

Libya daily security analysis report

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Prepared by:
Risk Analysis Team, Libya

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Latest Developments

Political Developments

- During a dialogue seminar on Jun 30, the Special US Envoy and Ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland conceded that it is challenging to persuade Libyan politicians to hold elections. He noted the “enormous level of mistrust” between Libya politicians as a root cause. He also stated that the US has been examining means of “how to assist Libyans in reaching a mechanism for distributing oil revenues.”
- In a tweet on social media, Norland stated that "The United States calls on Libyan political actors to refrain from the threat of an oil shutdown, which would have devastating repercussions on Libya's economy and harm all Libyans. We call on all Libyan leaders to put in place a comprehensive revenue control mechanism as a constructive way to address grievances over the distribution of oil revenues and to establish transparency without risking the health of Libya's economy or the apolitical nature of the NOC."
- In response to Norland's social media post, PM (GNS) Osama Hammad asserted that Norland's comments on the issue of the closure of oil terminals and the distribution of oil revenues were a blatant interference in Libya's internal affairs.
- In an address at the opening of a new park in Misrata, PM (GNU) Dbeibah noted that war had dominated the public scene only two years ago and that the country was now in a state of stability with development resulting in the opening of new parks, schools and roads each day. He added that the GNU was determined to continue with the “Back to Life” initiative and open all service facilities in different regions of the country.
- In a report by the American Middle East Institute, former US Envoy to Libya, Jonathan Winer stated that he expected increased diplomatic activity in the coming weeks in order to persuade the parliamentary bodies to amend the 6+6 committee election agreement, adding “no one should expect parliamentary or presidential elections anytime soon.” **COMMENT:** The report paints a dim prospect of the likelihood of elections and the state of the current election process. While elections in 2023 had always been considered to be unlikely, the current state of the process is a clear indication that elections are now near impossible in 2023. In reality little has been achieved throughout 2023 with the same issues, such as dual nationality and parallel governments, remaining no nearer to a solution. **COMMENT ENDS.**

Security

- On Jun 30, the LNA's 128 Brigade was reported as conducting operations along the Libya-Niger border. The operation commenced at the Nagaza gate, passing through Qatron to the Tom Border Crossing Point.
- The Deputy Chairman of the Sudanese Sovereign Council, Malik Agar, claimed that they had information on the cooperation of Wagner Group Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in southern Libya. **COMMENT:** Since the outbreak of the conflict between the RSF and Sudanese Government Forces there have been reports of Wagner Group assistance to RSF as well as alleged direct involvement by Wagner Group forces in the fighting. RSF also appear to be present in Southern Libya with an alleged airstrike by Sudanese Government Forces near the border in southeast Libya. **COMMENT ENDS.**
- The British Government renewed its travel warning to Libya, advising against all non-essential travel due to the fragile security and political situation in the country.

Oil and Gas Developments

- In a publicly released statement, the HoR's Energy Committee echoed Hammad's comments and asserted that Norland's statement on the threat of an oil closure was “a blatant interference in the internal affairs of the Libyan State.” The statement added that Norland was concerned with the

flow of oil while ignoring the suffering of the people of Cyrenaica and Fezzan. The statement also claimed that Norland ignored the corruption of the GNU.

Migrant Developments

- The Greek Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis asserted that Peloponnese Shipwreck was the fault of human smugglers and that it was unjust to lay accusations against the Greek Coastguard. During a joint press conference with the European Parliament's President, Roberta Metsola, Mitsotakis called for cooperation with transit countries to prevent the influx of migrants, particularly via sea routes from Libya. **COMMENT:** The Peloponnese shipwreck occurred on Jun 14, when a fishing trawler which may have been carrying as many as 750 migrants capsized. 104 survivors were rescued, while 78 bodies were also recovered. The remaining individuals were listed as missing and presumed drowned. In the aftermath of the incident, both Frontex and the Greek Coastguard have been criticized for not intervening earlier. **COMMENT ENDS.**
- Local sources reported that transit has nearly ceased at the Ras Ajdir border crossing to Tunisia. Reportedly the issue is due to delays of the Tunisian side in granting Libyans entry approval.


Assessment

In response to US Ambassador Richard Norland's social media post warning against an oil blockade, PM (GNS) Osama Hammad asserted that Norland's comments on the issue of the closure of oil terminals and the distribution of oil revenues were a blatant interference in Libya's internal affairs. He called on Norland to respect the sovereignty of the Libyan judiciary and not intervene in the favour of any party, claiming that Norland's statement was supporting the one party (GNU) that benefits from squandering. He then once again repeated his threat to 'raise the red flag' to stop the flow of oil revenue in order to protect it from misuse by "corrupt individuals." Lastly called on the HoR and the HCS to expedite practical steps towards presidential and parliamentary elections and proceed with forming a new unified government.

COMMENT: The statement from Hammad shows the political nature of the threat to close off oil production or control oil revenues. The issue of the formation of a new interim unified government appears to be at the core of the threat, however, this has received a decidedly lukewarm response from the wider international community. This has been noted both in this most recent verbal attack, and previous statements vilifying both Norland and SRSG Bathily and claiming that both were working against the prospect of elections due to a perceived bias towards the GNU. **COMMENT ENDS.**

Significant Incidents

Tripolitania Region




- 1. Unknown Explosion - Jul 01, Al-Murqub Province, Zliten:** A fire with accompanying explosions was reported at a warehouse in Zliten. The warehouse is reported as belonging to the Ahmed al-Futaisi armed group.
- 2. Security Operation - Jun 30, Az Zawiyah Province, Sabratah:** A security operation targeting human trafficking recovered a boat used in the trade.
- 3. Arrest - Jul 01, Az Zawiyah Province, Sabratah:** Sabratah CID arrested an individual who had previously escaped from a CID detention room. The individual is charged with a kidnapping in Nov 2022.

Cyrenaica Region



- 4. Crime - Jun 30, Derna Province, Umm al-Rizam:** Several kilos of heroin were recovered from a beach west of Umm al-Rizam.

Fezzan Region



5. Security Operation - Jun 30 17:00, Murzuq Province, Libya - Niger Border: The LNA's 128 Brigade was reported as conducting operations in the vicinity of the Libyan-Niger border.

Offshore

NSTR

Outlook

Short Term Outlook

- The MoR/HCS track continues to gather pace, with the HoR due to debate the election laws that have emanated from the 6+6 committee. Saleh has already raised concerns on the issue of dual nationality, a mandatory second round and the size/allocation of the parliament. Running in tandem is the concept of a new unified government to replace the GNU. The concept has the support of the HoR, HCS, LNA and the GNS, with all seeing such a government as a means to exert control and influence. For the very same reasons, the GNU remains resolutely opposed to it, while UNSMIL and the International community's reaction has been decidedly lukewarm. Both UNSMIL and the IC likely view the replacement of the GNU as an unnecessary threat to political security and by extension the election process, while also being concerned that any interim government would attempt to extend its tenure and prove to be an election spoiler.
- Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar has once again positioned himself well with influence over both the HoR/HCS track and the competing power-sharing talks between his family and the Dbeibah clan. With progress appearing possible on the HoR/HCS track, pressure is now growing on the power-sharing talks to come to an agreement, an agreement which could yet cause a significant rupture in the political landscape in the short term.
- The threat of an oil blockade or GNS control of NOC accounts both represent a further threat to the GNU and would see funding cut off for the GNU's cash-heavy projects. The coming week is

likely to see a reaction from the CBL, who would be required to allow the GNS control of the NOC accounts. Likewise should this cooperation not be forthcoming and the GNS move to impose a force majeure, this would require action from the LNA. To date, Haftar or the General Command has yet to comment on the threat, and their cooperation cannot be guaranteed.

- The security situation in Tripolitania is becoming increasingly unstable. As political divisions deepen, tensions amongst armed groups are growing with increasing competition over territorial control. This is particularly evident around Zawiyah and the northwest coastline as well as Tripoli International Airport. This trend is likely to continue to escalate with factions solidifying and looking for an advantage over opponents.
- The outbreak of violence in Sudan has the potential to cause conflagration across the region and destabilise the southern border areas with Libya. Speculation continues to suggest that the Libyan National Army (LNA) is providing material support to the Rapid Support Force (RSF), one of the belligerents of the Sudanese conflict. Convoys heading south from Libya have been targeted by the Sudanese Armed Forces, activity which may well have encroached on Libyan territory. While the border has allegedly been closed on both sides, local reports suggest traffic is moving normally at this time.

Medium to Long Term Outlook

- The solution to Libya's political impasse remains elections for many stakeholders with UNSMIL attempting to develop a new pathway. Realistically, the path to elections in 2023 will be fraught with difficulties however, there is a real chance that much-needed groundwork could be achieved whether elections are held or not. While UNSMIL heads efforts towards elections, other international stakeholders are prioritising more short-term objectives as they look to shape not just Libya, but regional and global issues.
- The resurgence of Jihadist Salafism in Tripolitania remains a potential source of destabilisation with indications of renewed tensions between adherents and those of Madkhali Salafism. This competition between the opposing ideologies seeps into the political as well as the military spaces and is expected to slowly intensify as the Jihadist Salafi adherents gain strength in the region. This could increasingly become a defining factor for various groups involved in the political and military spaces.
- While the political process continues to falter, armed groups are exploiting the situation to increase their strength, influence and power across Libya which will likely have a longer-term negative impact on the political situation.
- Terrorist groups remain active but contained in Libya. Islamic State (IS) will continue to present a threat to security forces, primarily in the south, and may re-establish the capability to mount sporadic attacks along the coastline in the future. The group continues to suffer from years of attrition and is more likely focused on providing support for more active IS theatres in sub-Saharan Africa. Al-Qaeda-aligned groups remain active in the country with their integration into societies in the south and some armed groups in the Tripoli area potentially posing a longer-term issue for Libya.

Key Dates

Date	Occasion	Comment
June 27 – 30, 2023	Eid Al-Adha	Public Holiday
July 19, 2023	Islamic New Year	Public Holiday
September 16, 2023	Martyrs' Day	Public Holiday

September 27, 2023	The Prophet's Birthday	Public Holiday
October 23, 2023	Liberation Day	Public Holiday
December 24, 2023	Independence Day	Public Holiday

Acronym List

AQ - Al-Qaeda
BDB – Benghazi Defense Brigade (Al Qaeda-aligned – AAS and RSCB associated/umbrella group)
CBL – Central Bank of Libya
CESF - Constitution and Election Support Force
CNI – Critical National Infrastructure
DACOCT - Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism (SDF)
DDR - Disarmament, demobilising and reintegration
GASO – General Administration of Security Operations
GACS – General Administration of Central Support
GECOL – General Electricity Company of Libya
GMMR – Great Man-made River
GNA – Government of National Accord (2016)
GNC – General National Congress (2012)
GNS – Government of National Stability (2021)
GNU – Government of National Unity (2021)
GTUC - Greater Tripoli Union Council (Tripoli militias and others, established in June 2020)
HCS – High Council of State (Tripoli-based)
HNEC – High National Elections Commission
HoR – House of Representatives (Tobruk-based)
IDF – Indirect Fire (mortars/rockets)
IDP - Internally Displaced Persons
IED - Improvised Explosive Device
IOC - International Oil Company
IS - Islamic State
ISA – Internal Security Agency
JMC – Joint Military Commission
LIFG – Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
LNA – Libyan National Army
LPA – Libyan Political Agreement (2015)
LPDF - Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (2020)
LROR - Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room
MoD - Ministry of Defense
MoF - Ministry of Finance
MoFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoI - Ministry of Interior
MoJ - Ministry of Justice
MoO - Ministry of Oil
MoT - Ministry of Transportation
NFDK - No Further Details Known
NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation (aid/charity)
NOC – National Oil Company
NSTR - Nothing Significant To Report
P3+2 – France, Germany, Italy – UK, US
PC – Presidency Council
PG – Presidential Guard
PFG - Petroleum Facilities Guard
RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade
RTA - Road Traffic Accident
TIP – Tripoli International Airport
SSA – Stability Support Authority
SAF - Small Arms Fire
SDF – Rada Deterrence Force/ Special Deterrence Force/ Rada
UXO - Unexploded Ordnance

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