

Libya weekly security analysis report

June 11, 2023

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Executive Summary

- The recent political advancements made by the 6+6 Committee in drafting the constitutional framework for elections, which were initially achieved in early June, have rapidly unravelled this week due to the deliberate efforts of various actors seeking to undermine the progress. Consequently, a considerable level of uncertainty now surrounds the status of the process, as actors strategically position themselves to adapt to the swiftly evolving situation. This scenario serves as yet another iteration of a recurring pattern that has been witnessed multiple times in Libya throughout the post-revolutionary era.
- Deputy Minister of the Interior (GNS), Faraj Gaim, declared the conclusion of security operations in the Egyptian border region, which had been underway since the end of May, this week. However, despite this announcement, security raids aimed at combating illegal migration have persisted, albeit with decreased intensity. These developments unfolded following resistance from residents of Tobruk, who opposed the imposition of a nightly curfew enforced by the LNA in their locality.
- Field Marshal Haftar is not the only actor with ambitions to increase his dominance within his region. This week saw Prime Minister (GNU) Abdulhamid Dbeibah move to establish a new armed formation in Tripolitania. This comes as the prime minister continues to prosecute his security campaign along the northwest coastline albeit at a much lower tempo following a series of negotiations.

Outlook

Short Term Outlook

- There is an increasing likelihood of forthcoming political change in Libya. The HoR and HCS track has made progress with regard to the constitutional basis for elections, however, this process is only likely to continue smoothly should they secure support for the next phase of their strategy which is the creation of a new unified government. This step is mainly to ensure their continued relevance and primacy over the political process as well as an opportunity to remove certain personalities, like Prime Minister (GNU) Abdulhamid Dbeibah.
- Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar has once again positioned himself well with influence over both the HoR/HCS track and the competing power-sharing talks between his family and the Dbeibah clan. With progress appearing possible on the HoR/HCS track, pressure is now growing on the power-sharing talks to come to an agreement, an agreement which could yet cause a significant rupture in the political landscape in the short term.
- Prime Minister (GNU) Dbeibah is under threat from the HoR/HCS track and is looking to secure a powersharing deal with Haftar in order to help maintain his position however, he has benefited recently from the re-election of Turkish President Erdogan, the fall of rival Misratan prime minister Fathi Bashagha, had is currently building political capital as a result of his security operation along the northwest coastline. He now needs to spend that political currency effectively in talks with Haftar as well as repairing the fractures in his support base. He also needs to manage the security campaign effectively to ensure he can contain his enemies while not pushing too hard and risking a wider destabilisation in the region.
- The security situation in Tripolitania is becoming increasingly unstable. As political divisions deepen, tensions amongst armed groups are growing with increasing competition over territorial control. This is particularly evident around Zawiyah and the northwest coastline as well as Tripoli International Airport. This trend is likely to continue to escalate with factions solidifying and looking for an advantage over opponents.
- The outbreak of violence in Sudan has the potential to cause conflagration across the region and destabilise the southern border areas with Libya. Speculation continues to suggest that the Libyan National Army (LNA) is providing material support to the Rapid Support Force (RSF), one of the belligerents of the Sudanese conflict. Convoys heading south from Libya have been targeted by the Sudanese Armed Forces, activity which may well have encroached on Libyan territory. While the border has allegedly been closed on both sides, local reports suggest traffic is moving normally at this time.

Medium to Long Term Outlook

- The solution to Libya's political impasse remains elections for many stakeholders with UNSMIL attempting to develop a new pathway. Realistically, the path to elections in 2023 will be fraught with difficulties however, there is a real chance that much-needed groundwork could be achieved whether elections are held or not. While UNSMIL heads efforts towards elections, other international stakeholders are prioritising more short-term objectives as they look to shape not just Libya, but regional and global issues.
- The resurgence of Jihadist Salafism in Tripolitania remains a potential source of destabilisation with indications of renewed tensions between adherents and those of Madkhali Salafism. This competition between the opposing ideologies seeps into the political as well as the military spaces and is expected to slowly intensify as the Jihadist Salafi adherents gain strength in the region. This could increasingly become a defining factor for various groups involved in the political and military spaces.
- While the political process continues to falter, armed groups are exploiting the situation to increase their strength, influence and power across Libya which will likely have a longer-term negative impact on the political situation.
- Terrorist groups remain active but contained in Libya. Islamic State (IS) will continue to present a threat to security forces, primarily in the south, and may re-establish the capability to mount sporadic attacks along the coastline in the future. The group continues to suffer from years of attrition and is more likely focused on providing support for more active IS theatres in sub-Saharan Africa. Al-Qaeda-aligned groups remain active in the country with their integration into societies in the south and some armed groups in the Tripoli area potentially posing a longer-term issue for Libya.

Threat Matrix

Region	Political	Terrorism	Militancy	Crime	Kidnap	Civil Unrest
Tripolitania	High	Moderate	High-Extreme	High	High	High
Tripoli	High	Moderate	High-Extreme	High	High	High
Cyrenaica	High	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Benghazi	High	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Fezzan	High	High	High-Extreme	High	High	Low-Moderate
Sabha	High	Moderate	High	High	High	Moderate

Threat Scale

Minimal	Low	Moderate	High	Extreme
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Weekly Assessment

6+6 Committee comes to an agreement

The recent political advancements made by the 6+6 Committee in drafting the constitutional framework for elections, which were initially achieved in early June, have rapidly unravelled this week due to the deliberate efforts of various actors seeking to undermine the progress. Consequently, a considerable level of uncertainty now surrounds the status of the process, as actors strategically position themselves to adapt to the swiftly evolving situation. This scenario serves as yet another iteration of a recurring pattern that has been witnessed multiple times in Libya throughout the post-revolutionary era.

UNSMIL opted for a cautious approach to the outcomes, making clear it would not be involved in any associated ceremony until it had at least had a chance to read the final text. This came as various actors look to enforce modifications to the agreed text following the conclusion of the committee's work at the same time as others outright rejected them. The committee itself stated that its outcomes, unmodified, would be now handed over to the HoR to be voted on, however, even this was challenged by a HoR member of the committee. UNSMIL has maintained caution through the week as the situation developed, giving themselves room to

manoeuvre as developments came thick and fast.

On June 07, they issued a statement, welcoming the 6+6 Committees' work but stated that they: "Recognise that important elements of the electoral laws and associated issues require buy-in and support from a broad range of Libyan institutions, civil society representatives, including women and youth, and political and security actors, to allow inclusive, credible and successful elections to take place." As a result, the mission stated that it would "continue to work with all relevant Libyan institutions, including the Presidential Council, to facilitate a process amongst all actors to address the contested elements of the electoral framework, secure the necessary political agreement on the path to elections, and enable a level playing field for all candidates."

The statement, which was welcomed by Western embassies, highlights the likelihood that despite the 6+6 Committee claiming a definitive draft has been produced, further work is expected to take place on the constitutional framework.

It remains unclear how the situation will develop. It's possible that UNSMIL will now look to step in and after accepting the outcomes, look towards building on them as they work towards creating a broad national consensus.

Should UNSMIL reject the outcomes, they may look to try and launch their own international mechanism in a bid to maintain traction and

work towards elections. Given the lack of support from the Libyan population after various UN-led efforts over the years to resolve the crisis along with political elites continuing to push back against elections, this development would see UNSMIL having to develop support across the country. This would be time-consuming and not in line with their continued efforts to hold elections by the end of the year.

As the HoR/HCS track finds itself once again floundering, it's possible that the power-sharing talks between the Dbeibah and Haftar clans could yet trigger a significant disruption within the political process. This could see efforts intensify in both camps to remove the head of the HCS, Khalid Mishri and the Speaker of the HoR, Aqila Saleh resulting in Dbeibah and Haftar increasing their level of control over their respective regions.

Alternatively, Mishri and Saleh could diverge from their current strategy of cooperation and revert to supporting the GNU and LNA respectively. This would likely result in the status quo remaining and is perhaps the least likely scenario at present.

Haftar looks eastwards

Deputy Minister of the Interior (GNS), Faraj Gaim, declared the conclusion of security operations in the Egyptian border region, which had been underway since the end of May, this week. However, despite this announcement, security raids aimed at combating illegal migration have persisted, albeit with decreased intensity. These developments unfolded following resistance from residents of Tobruk, who opposed the imposition of a nightly curfew enforced by the LNA in their locality.

At the end of May, LNA border guards began to put pressure on local smuggling gangs which are largely associated with the Haboun and Qatan tribes. This saw a shootout between the

border guards and a smuggling gang which resulted in the death of a 14-year-old child (referred to in some reports as an adult). This incident triggered pushback from the Haboun and Qatan tribes who launched an armed attack on the border guard's camp, burning their vehicles. The incident significantly escalated the situation and resulted in the inevitable

deployment of reinforcements from the LNA and Ministry of Interior (GNS) forces, leading to an intensive campaign against smuggling gangs in the border areas as well as Tobruk.

The development comes against the backdrop of increasing levels of illegal migration emanating from the east of Libya with around 10,000 people landing in Italy in the first five months of 2023. The increase in illegal migration in the area is both a source of finance and political leverage which the Haftar clan is looking to exploit. The Haftar's however do not have control in the Tobruk or border areas with Speaker of the HoR, Aqila Saleh's tribe, the Obeidat, dominating the area.

The Obeidat is the largest tribe in east Libya and counts the area from the

Egyptian border in the east to the highlands above Derna in the west as it's homeland. Members also live in Benghazi, Ajdabiya and Derna in significant numbers. The tribe is a Saadi tribe which traces its ancestry to the founding mother of the nine aristocratic tribes in eastern Libya: Obeidat, Abid, Ailat Fayid, Arif, Awaqir, Barassa, Darsa, Hasa and Magharb. It settled the region in the 16th century after dislodging the Awlad Ali tribe into Egypt. Despite their history, the two maintain good relations. The Obeidat has approximately 15 sub-tribes or client tribes which include the Haboun, the Qatan, and the Mnefa tribe, to which the current president belongs.

The tribe has long held a strong position within Libyan politics, a position which peaked under the era of the monarchy and Senussi order. The Senussi order, which gave rise to the monarchy in the 50's, emanated from the Jaghboub Oasis

“UNMSIL recognises that important elements of the electoral laws and associated issues require buy-in and support from a broad range of Libyan institutions, civil society representatives, including women and youth, and political and security actors, to allow inclusive, credible and successful elections to take place.”

UNSMIL Statement – June 07, 2023

to the south of Tobruk along the Egyptian border. The tribes' influence however was eroded under the Gadhafi regime, which overthrew the monarchy in 1969. The tribe has sought to rebuild its political influence after joining the revolution in 2011.

While the Haftar clan now dominates the western part of Cyrenaica, the Obeidat continues to dominate the east. Long-standing tensions are once again rising between the two centres of power with the sons of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar turning their eyes eastwards from their stronghold in Benghazi. During May, this saw them finally break the dominance that Lieutenant General Abdelrazek Al-Nadouri, the chief of staff of the LNA, had built in Marj. This saw the Haftar clan begin to project influence in the city of Marj as they subsumed the local 115 Battalion, which had represented the military power of the Nadouri's, into 106 Brigade. Nadouri comes from the Magharba tribe, one of the nine Saadi tribes.

With Marj now coming increasingly under their influence, the Haftar clan is continuing to push east. At the end of May, the Haftar's backed Colonel Yahya Al-Asima from 106 Brigade in an attempt to dislodge Obeidat forces from Labraq Airbase east of Bayda, and around 40km west of Ayn Marrah, an Obeidat stronghold. Colonel Asima, as well as being a member of 106 Brigade, is from the Barassa Tribe, another of the nine Saadi tribes. The tribal dimension has not gone unnoticed with local accusations that the Haftar clan is looking to exacerbate competition between the dominant tribes in eastern Libya in order to facilitate their efforts to project influence eastwards in a divide-and-conqueror-inspired strategy.

And these ambitions include projecting influence into the heartlands of the Obeidat. The border guards in Musaid were allegedly acting on orders from Saddam Haftar when they began to build pressure on the local smuggling gangs from the Haboun and Qatan tribes towards the end of May. Saddam had allegedly sent a message via Ali al-Mashy, commander of the 20/20 Group (Tariq Bin Ziyad Brigade), informing the smugglers that if they wished to continue work, they would have to move their operations to Benghazi. This message was undoubtedly received badly but signalled Saddam's future intent. After all, the 20/20 Group is already heavily engaged in illegal migration operations, housing migrants allegedly flown in from Syria via Cham Wings Airlines, in warehouses in the greater Benghazi area and Fezzan.

The move to project influence eastwards by the Haftar clan has key national and geopolitical implications. It is bringing them into direct confrontation with Aqila Saleh, speaker of the HoR who has already seen the seat of Parliament moved from Tobruk to Benghazi after it was attacked in July 2022. Reports suggested Saleh's position was under pressure in May with the Haftar clan working towards his removal at the same time as their ultimately successful strategy to have Fathi Bashagha stood down as prime minister of the GNS. It was the intervention of Cairo, which continues to support Saleh, which ultimately saved his position however the influence of the Haftar clan over him is becoming more and more evident. Over the last month, Saleh has increasingly cut a more isolated figure domestically however continues to maintain international relationships.

As well as their ongoing support to Saleh, the Sudan crisis is also impacting relations between Cairo and Haftar. Both have found themselves on different sides of the crisis with Cairo warning Haftar in the early days of the conflict to cease their support for the Rapid Support Force (RSF). Haftar has used the recent security operations in the Tobruk and border areas to build political leverage over Cairo after rounding up around 4000 illegal migrants. Most are Egyptians with reports indicating 2000 have already been deported, by foot over the border, leaving another 2000 waiting in the wings as leverage. This comes as Cairo deals with pressure on its southern border due to increasing numbers of Sudanese refugees heading north to escape the conflict.

Using illegal migration to build political leverage is not only aimed at Cairo, however. With 10,000 people reaching Italian shores from eastern Libya over the first 5 months of the year, Rome is increasingly being manoeuvred into having to deal with Haftar. This was highlighted in early May when the field marshal travelled to Rome to meet with Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni. Illegal migration remains a priority issue for Italy's new government and with the explosion of the eastern migration route, the Haftar clan hopes to exploit the situation to secure Italian support, support which they have seen been pushed to Tripolitania over the past few years.

This is likely to be an enduring long-term trend as the Haftar clan looks to assert its authority across the east in an effort to become the dominant political power. This will bring it into direct confrontation with various actors as well as tribes and as such, they may increasingly look to employ the Gadhafi strategy of

encouraging tribal tensions which they can then utilise to increase their influence. This is likely to see further areas of destabilisation over the medium to long term alongside further efforts to control, if not remove, political actors like Aqila Saleh who have their own power bases in the east.

Dbeibah works to shift the security landscape in his favour


Field Marshal Haftar is not the only actor with ambitions to increase his dominance within his region. This week saw Prime Minister (GNU) Abdulhamid Dbeibah move to establish a new armed formation in Tripolitania. This comes as the prime minister continues to prosecute his security campaign along the northwest coastline albeit at a much lower tempo following a series of negotiations.

The National Apparatus for Supporting Armed Forces, which reportedly aims to “protect the February 17 revolution,” was established by the prime minister on June 06. Ahmed Issa, brother of Mohammed Issa, the Undersecretary of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was appointed as commander while Othman Lahab was appointed as its deputy. Lahab is the commander of 103 Battalion which operates around the west and south of Zawiyah.

Dbeibah’s effort to establish the new force is being challenged by the Presidential Council who stated that the decision was “issued by a body that is not legally competent and violates the provisions of Article 3, Paragraph 7, of Law No. 11 of 2012.”

The creation of the new force likely serves several purposes. While being another vehicle for the prime minister to justify the use of state funds to build his support base, its primary design is assessed to be as a praetorian guard. This comes as Dbeibah faces a number of challenges to his continued leadership. As well as the HoR/HCS track which seeks to unseat him, he is also facing a loss of support from some armed group commanders in Tripolitania. As highlighted in 2022, one key aspect of remaining in power will be his ability to physically stay in Tripoli and in control of the key levers of state, a strategy bolstered by the addition of a new force which is under his direct control. The force has also been given a broad remit which would allow Dbeibah to use it as a counter to the ambitions of various armed group commanders who continue to expand across the region.

The force has also been linked to previous calls by the Grand Mufti, Sadiq al-Ghariani, for a National Guard to be established. This has led to accusations that its creation is, in part, a counterbalance to 444 Brigade and SDF which lean towards the Salafi movement and comes as tensions between the opposing religious



Graphic: Airstrikes associated with the GNU Security operation along northwest coastline

currents continues to escalate in Tripolitania as the Jihadist Salafi element re-establishes itself.


The inclusion of Lahab also points to another strategy at play. Lahab has been associated with anti-Dbeibah forces which have concentrated to the west and south of Tripoli since losing positions inside the capital in August 2022 through a series of battles. The prime minister has been looking to erode this coalition since successfully confronting the immediate threat they posed last year when they backed his rival Fathi Bashagha's attempts to enter Tripoli.

Following the battles in 2022, Dbeibah moved to reconcile 55 Battalion, strategically located in Warshefana which provided a safe haven and focal point for anti-Dbeibah forces. After threatening the battalion militarily which included a probing attack by their long-standing enemy, 3 Unit, negotiations began with the battalion commander, Muammar Dhawi. He eventually shifted his support back to the GNU, officially being incorporated within the Ministry of Defence forces and given seven months back pay for his men. Since then, he has sought to craft a new image for himself as a community leader and may be pursuing political aspirations. Despite his shift, he is not assessed to be loyal to Dbeibah and continues to associate with the anti-Dbeibah coalition, at times providing mediation.


It appears that the prime minister is employing a similar strategy to that used with 55 Battalion, although on a larger scale, with the ongoing security campaign along the northwest coastline. After applying military pressure, negotiations have been struck up with various opposing elements. As well as the appointment of Lahab as the deputy of the National Apparatus for Supporting Armed Forces, Zawiyah-based commanders have engaged in talks with the powerful Bouzriba family. The family's interests were heavily targeted in the opening days of the air campaign however this week saw them strike a cooperation deal with opposing Zawiyah actors, Major General Namroush, commander of the Western Coast Military Region, and Mahmoud bin Rajab, commander of 52 Brigade. Despite a continuation of the campaign, albeit at a much lower tempo, the Bouzriba's have seen no further targeting since the agreement was announced on June 06. Instead, the campaign has largely focused on Zuwara.

While neither development has struck a decisive blow to the anti-Dbeibah forces, it has shifted the dynamics somewhat with those targeted swaying towards doing a deal rather than face further attrition of their positions. Further moves will likely aim to isolate key actors like Major General Osama Jweli from local allies as Dbeibah tries to seal the growing cracks in his support base and the wider region and fend off challenges to his premiership.

Weekly Statistical Overview



Graph: Breakdown of weekly statistics including incident count, fatalities, injuries, kidnaps and arrests by region



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
Image: Weekly security incidents across the country by province

Activity levels decreased from 127 to 74 this week.


Tripolitania saw a decrease with 46 incidents this week compared to 89 from last week. This may in part be due to the ongoing GNU security operation along the northwest coastline which has resulted in a suppression of military movement with negotiations this week seeing agreements struck with armed group commanders.

Activity levels in Cyrenca reduced this week as security operations in the east of the region slowed and came to a close. This week saw 20 incidents reported compared to 30 last week.

Activity remained steady in Fezzan with eight incidents reported this week, the same as last week.



Graph: Weekly security incidents across the country by region for the past six months



Graph: Weekly security incidents across the country by incident category for the week

Weekly Significant Incidents

Tripolitania




Image: Weekly security incidents reported across Tripolitania

Security Incidents

- Jun 05** | Armed Clash - Sirte Province, Al-Naqah: The attempted arrest of a Qaddafi tribal member by GACS, under the command of Nasser Mehle Al-Ferjani, resulted in an armed clash. The attempted arrest took place in the street, causing panic amongst local civilians. The arrest did not go smoothly and resulted in GACS opening fire. The neighbourhood is dominated by the Qaddafi tribe.
- Jun 06** | Airstrike - Nuqat Al-Khams Province, Semafro Old City: An airstrike targeted a Ministry of Interior facility. This highlights the fact that many militias involved in criminal activity are also legitimate armed forces.
- Jun 06** | Threat Warning - Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah: The West Coast Military Zone sent an urgent message calling for civilians to stay away from criminal locations, drug dealers, smuggling and fuel storage sites stating that these were considered legitimate military targets.
- Jun 07** | Security Operation - Nuqat Al-Khams Province, Zuwara: The Security Directorate in Zuwara detained over 40 illegal migrants found in a house in the city. Four suspects involved in the trafficking of migrants were also arrested. This comes as the Italian Ministry of Interior announced a notable decrease in the arrival rates of illegal migrants via sea routes to Italy over the first five months of 2023 compared to the same time in 2022 with Tunisia overtaking Libya as the primary transit point.
- Jun 07** | Airstrike - Nuqat Al-Khams Province, Zuwara: An airstrike targeted an unknown location in the city.
- Jun 07** | Surveillance - Nuqat Al-Khams Province, Jadida: A drone was sighted flying over the area.

- Jun 07** | Surveillance - Nuqat Al-Khams Province, Ajaylat: A drone was sighted flying over the area.
- Jun 07** | Airstrike - Nuqat Al-Khams Province, Zuwara: A drone strike was reported in the city resulting in a column of dark smoke.
- Jun 07** | Troop Movements - Nuqat Al-Khams Province, Mellitah Terminal: The Ammar Belkour militia escorted an unknown number of illegal migrants to the shoreline near Mellitah. The militia was heavily targeted at the start of June during the GNU northwest coastline operation. Several airstrikes hit militia locations in Shabika along with a security raid by an Al-Far aligned group which resulted in clashes.
- Jun 07** | Airstrike - Nuqat Al-Khams Province, Zuwara: Another airstrike targeted a fuel smuggling location in the city.
- Jun 08** | Airstrike - Nuqat Al-Khams Province, Zuwara: Another airstrike targeted the area.
- Jun 08** | Troop Movements - Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah: 103 Battalion, under the command of Othman Lahab, deployed south of Zawiyah. Lahab has been appointed as the Deputy of Prime Minister (GNU) Dbeibah's new armed force:
- Jun 09** | Airstrike - Az Zawiyah Province, Bir Muammar: Airstrikes targeted a black-market fuel site in the area.
- Jun 09** | Surveillance - Tripoli Province, Ain Zara: A drone was noted flying above the area.
- Jun 10** | Troop Movements - Al-Murqub Province, Tarhunah: 444 Brigade mobilised around 150 armed vehicles from Tarhunah to Tripoli.
- Jun 10** | Murder/ Execution - Az Zawiyah Province, Motrid: An unidentified dead body, handcuffed and with feet bound, was found along the shoreline.

Cyrenaica




Image: Weekly security incidents reported across Cyrenaica

Security Incidents

- Jun 04** | Arrest - Al-Butnan Province, Tobruk: The LNA arrested Saber al-Awami. Awami was the driver of a large piece of plant which was used to break down the walls around the parliament building during the attack in July 2022 by local protestors. The Speaker of the HoR, Aqila Saleh, accused President Menfi and his brother Sami of mobilizing the demonstration which led to the attack. The Menfi family and tribe strongly denied the accusations. The HoR has since been moved from Tobruk, an area dominated by Saleh, to Benghazi, an area dominated by Haftar.
- Jun 04** | Security Operation - Al-Wahat Province, Ajdabiya: 166 Infantry Brigade (LNA) raided a fuel smuggling site to the south of Ajdabiya.
- Jun 05** | Demonstration - Benghazi Province, Benghazi: Posters for a joint Turkish and Libyan exhibition were ripped down and driven over while others were burnt. This follows similar activity on June 03 in Bayda. The posters are adverts for the Turkish Industries Exhibition which is planned to take place at the Al-Hawary Fairgrounds in Benghazi between June 12-15.
- Jun 05** | Armed Attack - Al-Butnan Province, Customs Office Musaid: Members of the Tariq Bin Ziyad Brigade (LNA) attacked the Customs Office resulting in work stopping.
- Jun 05** | Demonstration - Al-Marj Province, Marj: Posters for a joint Turkish and Libyan exhibition were ripped down and driven over while others were burnt. This follows similar activity on June 03 in Bayda and June 05 in Benghazi. The posters are adverts for the Turkish Industries Exhibition which is planned to take place at the Al-Hawary Fairgrounds in Benghazi between June 12-15.
- Jun 06** | Weapons Find - Al-Butnan Province, Bir Al-Ashhab: The Joint Security Force (MoI/LNA) uncovered drugs, pills and weapons hidden inside farms in the Bir Al-Ashhab area near Tobruk. Those responsible had already fled prior to the forces entry.
- Jun 06** | Security Announcement - Al-Butnan Province, Tobruk: The Tobruk Security Directorate announced the end of the nightly curfew which was imposed on June 03 due to ongoing security operations in the area. This comes after notable pushback from locals who rejected the curfew, taking to the streets. It should be noted that Tobruk is dominated by the Obeidat Tribe, which counts HoR Speaker Saleh as a member. Saleh is believed to be coming under notable pressure at present from the Haftar clan.
- Jun 07** | Security Operation - Al-Butnan Province, Bardiyah: The Department of Relations and Cooperation in the Eastern Region detained 400 illegal immigrants in Bardiyah.
- Jun 09** | Assault - Al-Butnan Province, Tobruk: Tensions between members of the Minister of Interior (GNS) and the Tariq Bin Ziyad Brigade (LNA) devolved into scuffles over who is securing money, cars and drugs seized during recent operations in Musaid and Tobruk.
- Jun 10** | Security Operation - Benghazi Province, Kuwayfiah: Benghazi Security Forces raided a house in the area used by an Egyptian national for "conducting surgical operations." This appears to have been an unlicensed medical clinic.
- Jun 10** | Security Operation - Al-Butnan Province, Musaid: The Musaid Security Directorate and DCIM-Tobruk Branch detained around 200 immigrants of various nationalities (Egypt, Syria and Bangladesh) in the Shat area.

Fezzan




Image: Weekly security incidents reported across Fezzan

Security Incidents

- Jun 08** | Security Announcement - Wadi Al-Hayaa Province, El Feel Oilfield: Unconfirmed reports claimed that El Feel had been closed down. This comes as Prime Minister (GNU) Dbeibah signed an MOU regarding oil and gas with Rome.
- Jun 09** | Security Operation - Al-Jufra Province, Jufra: The Tariq Bin Ziyad Brigade and 128 Brigade (LNA) launched a joint wide-scale operation to patrol the area in a bid to enhance security and combat crime.
- Jun 09** | Security Operation - Sabha Province, Samnu: The Tariq Bin Ziyad Brigade and 128 Brigade (LNA) launched a joint wide-scale operation to patrol the area in a bid to enhance security and combat crime.
- Jun 09** | Security Operation - Sabha Province, Tamanhint: The Tariq Bin Ziyad Brigade and 128 Brigade (LNA) launched a joint wide-scale operation to patrol the area in a bid to enhance security and combat crime.
- Jun 09** | Security Operation - Wadi Al-Hayaa Province, Obari: The Tariq Bin Ziyad Brigade and 128 Brigade (LNA) launched a joint wide-scale operation to patrol the area in a bid to enhance security and combat crime.
- Jun 09** | Security Operation - Ghat Province, Ghat: The Tariq Bin Ziyad Brigade and 128 Brigade (LNA) launched a joint wide-scale operation to patrol the area in a bid to enhance security and combat crime.
- Jun 09** | Security Operation - Ghat Province, Essen Border Crossing: The Tariq Bin Ziyad Brigade and 128 Brigade (LNA) launched a joint wide-scale operation to patrol the area in a bid to enhance security and combat crime.
- Jun 09** | Security Operation - Al-Jufra Province, Fugaha: The Tariq Bin Ziyad Brigade and 128 Brigade (LNA) launched a joint wide-scale operation to patrol the area in a bid to enhance security and combat crime.
- Jun 10** | Weapons Find - Wadi Al-Hayaa Province, Obari: The Sabha Military Region Special Task Force intercepted military weapons being transported from Misrata to Obari. The LNA stated that the weapons were part of a military mission.

Acronym List

AQ - Al-Qaeda

BDB – Benghazi Defense Brigade (Al Qaeda-aligned – AAS and RSCB associated/umbrella group)

CBL – Central Bank of Libya

CESF - Constitution and Election Support Force

CNI – Critical National Infrastructure

DACOCT - Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism (SDF)

DDR - Disarmament, demobilising and reintegration

GASO – General Administration of Security Operations

GACS – General Administration of Central Support

GECOL – General Electricity Company of Libya

GMMR – Great Man-made River

GNA – Government of National Accord (2016)

GNC – General National Congress (2012)

GNS – Government of National Stability (2021)

GNU – Government of National Unity (2021)

GTUC - Greater Tripoli Union Council (Tripoli militias and others, established in June 2020)

HCS – High Council of State (Tripoli-based)

HNEC – High National Elections Commission

HoR – House of Representatives (Tobruk-based)

IDF – Indirect Fire (mortars/rockets)

IDP - Internally Displaced Persons

IED - Improvised Explosive Device

IOC - International Oil Company

IS - Islamic State

JMC – Joint Military Commission

LIFG – Libyan Islamic Fighting Group

LNA – Libyan National Army

LPA – Libyan Political Agreement (2015)

LPDF - Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (2020)

LROR - Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room

MoD - Ministry of Defense

MoF - Ministry of Finance

MoFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MoI - Ministry of Interior

MoJ - Ministry of Justice

MoO - Ministry of Oil

MoT - Ministry of Transportation

NFDK - No Further Details Known

NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation (aid/charity)

NOC – National Oil Company

NSG – National Salvation Government (GNC)

NSTR - Nothing Significant To Report

P3+2 – France, Germany, Italy – UK, US

PC – Presidency Council

PG – Presidential Guard

PFG - Petroleum Facilities Guard

RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade

RTA - Road Traffic Accident

TIP – Tripoli International Airport

SSA – Stability Support Authority

SAF - Small Arms Fire

SDF – Rada Deterrence Force/ Special Deterrence Force/ Rada

UXO - Unexploded Ordnance

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