

Libya weekly security analysis report

April 30, 2023

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Executive Summary

- The political process remains in the doldrums with the 6+6 HoR/HCS committee continuing to be promoted by both bodies as the vehicle to take the nation to elections, while failing even to meet. In interviews during the week two committee members revealed that the committee has yet to even discuss the contentious issues, nearly one month after being created. In total, the process of passing the 13th constitutional amendment and creating the subsequent committee has taken three months leading many to believe that the committee itself is yet a further stalling tactic from the HoR and HCS.
- A series of clashes were reported in Zawiyah on the night of Apr 23, with renewed fighting on Apr 24. Initial reporting indicates that the clashes broke out after an attempted targeted attack against Salah al Azraq and Hamidi Bin Nasser which was itself retaliation for the murder of Abdo Zait on Apr 22. Zait is alleged to have been affiliated with Hassan Abu Zariba's SSA Western Region. The clashes were reported to be between Abu Zait's affiliates and Hazem Arhim (aka al-Awais). A mobilization of forces under Mohmamed Bahroun (al-Far) was later reported, and a ceasefire was negotiated bringing calm to the area.
- Protests by youth were then seen throughout the Zawiyah area on Apr 27. The demonstrations were in reaction to the release of a video purporting to show Libyans being tortured by Africans. The demonstrations saw the closure of entry and exit points to Zawiyah, Zawiyah Refinery, Zawiyah Municipal Council and Zawiyah Security Directorate. The youth movement of Zawiyah also released a list of demands and vowed to continue to block routes until their demands are met. The GNU CoS, Lieutenant General Muhammad Haddad then visited Zawiyah's Martyrs Square on Apr 28 and spoke with protestors. Haddad pledged that the army was ready to defend the people of Zawiyah and that the demands of the protestors were legitimate. Haddad added, "We are not evading responsibility, but rather we came to join those righteous martyrs." Local sources reported that the routes were reopened either shortly before or immediately after the address from Haddad. The message from Haddad will have been well received by protestors. Haddad is viewed as a military professional rather than a product of an armed group legacy. However, previous pledges following violence in Zawiyah, including the formation of the Zawiyah Operations Room following the murder of a family on Dec 24, 2022, have saw little change in the overall security situation.
- GNU Foreign Minister, Najla Mangoush, held a call with the US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Barbara Leaf where the two discussed strengthening cooperation between the two countries on the Sudan conflict file. In a social media post on the call, the US State Department stated that it "strongly supports efforts to end the violence in Sudan & prevent further regional spillover. In a call, A/S Leaf & Libyan FM Najla Mangoush discussed the impact on regional security as well the importance of full support for UN efforts leading to Libyan elections."
- The US Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Barbara Leaf also spoke by phone to LNA Commander Khalifa Haftar on the "urgent need to prevent outside actors, including the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group, from further destabilizing Libya or its neighbours, including Sudan." The report of the conversation was carried out on the official US State Department -Near Eastern Affairs social media page and underlines the continued urgency that the US sees in the limited or eliminating Wagner Group influence in Libya and elsewhere in Africa. Leaf raised the issue of Wagner Group with Haftar during his visit in March and the subsequent lack of any developments in their removal will have been met with some frustration. In addition, increased reporting of either the LNA or Wagner Group resupplying the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan from Libya will have only reinforced the assessment that Wagner Group is primarily attempting to disrupt and subsequently influence regimes throughout Africa.

Outlook

Short Term Outlook

- The political process remains stalled, despite the best efforts of SRSG Bathily and his new initiative. The recently created 6+6 committee, created by the HoR and HCS to resolve the outstanding issues related to the election laws and constitutional basis for the elections has made no progress. The committee was viewed by many as a further attempt to delay the election process, and its actions to date would support this belief. Bathily has continued to engage with various political actors throughout the country, however, his new initiative remains ill-defined and as such appears to have received vocal approval but limited results.
- The security situation in and around Tripoli remains fundamentally unstable. After significant changes to the capital's security makeup in August and September 2022, new faultlines are emerging as militia commanders continue to consolidate their positions. This includes expanding their influence through ministries and other state apparatus. In addition, plans to reconstruct Tripoli International Airport threaten to destabilise the delicate balance of power in the city with Misratan entities looking to claim significant influence over the location. The resurgence of Jihadist Salafism in Tripolitania is also a potential source of destabilisation, one which is currently being felt in Tajura and along the north-west coastline. This instability along the coastline may be positively impacted by efforts in Zawiyah to reorganise armed groups which could increase cooperation. Armed groups in Tripoli continue to be empowered via financial, military, and political means, ensuring they will continue to exert significant influence over the political situation.

Medium to Long Term Outlook

- The solution to Libya's political impasse remains elections for many stakeholders with UNSMIL attempting to develop a new pathway. Realistically, the path to elections in 2023 will be fraught with difficulties however, there is a real chance that much-needed groundwork could be achieved. While UNSMIL heads efforts towards elections, other international stakeholders are prioritising more short-term objectives as they look to shape not just Libya, but regional and global issues.
- Terrorist groups remain active but contained in Libya. Islamic State (IS) will continue to present a threat to security forces, primarily in the south, and may re-establish the capability to mount sporadic attacks along the coastline in the future. The group continues to suffer from years of attrition and is more likely focused on providing support for more active IS theatres in sub-Saharan Africa. Al-Qaeda-aligned groups remain active in the country with their integration into societies in the south and some armed groups in the Tripoli area potentially posing a longer-term issue for Libya.

Threat Matrix

Region	Political	Terrorism	Militancy	Crime	Kidnap	Civil Unrest
Tripolitania	High	Moderate	High-Extreme	High	High	High
Tripoli	High	Moderate	High-Extreme	High	High	High
Cyrenaica	High	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Benghazi	High	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Fezzan	High	High	High	High	High	Low-Moderate
Sabha	High	Moderate	High	High	High	Moderate

Threat Scale	Minimal	Low	Moderate	High	Extreme

Weekly Assessment

6+6 Makes No Progress

The much-lauded 6+6 committee, formed by the HoR and the HCS to resolve the issues of the election laws and the constitutional basis for the election has yet to make any tangible progress of the core issues.

Jalal al-Shahudi, an HoR member of the 6+6 committee claimed in an interview that SRSB Bathily's approach is an attempt to strain the relationship between the HoR and the state. He stated that "The UN envoy, and all the intervening countries, must be aware that we are keener than everyone else to serve our country, but each entity has its own vision on the matter." He added that the insistence of UNSMIL and intervening countries to commit to a date for completing the election laws risked a repeat of the failure of the LPDF roadmap and the failed December 2021 elections.

A similar sentiment was made by HCS 6+6 member Ahmed al-Awjali, who stated that "We cannot, from now on before we start, set a date in advance for the completion of our work, but we all look forward to the discussions going smoothly, and at that time we may be able to agree on the laws even before next June." He criticized Bathily's request during his UNSC briefing for the committee to speed up its work and asserted that it amounted to an attempt to exert pressure. Finally, Al-Awjali confirmed that the committee has not yet discussed in any way the controversial articles regarding the conditions for running for the presidency, including the candidacy of military personnel and dual nationals.

Both the comments from Shahudi and Awjali appear to show an increasing rejection of UNSMIL's perceived intervention in what they view as a Libyan matter. The committee, itself an outcome of the 13th constitutional amendment has been viewed by many as yet another stalling tactic from both the HoR and the HCS. In reality, the passing of the amendment, and the subsequent formation of the 6+6 committee has already taken three months, with

the core issues relating to candidate criteria not even having been discussed. Expectations for the committee are low, and while statements claiming some form of progress can be expected to counter increasing criticism, the likely outcome is a compromised set of election laws which may be used as a premise by powerful political elites to further delay elections on the basis that they would result in instability.

Continued Instability in Zawiyah

A series of clashes were reported in Zawiyah on the night of Apr 23, with renewed fighting on Apr 24. Initial reporting indicates that the clashes broke out after an attempted targeted attack against Salah al Azraq and Hamidi Bin Nasser which was itself retaliation for the murder of Abdo Zait on Apr 22. Zait is alleged to have been affiliated with Hassan Abu Zariba's SSA Western Region. The clashes were reported to be between Abu Zait's affiliates and Hazem Arhim (aka al-Awais). A mobilization of forces under Mohmamed Bahroun (al-Far) was later reported, and a ceasefire was negotiated

bringing calm to the area.

The ceasefire collapsed on the afternoon of Apr 24 with renewed clashes between the al Ziat and al Awais factions. Open sources reported that four persons were killed on the night of Apr 23, including two civilians who were killed when an RPG struck their home. The Red Crescent also reported that they had evacuated 30 families from areas directly impacted by the fighting.: The demands of the Zait-aligned faction are not known, nor are the

terms of the initial ceasefire.

Subsequent reporting on the clashes revealed that Abdo Zait was murdered on Apr 22 following his earlier abduction and beating of Hazim Arhim (al-Awais) and the killing of Hazem al-Dubali. Zait had accused both of affiliation with the LNA, following a visit by both to the east of the country. As well as Ziat's murder, his brother, Amir Zait was kidnapped by al-Awais aligned forces. The fighting between Ziat and al-Awais forces subsided following the intervention

"The UN envoy, and all the intervening countries, must be aware that we are keener than everyone else to serve our country, but each entity has its own vision on the matter."

HoR 6+6 member Jalal al-Shahudi

of the Al-Siila'a battalion under Othman Lahab and the release of Amir Zait. Subsequent meetings between the notables of the Awlad Saqr tribe and military leaders in the city then saw some form of short-lived resolution.

Protests by youth were then seen throughout the Zawiyah area on Apr 27. The demonstrations were in reaction to the release of a video purporting to show Libyans being tortured by Africans. The demonstrations saw the closure of entry and exit points to Zawiyah, Zawiyah Refinery, Zawiyah Municipal Council and Zawiyah Security Directorate. The youth movement of Zawiyah also released a list of demands and vowed to continue to block routes until their demands are met:

- We demand the abolition of the joint security force and its restructuring again, the criminalization of witches and the issuance of a law criminalizing all those who deal with them.
- The punishment must be applied to the Africans who appeared in the torture video, and the work of the Security Directorate must be completely stopped and its compliance with the judiciary.
- We demand the election of a new municipal council and the suspension of all members of the current municipal council and their accountability.
- The agencies working with the Al-Zawia refinery must be restructured in coordination with the Oil Facilities Guard to prevent smuggling, and a committee will be formed from the youth of the movement to follow up on the implementation of this demand.
- We demand that the security services that dealt with Africans or sold them gasoline be held accountable.
- We demand the closure of all petrol stations known to smuggle fuel, and they are 5 stations.

The issue of a large migrant population in Zawiyah, by some reports 46,000 out of a total population of 186,00 has long been recognised as a social issue. The release of the video, showing the torture of an alleged Zawiyah youth by Africans had a predictable spontaneous response and given the pre-existing demographic issues, this latest development significantly increases the risk of revenge attacks against the African migrant population, both within Zawiyah and other areas of Libya. Online posts calling for the clearing of dens' or similar hate speech only fuel the existing fire.

Such activity has a precedent with a pogrom against Africans in 2000. This episode saw violence throughout the country, with 150 deaths being reported in Zawiyah alone, which was once again a focus of activity. While the country has changed significantly since 2000, the social issues and deep-seated socially based resentment remain much the same. However, the release of the video is also likely a tactical move by groups in the city to weaponise the race issues already present and provide an opportunity for them to advance their own self-serving agendas.

Demonstrations continued throughout Apr 27 and into Apr 28. Forces from 52 Brigade under Mahmoud Bin Rajab were deployed by the commander of the Western Coastal Military Zone, Salah Namroush. The force announced the reopening of the coastal road, however, came under attack in the area of the Daman traffic lights in central Zawiyah. Video footage showed sustained stone-throwing from protestors who claimed that they were forcing 52 Brigade out as they employed Syrian mercenaries. SAF was also reported against 52 Brigade but no injuries were reported. By 0200hrs on Apr 28 52 Brigade withdrew and roadblocks were reimposed.

The GNU CoS, Lieutenant General Muhammad Haddad then visited Zawiyah's Martyrs Square on Apr 28 and spoke with protestors. Haddad pledged that the army was ready to defend the people of Zawiyah and that the demands of the protestors were legitimate. Haddad added, "We are not evading responsibility, but rather we came to join those righteous martyrs." Local sources reported that the routes were reopened either shortly before or immediately after the address from Haddad. The message from Haddad will have been well received by protestors. Haddad is viewed as a military professional rather than a product of an armed group legacy. However, previous pledges following violence in Zawiyah, including the formation of the Zawiyah Operations Room following the murder of a family on Dec 24, 2022, have saw little change in the overall security situation. This latest pledge will mean little without a tangible and effective security presence that is not viewed as a deployment of an armed group under a formalized structure. Furthermore, the underlying issue that resulted in the most recent protest is founded in social demographics with the high numbers of migrants present in the city now drawing significant resentment. This latest initiative will do little to alleviate this issue, and therefore the threat of protests or revenge attacks on the


migrant social group remains in the short to medium term.


In a later statement published on its social media account, the 444th Combat Brigade announced that it had refused to intervene in Zawiyah after receiving a request from the GNU. The statement added that the decision was taken in order to avoid clashes with the Zawiyah youth and asserted that the government must

listen to the demands of the people and to “abandon the policy of muzzling voices using military force if it wants to continue in its position.” 444 Brigade has typically avoided involvement in affairs it deems political, with its role in the GNU/GNS motivated clashes being that of interventionist rather than protagonist and so for now it is unclear what measures Haddad will be able to take to honour the recent pledges made.

Weekly Statistical Overview

Graph: Breakdown of weekly statistics including incident count, fatalities, injuries, kidnaps and arrests by region






Activity levels increased 48 incidents nationally, up from 33.

Tripolitania saw levels increase with the majority of significant activity being reported in the Zawiyah area. The city saw two days of clashes, followed by two days of protests following the release of a contentious video. The protests saw the coastal road being closed and although the protests subsided, the underlying issues remain unsolved.

Cyrenica saw a decrease this week from 12 to 10. The period saw the continued deployment of LNA forces to the border area. Unconfirmed reporting also continues to indicate that the LNA or Wagner group have been utilising Kufra airbase to resupply RSF forces fighting in Sidan

The southern region remained quiet with only two reported incidents.



Weekly Significant Incidents

Tripolitania




Image: Weekly security incidents reported across Tripolitania

Security Incidents

- Apr 22** | Arrest - Al-Murqub Province, Khoms: GASO arrested a male accused of killing a family member. A firearm was recovered at the scene.
- Apr 23** | Security Operation - Nuqat Al-Khams Province, Al-Assah: The Mol Border Guard conducted patrolling operations between Ras Ajdir and al-Assah.
- Apr 23** | Armed Clash - Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah: Armed clashes broke out in the area of Ghanudi traffic island resulting in four fatalities, including two civilians. The clashes started after the attempted assassination of Salah Azraq and Hamdi Bin Nasser, which itself was a retaliation for the killing of Abdo Zait on Feb 22.
- Apr 24** | Armed Clash - Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah: Renewed clashes were reported in Zawiyah following the collapse of a truce which had ended the fighting on the 23/24 Apr.
- Apr 24** | Armed Attack - Al-Murqub Province, Khoms: An armed attack was reported in the area of Wadi Kiam VCP. The VCP was temporarily closed.
- Apr 25** | Arrest - Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah: Following the arrest of the brother of Zawiyah Coastguard commander Bidja, tensions were reported as high in the Zawiyah area with the Bidja faction threatening to take action against SSA western branch if he is not released.
- Apr 25** | Murder/ Execution - Tripoli Province, Suq al-Juma: Two expatriate workers (nationality not known) were shot in the Suq al Juma area. Both were transferred to hospital where one died. A suspected perpetrator was arrested and a weapon recovered.
- Apr 25** | Security Operation - Tripoli Province, Espiaa: A force of 100 vehicles from the Western Military Region were deployed to the "Southern Line of Tripoli" in order to conduct counter smuggling operations.
- Apr 25** | Murder/ Execution - Az Zawiyah Province, Harsha: A male, named as Khaled Bashir Abdel Mawla was seriously injured in an assassination attempt.
- Apr 26** | Security Operation - Nuqat Al-Khams Province, Al-Assah: GNU Border Security conducted border patrols between Al Assah and Tiji

- Apr 26 Security Operation - Al-Jabal Al-Gharbi Province, Ash Shwayrif: GNU MoI Border Guards conducted operations on the River Road between Bani Walid and Ash Shwayrif.
- Apr 26 Other - Nuqat Al-Khams Province, Ras Ajdir: Unconfirmed sources reported that restrictions had been placed on Tunisians entering Libya through the Ras Ajdir Border Cross Point. Tunisia military were also reported as mobilizing near the border.
- Apr 26 Murder/ Execution - Nalut Province, Nalut: A Zintani local, named as Ali Mufti al-Mahrouq was shot and killed by unknown perpetrators. Local sources report that the murder raised tensions between Nalut and Zintani factions with the latter expected to conduct a show of force in Nalut areas.
- Apr 27 Demonstration - Az Zawiyah Province, Harsha: Local youth closed road with burning tyres in response to the recent release of a video.
- Apr 27 Demonstration - Az Zawiyah Province, Mutarad: Local youth closed road with burning tyres in response to the recent release of a video.
- Apr 27 Demonstration - Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah: Local youth blocked routes with burning tyres throughout Zawiyah
- Apr 27 Demonstration - Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah Security Directorate: Local Youth closed down Zawiyah Security Directorate.
- Apr 27 Demonstration - Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah Refinery VCP: Local youth forced the closure of Zawiyah Refinery VCP.
- Apr 27 Demonstration - Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah Municipal Council: Local youth closed down Zawiyah Municipal Council.
- Apr 27 CP/ Roadblock - Az Zawiyah Province, Jadda'im: Local youth closed Samoud VCP with earth berms in protest to the deteriorating security situation in Zawiyah.
- Apr 27 CP/ Roadblock - Az Zawiyah Province, Tuwaybiyah: The route was closed in Tuwaybiyah.
- Apr 27 Sabotage - Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah: Valves for fuel and gas at the Semaforo were closed. The valves supply western Tripoli from Zawiyah refinery and their extended closure is expected to result in power cuts.
- Apr 27 Arrest - Al-Jafara Province, Mayah: The 'Anti Immigration Committee' and coastguard seized a boat and arrested illegal migrants onboard.
- Apr 27 CP/ Roadblock - Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah: Following the deployment of 52 Brigade forces the coastal road was reported as being reopened.
- Apr 28 Demonstration - Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah: Sustained stone throwing and protest resulted in the withdrawal of 52 Brigade and the reimposition of roadblocks on the coastal road.
- Apr 28 SAF - Az Zawiyah Province, Daman Street: An SAF attack by a local actor was reported against 52 Brigade at the Daman traffic lights.
- Apr 28 Demonstration - Az Zawiyah Province, Mutarad: Local youth blocked the coastal road with burning tyres following the withdrawal of 52 Brigade.
- Apr 28 Arrest - Tripoli Province, Castelverde: 21 illegal migrants of Bangladeshi, Pakistan and Egyptian origin were arrested as they prepared to set sail to Europe.
- Apr 28 CP/ Roadblock - Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah: Following the visit of GNU CoS Haddad local sources reported that the coastal road had been reopened.
- Apr 28 Security Operation - Al-Jafara Province, Mayah: GACS Western Branch reported rescuing 473 migrants of various nationalities.
- Apr 28 Demonstration - Az Zawiyah Province, Daman Street: Demonstrations restarted in the area of Semaforo Daman resulting in the closure of a route with burning tyres.
- Apr 28 Murder/ Execution - Az Zawiyah Province, Sabratah: A male named as Jamal al Harari was killed following a quarrel.

Cyrenaica




Image: Weekly security incidents reported across Cyrenaica

Security Incidents

- Apr 24** | Armed Attack - Kufra Province, Libya - Sudan Border: An unidentified group attacked a border checkpoint manned by 110th Battalion personnel. An exchange of fire was reported before the group returned to the Sudanese side of the border.
- Apr 24** | Murder/ Execution - Al-Jabal Al-Akhdar Province, Shahat: The burned body a 8 year old girl was recovered.
- Apr 24** | Security Operation - Al-Wahat Province, Ajdabiya: GACS Ajdabiyah Branch and 152 Bn conducted a raid which recovered an unspecified amount of stolen copper wire.
- Apr 24** | Murder/ Execution - Al-Butnan Province, Tobruk: The body of Hafez Arhuma al Zaidani was discovered.
- Apr 24** | Kidnap - Al-Jabal Al-Akhdar Province, Bayda: A female minor was kidnapped by a male. Bayda al-Madina police later arrested the individual and released the captive.
- Apr 24** | Security Operation - Al-Marj Province, Marj: Marj CID were reported as conducting anti-smuggling operations.
- Apr 24** | Troop Movements - Kufra Province, Libya - Sudan Border: LNA were reported as deploying additional forces in the area of the Libyan/Sudanese border.
- Apr 24** | Armed Robbery - Benghazi Province, al-Kish: An armed robbery was reported in the al-Kish area with 95,000 LYD being stolen. Benghazi CID reported that one perpetrator was arrested while operations to apprehend three further suspects continued.
- Apr 26** | Troop Movements - Kufra Province, Kufra: Unconfirmed sources reported the arrival of large ammunition resupply and Wing Loong Chinese made UAVs.
- Apr 26** | Troop Movements - Al-Wahat Province, Wahat: LNA 110 Battalion were redeployed from Wahat to the South.

Fezzan




Image: Weekly security incidents reported across Fezzan

- Apr 23** | Troop Movements - Al-Jufra Province, Jufra: A group of approximately 100 Janjaweed were reported as mobilizing from Jufra airbase towards Sudan.
- Apr 26** | Armed Attack - Al-Jufra Province, Zillah: Alleged 77 Battalion of the 128 Brigade forces attacked Zillah Courthouse resulting in the release of a fuel smuggler who was accused of causing death by dangerous driving.

Acronym List

AQ - Al-Qaeda

BDB – Benghazi Defense Brigade (Al Qaeda-aligned – AAS and RSCB associated/umbrella group)

CBL – Central Bank of Libya

CESF - Constitution and Election Support Force

CNI – Critical National Infrastructure

DACOCT - Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism (SDF)

DDR - Disarmament, demobilising and reintegration

GASO – General Administration of Security Operations

GACS – General Administration of Central Support

GECOL – General Electricity Company of Libya

GMMR – Great Man-made River

GNA – Government of National Accord (2016)

GNC – General National Congress (2012)

GNS – Government of National Stability (2021)

GNU – Government of National Unity (2021)

GTUC - Greater Tripoli Union Council (Tripoli militias and others, established in June 2020)

HCS – High Council of State (Tripoli-based)

HNEC – High National Elections Commission

HoR – House of Representatives (Tobruk-based)

IDF – Indirect Fire (mortars/rockets)

IDP - Internally Displaced Persons

IED - Improvised Explosive Device

IOC - International Oil Company

IS - Islamic State

JMC – Joint Military Commission

LIFG – Libyan Islamic Fighting Group

LNA – Libyan National Army

LPA – Libyan Political Agreement (2015)

LPDF - Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (2020)

LROR - Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room

MoD - Ministry of Defense

MoF - Ministry of Finance

MoFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MoI - Ministry of Interior

MoJ - Ministry of Justice

MoO - Ministry of Oil

MoT - Ministry of Transportation

NFDK - No Further Details Known

NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation (aid/charity)

NOC – National Oil Company

NSG – National Salvation Government (GNC)

NSTR - Nothing Significant To Report

P3+2 – France, Germany, Italy – UK, US

PC – Presidency Council

PG – Presidential Guard

PFG - Petroleum Facilities Guard

RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade

RTA - Road Traffic Accident

TIP – Tripoli International Airport

SSA – Stability Support Authority

SAF - Small Arms Fire

SDF – Rada Deterrence Force/ Special Deterrence Force/ Rada

UXO - Unexploded Ordnance

The GardaWorld Difference



122,000+

employees

45

countries with operations & infrastructure

\$3B+

in revenues

22,000+

clients

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SECURE EVERY DAY

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