either Sharara or El Feel.

The demands made by the tribes go far beyond the release of Boumtari and have been expanded to the removal of the GNU and Siddiq Kabir from the CBL. This clearly posed issues in reaching a resolution to the issue, as neither the GNU nor Kabir have any intention of being removed, although the latter may still be offered by the GNU in an attempt to appease the protestors. Media sources claim that the closures will result in the loss of 330,000 bpd and the closure has also reportedly led to load shedding in the Tripoli area as the gas supply to power stations has been decreased.

Unconfirmed open sources then reported that four members of the HCS were detained at Mitiga airport, also by the Internal Security Services. The members were named as

“The kidnapping and detention of Boumtari is a crime that violates the law and is an infringement of freedoms and human rights.”

The HoR Committee for Justice and National Reconciliation

Suleiman Zoubi, Abdul Qadir, Ahwili Shaban Abustah and Adel Karmous. Unconfirmed sources reported that the four were detained due to their support for the formation of a unified government. Subsequent reporting indicates that the four were likely detained for a short period of time, but later released. However, the passports were retained and travel was denied. The Internal Security later claimed that the denial of travel was in relation to allegations that the head of the HCS, Khaled Mishri, had bribed the four with foreign-provided funds for their support in the upcoming HCS internal election.

The International Response

UNSMIL released a statement on the developments. In the statement, UNSMIL announced that it “is deeply disturbed by the continued abductions, arbitrary arrests, and disappearances of citizens and public figures by various security actors in Libya.” The statement detailed the detention of Boumtari and the case of the HCS members at Mitiga airport. The statement called on “Libyan authorities and security entities to release all those arbitrarily detained, ensure independent investigations for all alleged extra-legal detentions and abductions and bring the perpetrators to justice.” On the current oil blockade, the statement called for the blockade to be lifted, asserting that was needlessly costing the Libyan people their primary source of income. The statement is indicative of genuine concern over actions by the GNU and its security actors that are increasingly authoritarian with the apparent targeting by the GNU of political rivals. While politics in Libya has always been subject to the actions of armed actors, the brazenness of these recent developments gives significant cause for concern that the GNU will openly attack their rivals, continue to solidify their position and sabotage any chance of elections.

The US Embassy also released a statement agreeing with and supporting the UNSMIL statement. The US statement also “advises against any actions that can lead to further tensions and undermine the aspirations of the Libyan people.”

The Domestic Escalation

The head of the HCS, Khaled Mishri also released a statement on the recent developments. Throughout the statement, Mishri condemned PM Dbeibah and claimed that Dbeibah “seeks war to stay in office and spend money without accountability or supervision.” He repeated the claim that Boumtari was arrested as he intended to run for the position of the Governor of the CBL and also warned that any action by Dbeibah against him or HCS members would result in armed clashes. Mishri also revealed that he had spoken to the Attorney General who confirmed that there were no charges against Boumtari.

“The tribes in solidarity with us closed the Sharara and Al-Feel fields. We will close more fields within hours until the Dbeibah government is overthrown, even if Boumtari is released. The ceiling of our demands has risen, and the oil will not be reopened except by overthrowing Al-Siddiq Al-Kabir and changing the Debaibah government.”

Head of the Supreme Council of the Azawiyah tribes, Al-Senussi Al-Haliq

The elders and notables of Zawiyah issued a further statement in support of Boumtari on Jul 14 and denounced the recent targeting of HCS members. The statement asserted that the actions have resulted in further security destabilization and that it held the GNU wholly responsible. The group also called on their Misratan counterparts to assume their responsibility in relation to the Prime Minister’s actions. The statement gave the date of Jul 25 for the situation to be resolved. The statement ended with a note that it had been prepared after consultation with Othman Lahab, Mahmoud Bin Rajab and Hassan Bouzriba in a clear indication that the threats made in the statement are backed by military force.

The elders and notables of the South East also released a statement in support of Boumtari and announced that they would now close oilfields in their area and block the man-made river in Tazirbu and Al-Sarir.

Resolution?

The issue saw some resolution with the release of Boumtari on the evening of Jul 15. Initial reporting indicates that production restarted on both Sharara and El Feel, however, the closing of major fields with such ease will have rattled the confidence of foreign investors and once again highlight the fragility of Libyan oil production. Reliability of supply is crucial to the

strategic plans of oil majors moving forward and that one illegal tension potentially would result in the closure of the entirety of oil production in the south and east is likely to cause concern. Furthermore, the demands of the Azawiyah tribe are yet to be fulfilled as they had called for both the removal of Siddiq Kabir and the GNU. While the latter was an unlikely proposition, the removal of Kabir may be forced upon Dbeibah given the scale of the fallout and the universal condemnation of the detention of Boumtari.

The events also reveal an increasingly brazen authoritarianism by GNU security actors. Throughout the detention of Boumtari the Attorney General, Siddiq Sour, confirmed that there were no charges against Boumtari and it was reported that his release was a result of the intervention of Sour. However, the Internal Security Services have stated that they are continuing to investigate Boumtari for corruption during his time as GNA Minister of Finance. Likewise, the charges of corruption against the HCS members, again by the Internal Security

Services appear convenient in light of the upcoming HCS elections. Corruption is endemic in Libya, and to a degree, institutional, however, investigations and prosecutions are generally considered to be selective and politically motivated.

Weekly Statistical Overview

Region	Incident Count	Injuries	Fatalities	Kidnapped	Arrests
Tripolitania	26	3	0	1	154
Cyrenaica	8	0	0	0	120
Fezzan	6	0	0	0	0
Offshore	1	0	0	0	0
Total	41	3	3	3	281





Image: Weekly security incidents across the country by province

Activity levels decreased from 56 to 41 this week.


Tripolitania saw a decrease with 26 incidents this week compared to 49 from last week. The decrease was as a result of a lack of significant activity on the northwest coastline. A series of protests and road closures were reported throughout the Northwest Mountains, with protestors demonstrating against the Mol security plan for the region. A notable 444 Brigade force was also reported as moving south from Ash Shwayrif. This follows a clash between 444 Brigade and an LNA unit, although it is unknown if this is related.

A slight increase was seen in the east with eight incidents. The majority of incidents related to criminality and migrant related activity. Southeastern elders did threaten an oil blockade and the closing of the MMR. The current status is not known.

Activity increased with six incidents. Sharara and El Feel were temporarily closed in protest at the arrest of Boutrani.



Graph: Weekly security incidents across the country by region for the past six months



Graph: Weekly security incidents across the country by incident category for the week

Weekly Significant Incidents

Tripolitania




Image: Weekly security incidents reported across Tripolitania

Security Incidents

- Jul 09** | Other - Nuqat Al-Khams Province, Ras Ajdir: The MoI border Guard came across 49 migrants lost in the desert between Dahrat al-Khas and Abu al-Sharaf.
- Jul 09** | Armed Attack - Tripoli Province, Zanatah: An attack by an unidentified armed actor was reported at the ACA HQ. The attack is reportedly as a result of the refusal of the incumbent head to stand aside for a replacement vote in during a contentious session of the HoR.
- Jul 09** | Armed Attack - Al-Jabal Al-Gharbi Province, Alasaba: An SAF attack resulted in the injury of an alleged Alasaba elder, Ibrahim Fitouri.
- Jul 09** | SAF - Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah: An SAF attack resulted in the injury of Hamid Kazima.
- Jul 10** | Arrest - Al-Murqub Province, Tarhunah: A suspected 444 Brigade raid resulted In the arrest of the Tarhuna Elders and Dignitaries Head, Suleiman Tawati.
- Jul 10** | Arrest - Al-Murqub Province, Zliten: Zliten Security Directorate arrested 70 illegal migrants being transported on a truck.
- Jul 10** | Security Operation - Nuqat Al-Khams Province, Ajaylat: A security operation was reported on an illegal migrant smuggling related location associated with the Ammar Balkour armed group. One boat was reported as being on fire at the site.
- Jul 11** | Arrest - Tripoli Province, Mitiga Airport: Faraj Boumtari, the former Minister of Finance of the Government of National Accord, was arrested by Internal Security at Mitiga Airport.
- Jul 11** | Security Operation - Tripoli Province, Garabuli: GACS Msallata branch was reported as conducting mobile and static security operations in the Garibli area.
- Jul 11** | Armed Clash - Al-Jabal Al-Gharbi Province, Nafousa Mountains: An armed clash was reported between the al-Wuhayshi and al-Koni families resulting in the hospitalisation of one female.

- Jul 11 | Forced Entry - Tripoli Province, Hay Andalous: An armed group forced entry into the French School and expelled those persons within.
- Jul 12 | Arrest - Misrata Province, Misrata: An individual was arrested by the Misrata Security Directorate and ISA on charges of kidnap and torture. The charges relate to two individuals who were discovered on Jul 07 one of whom was dead and the other seriously injured. The dead individual was later named as Muhammad al-Senussi al-Ferjani.
- Jul 12 | IED Found/Cleared - Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah: A singular source reported an IED was discovered attached to a telecommunications tower near the Trfaas school in Zawiyah.
- Jul 12 | Demonstration - Tripoli Province, Rajban: Local residents protested the lack of services and poor security provision in Al-Rajban.
- Jul 13 | Arrest - Tripoli Province, Tripoli: Unconfirmed sources reported that the Head of the HCS, Khaled Mishri was placed under house arrest.
- Jul 13 | Arrest - Tripoli Province, Mitiga Airport: Four members of the HCS were arrested at Mitiga Airport.
- Jul 13 | Troop Movements - Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah: Unconfirmed sources reported the mobilization of groups in Zawiyah in support of Khaled Mishri.
- Jul 13 | Demonstration - Al-Jabal Al-Gharbi Province, Mizdah: A protest against the proposed security reforms was reported between Mizdah and Alshgega.
- Jul 13 | Demonstration - Al-Jabal Al-Gharbi Province, Nafousa Mountains: Protests were reported in Amazigh areas of the Nafousa Mountains. The demonstrations were in Kabaw, Mashashiya, Yefren, Nalut and Jadu.
- Jul 13 | Military Announcement - Al-Jabal Al-Gharbi Province, Nafousa Mountains: A state of emergency was declared in the Nafousa Mountains Military Region commanded by Lieutenant General Osama Juweili. The reason given was the targeting of HCS members and leadership in Tripoli.
- Jul 15 | Prisoner Release - Tripoli Province, Tripoli: the ISA announced the release of the former GNA Finance Minister Boumtari. The ISA added that they were continuing to investigate Boumtari on corruption charges.
- Jul 15 | Troop Movements - Al-Jabal Al-Gharbi Province, Ash Shwayrif: Approximately 400 armed vehicles of 444 Brigade were reported south of Bani Walid and Qurayyat with an intention to move into the desert.
- Jul 15 | Arrest - Tripoli Province, Hay Andalous: During the course of a new security campaign Tripoli Security Directorate arrested 15 beggars.
- Jul 15 | Kidnap - Misrata Province, Bani Walid: 444 Brigade freed a kidnap for ransom victim, Muftah Omar Abdelsalam Masoud, in an operation in a valley south of Bani Walid.
- Jul 15 | Arrest - Al-Murqub Province, Urban: Security forces from al Urban intercepted a vehicle driven by two Libyans and transporting ten illegal migrants.
- Jul 15 | Armed clash - Al-Jabal Al-Gharbi Province, Hamada: Local sources reported an armed clash between suspected 444 Brigade and the LNA's 177 Battalion in the Hamada desert area (approx 100 west of Ash Shwayrif).

Cyrenaica




Image: Weekly security incidents reported across Cyrenaica

Security Incidents

- Jul 09** | Arrest - Derna Province, Derna: 17 Sudanese illegal migrants were arrested by Derna Security Directorate before handing them over to DCIM Derna Branch.
- Jul 09** | Security Operation - Al-Butnan Province, Tobruk: Tobruk Security Directorate raided a warehouse 40k south of Tobruk and detained 96 illegal migrants.
- Jul 11** | Arrest - Benghazi Province, Benghazi: The Benghazi Branch of the Anti-Narcotics Agency arrested an individual in possession of 6,000 Tramadol tablets.
- Jul 11** | Assault - Benghazi Province, Benghazi: An unconfirmed single source reported that HoR members Talal Mihoub, Salihin Nabi and Badr Nahib attempted to assault the HoR Speaker Aqila Saleh to prevent the convening of the HoR session.
- Jul 12** | Demonstration - Al-Jabal Al-Akhdar Province, Bayda: A demonstration was reported in al-Bayda. Protestors were demonstrating against the recent victory of the al-Nakhla list in the recent municipal election. Protestors assert that the list is supported by Haftar coalition and the Muslim brotherhood.
- Jul 13** | Armed Attack - Benghazi Province, Benghazi: Al-Ahly Benghazi football fans attacked the home of the President of the Libyan Football Federation, Abdul Hakim al-Shalmani.
- Jul 14** | Arrest - Al-Wahat Province, Wahat: Two gangs involved in the theft of electrical wiring were arrested by the Wahat Security Directorate.
- Jul 15** | Blockade - Al-Wahat Province, Sarir: The council of elders of the South East announced that they will close the oilfields in their areas and block the headwaters of the MMR at Tazirbu and Al-Sarir

Fezzan




Image: Weekly security incidents reported across Fezzan

Security Incidents

- Jul 09** | Armed Clash - Murzuq Province, Libya - Chadian Border: An armed clash was reported between the LNA and suspected smugglers.
- Jul 11** | Kidnap - Sabha Province, Sabha: Two males were kidnapped for ransom and tortured. The two were named as Mushel Ayoub and Najeh Zarqinouh and the incident is believed to have occurred in Jun.
- Jul 11** | Murder/ Execution - Sabha Province, Forty Street: A body of a victim of a suspected targeted killing was recovered on Forty Street. The victim was named as Ibrahim Haddad al-Gaddafi
- Jul 13** | Blockade - Wadi Al-Hayaa Province, Sharara Oilfield: Members of the Azawiya and Maghrebi tribes closed the Sharara and el Feel oilfields and demanded the release of former Finance Minister Boumtari and the removal of the GNU.
- Jul 13** | Arrest - Wadi Al-Shatii Province, Brak al-Shati: Seven African nationals were arrested in connection with the killing of a fellow African national. Reportedly the killing was related to a financial dispute.
- Jul 14** | Murder/ Execution - Al-Jufra Province, Waddan: A 128 Brigade member was murdered by an alleged Janjaweed member.

Acronym List

AQ - Al-Qaeda
BDB – Benghazi Defense Brigade (Al Qaeda-aligned – AAS and RSCB associated/umbrella group)
CBL – Central Bank of Libya
CESF - Constitution and Election Support Force
CNI – Critical National Infrastructure
DACOCT - Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism (SDF)
DDR - Disarmament, demobilising and reintegration
GASO – General Administration of Security Operations
GACS – General Administration of Central Support
GECOL – General Electricity Company of Libya
GMMR – Great Man-made River
GNA – Government of National Accord (2016)
GNC – General National Congress (2012)
GNS – Government of National Stability (2021)
GNU – Government of National Unity (2021)
GTUC - Greater Tripoli Union Council (Tripoli militias and others, established in June 2020)
HCS – High Council of State (Tripoli-based)
HNEC – High National Elections Commission
HoR – House of Representatives (Tobruk-based)
IDF – Indirect Fire (mortars/rockets)
IDP - Internally Displaced Persons
IED - Improvised Explosive Device
IOC - International Oil Company
IS - Islamic State
JMC – Joint Military Commission
LIFG – Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
LNA – Libyan National Army
LPA – Libyan Political Agreement (2015)
LPDF - Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (2020)
LROR - Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room
MoD - Ministry of Defense
MoF - Ministry of Finance
MoFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoI - Ministry of Interior
MoJ - Ministry of Justice
MoO - Ministry of Oil
MoT - Ministry of Transportation
NFDK - No Further Details Known
NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation (aid/charity)
NOC – National Oil Company
NSG – National Salvation Government (GNC)
NSTR - Nothing Significant To Report
P3+2 – France, Germany, Italy – UK, US
PC – Presidency Council
PG – Presidential Guard
PFG - Petroleum Facilities Guard
RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade
RTA - Road Traffic Accident
TIP – Tripoli International Airport
SSA – Stability Support Authority
SAF - Small Arms Fire
SDF – Rada Deterrence Force/ Special Deterrence Force/ Rada
UXO - Unexploded Ordnance

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