

Libya weekly security analysis report

April 16, 2023

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Executive Summary

- This week saw two significant visits by the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Sameh Shoukrey, who met with both his Greek and Turkish counterparts in their respective capitals. During his visit to Greece, Shoukrey confirmed Egypt's support to restore Libya's "unity, stability and full sovereignty through intra-Libyan consensus." Shoukrey also claimed that Egypt had achieved "successive accomplishments" through communication with all Libyan parties. In a later meeting between the Shoukrey and his Turkish counterpart, Melvut Cavusoglu, both agreed to cooperate more closely on Libya and will soon announce the reappointment of ambassadors to each other's countries. It is believed that both sides are also working toward a possible meeting between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt.
- Significant fighting erupted in Khartoum, Sudan on the morning of Apr 15 between the Sudanese Army and the Rapid Support Force (RSF). The developments have been categorized as a coup by the RSF against the current military government of Sudan. As with the initial period in any conflict, reporting is confused with various claims being made and disputed by both sides. While the RSF appear to have seized key locations in Khartoum and elsewhere in the opening hours of the coup, these were achieved as a result of surprise. The RSF's ability to retain these initial gains is unclear with the Sudanese Armed forces having complete control of the air (the RSF have no reported aerial assets) and a significant advantage in armour.
- The GNU CoS, Lieutenant General Mohammed Haddad travelled to Benghazi on Apr 13 where he met with his LNA counterpart Lieutenant General Abdel Nadhour. In a change to the normal format of such meetings, much of the proceedings were recorded and shared on traditional and social media. Haddad made several statements, underlying their willingness to preserve the sanctity of the Libyan state and provide protection for the elections. Nadouri added that the military establishment was one of the most important pillars of the state and was not subject to "tribal, partisan, and political affiliations." This meeting appears to be an initial step at confronting both the administrative challenge of reunification as well as the ever-contentious issue of the chain of command.
- Russia's permanent representative to the United Nations, Vasily Nebenzya blamed the destabilization of the Sahel region on the 'reckless Western adventure' in Libya." During his speech to the UNSC on Mali, Nebenzya called on the West to "admit their mistakes and abandon the neo-colonial narrative." In its current one-month tenure of the presidency of the UNSC Russia was expected to use its position as a platform to vilify its detractors, while ignoring its own actions in Ukraine. The statement from Nebenzya is in keeping with the long-stated position of Russia, in that the actions of NATO in 2011 were self-serving and led to both the destabilization of Libya and the wider Sahel region. Nebenzya also met with the Libyan Permanent Representative to the UN, Taher el-Sonni to discuss the recent developments in Libya and the challenges facing the political track and the electoral process. The two discussed the role that Russia could play to support Libyan stability and the importance of joint action between the two nations to fulfil the aspirations of the Libyan people.
- The LNA has continued their border operations with units from 128 Brigade, TBZ Brigade, 73rd Brigade and the 155th, 10th and 676th Battalions conducting mobile Southern Border Strip. The operations have been well publicized, both for their purpose and as a demonstration of inter-unit cooperation within the LNA. It also continues to signal LNA intent to control the borders in areas under their control and counters any potential for MoI Border Force to encroach into LNA areas of control or influence.
- SRSB Bathily travelled to Sabha where he met with military and security commanders, social leaders and university staff. Throughout the series of meetings, Bathily commended the groups for their continued efforts in their respective fields, with the core message being to delivered to Bathily being the end of the political and social marginalization of the South.

Outlook

Short Term Outlook

- Libya remains locked in a political impasse with two governments, both of which are slowly weakening. The House of Representatives (HoR) and the High Council of State (HCS) continue to dominate the current political scene, with their efforts to resolve key issues like the constitution taking centre stage. SRSB Abdoulaye Bathily is attempting to wrest some control away from the two entities in a bid to make progress towards elections in 2023, however, they continue to enjoy the support of key regional and international backers. Various factions are beginning to position themselves for expected change in 2023 as the UN continues to push towards elections, while regional and global issues, not least the Ukraine offensive, continue to shape the international communities' agendas in Libya.
- The security situation in and around Tripoli remains fundamentally unstable. After significant changes to the capital's security makeup in August and September 2022, new faultlines are emerging as militia commanders continue to consolidate their positions. This includes expanding their influence through ministries and other state apparatus. In addition, plans to reconstruct Tripoli International Airport threaten to destabilise the delicate balance of power in the city with Misratan entities looking to claim significant influence over the location. The resurgence of Jihadist Salafism in Tripolitania is also a potential source of destabilisation, one which is currently being felt in Tajura and along the north-west coastline. This instability along the coastline may be positively impacted by efforts in Zawiyah to reorganise armed groups which could increase cooperation. Armed groups in Tripoli continue to be empowered via financial, military, and political means, ensuring they will continue to exert significant influence over the political situation.

Medium to Long Term Outlook

- The solution to Libya's political impasse remains elections for many stakeholders with UNSMIL attempting to develop a new pathway. Realistically, the path to elections in 2023 will be fraught with difficulties however, there is a real chance that much-needed groundwork could be achieved. While UNSMIL heads efforts towards elections, other international stakeholders are prioritising more short-term objectives as they look to shape not just Libya, but regional and global issues.
- Terrorist groups remain active but contained in Libya. Islamic State (IS) will continue to present a threat to security forces, primarily in the south, and may re-establish the capability to mount sporadic attacks along the coastline in the future. The group continues to suffer from years of attrition and is more likely focused on providing support for more active IS theatres in sub-Saharan Africa. Al-Qaeda-aligned groups remain active in the country with their integration into societies in the south and some armed groups in the Tripoli area potentially posing a longer-term issue for Libya.

Threat Matrix

Region	Political	Terrorism	Militancy	Crime	Kidnap	Civil Unrest
Tripolitania	High	Moderate	High-Extreme	High	High	High
Tripoli	High	Moderate	High-Extreme	High	High	High
Cyrenaica	High	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Benghazi	High	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Fezzan	High	High	High	High	High	Low-Moderate
Sabha	High	Moderate	High	High	High	Moderate

Threat Scale	Minimal	Low	Moderate	High	Extreme
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Weekly Assessment

Egypt, Greece and Turkey to Work Closely on Libya

This week saw two significant visits by the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Sameh Shoukrey, who met with both his Greek and Turkish counterparts in their respective capitals. During his visit to Greece, Shoukrey confirmed Egypt's support to restore Libya's "unity, stability and full sovereignty through intra-Libyan consensus." Shoukrey also claimed that Egypt had achieved "successive accomplishments" through communication with all Libyan parties.

In addition to a joint interest in Libya, Greece and Egypt have several key agreements, including the Greek Egyptian electricity power project, GREGY Interconnector and more significantly the 2020 maritime agreement, which created an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for oil and gas drilling rights in the Mediterranean and overlaps with areas included in the Libyan-Turkish EEZ maritime agreement of Nov 2019. Maritime demarcations have become a key factor in the relations of Mediterranean nations, with the boundaries representing both issues of national pride and future economic strategies for Egypt, Greece, Turkey and Libya. While this key issue appears to have been temporarily set aside, or relegated to a series of vocal objections, it is expected to come to the fore in the future, once conditions allow for the development of such offshore assets.

In a later meeting between Shoukrey and his Turkish counterpart, Melvut Cavusoglu, both agreed to cooperate more closely on Libya and will soon announce the reappointment of ambassadors to each other's countries. It is believed that both sides are also working toward a possible meeting between Turkish President Recep

Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt.

The improvement in bilateral Turkish-Egyptian relations comes as part of a wider geopolitical shift. Libya represents a critical aspect of these changes, given the involvement of Turkey and Qatar and the opposing group of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt in the conflict of 2019/20 as well as their continued support for the GNU and the LNA/HoR respectively. Notably, Turkey has also recently made successful outreach to Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while also positioning itself as a bridge nation between Russia and the West, the former also being a major actor in Libya.

The recent increase in US engagement also feeds into this geopolitical change in that Turkey, Egypt and Russia all had direct physical involvement in the 2019/20 conflict, with Turkey and Russia retaining forces within Libya. Conversely, the US only had the role of supporting diplomatic initiatives either emanating from the Berlin Conference of 2019 or UNSMIL. In this regard, Turkey, Egypt and Russia were largely left to their own devices and were able to exert considerable influence and concessions from their respective proxies, as evidenced by the maritime and security agreements made between the GNA and Turkey

and subsequently renewed by the GNU.

Arguably this has also contributed to the continuance of the political status quo, as Turkey, Egypt and Russia would see no advantage to the holding of elections that could see the election of an administration that was hostile to one or all of them.

The prospect of a developing tripartite informal agreement of cooperation was perhaps demonstrated by the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Ankara in the previous week, with Lavrov meeting not only his Turkish counterpart but Turkish President Erdogan. Therefore, the direct involvement of the US, most evident in their continued calls for the removal of Wagner group and the potential for

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permanent diplomatic presence, represents a threat to the hegemony that had previously existed. Furthermore, the perceived pandering of the GNU to US visitors and the rendition of former regime official Mohammed Abouagela Masud in Dec 2022 may reinforce the notion that increased involvement by the US, or the GNU's (or its successor) alignment to US Libyan policies and programs, would represent a significant challenge for both Turkey and Egypt and therefore close cooperation and a joint position on Libya will ultimately be of benefit to both in their economic and strategic military aspirations.

Russian Outreach Continues

Russia's permanent representative to the United Nations, Vasily Nebenzya blamed the destabilization of the Sahel region on the 'reckless Western adventure' in Libya." During his speech to the UNSC on Mali, Nebenzya called on the West to "admit their mistakes and abandon the neo-colonial narrative."

In its current one-month tenure of the presidency of the UNSC Russia was expected to use its position as a platform to vilify its detractors, while ignoring its own actions in Ukraine. The statement from Nebenzya is in keeping with the long-stated position of Russia, in that the actions of NATO in 2011 were self-serving and led to both the destabilization of Libya and the wider Sahel region. Russia is not alone in this assertion with many nations, some of whom were previous supporters of resolution 1973 which authorized the use of 'all necessary' means', expressing concern even as the 2011 situation developed to its climax in October 2011. It, therefore, provides a convenient "go to" for Russia in terms of demonstrating the hypocrisy of Western nations' policies and their long-term impact on global security during a period when there has been a visible increase in US engagement in Libya.

Nebenzya also met with the Libyan Permanent Representative to the UN, Taher el-Sonni to discuss the recent developments in Libya and the challenges facing the political track and the electoral process. The two discussed the role

that Russia could play to support Libyan stability and the importance of joint action between the two nations in order to fulfil the aspirations of the Libyan people. Such outreach by Russia is expected to continue, although its acceptance by the GNU is open to question. The special session on Libya on Apr 18 is expected to present yet another prime opportunity for Russia to criticize previous NATO action in Libya and the failure of European nations to progress the political track as a counter to the current efforts, led by the US, to remove Wagner forces from the country.

RST Launches Coup in Sudan

Significant fighting erupted in Khartoum, Sudan on the morning of Apr 15 between the Sudanese Army and the Rapid Support Force (RSF). The developments have been categorized as a coup by the RSF against the current military government of Sudan.

As with the initial period in any conflict, reporting is confused with various claims being made and disputed by both sides. While the RSF appear to have seized key locations in Khartoum and elsewhere in the opening hours of the coup, these were achieved as a result of surprise. The RSF's ability to retain these initial gains is unclear with the Sudanese Armed forces having complete control of the air (the RSF have no reported aerial assets) and a significant advantage in armour.

The clashes followed a period of increased tension in the Khartoum area after the reported mobilization of RSF forces under Major General Dagalo (Hemeti), who is also Vice President of the ruling military Sovereign Council. Several sources report that in a coordinated attack on the morning of April 15, RSF assaulted several key Sudanese Army locations, the Presidential compound, Meroe military airport and the civilian airport, with footage showing Saudi and Ukrainian civilian aircraft ablaze at the latter. In an interview with Al Jazeera, Dagalo described the current President of the Sovereign Council, Abdel Fattah al Burhan as a "criminal who is destroying the country" and that his troops were winning the battle against the Armed Forces of Sudan. Footage of airstrikes by both fixed and rotary-winged assets in Khartoum (presumably by Government forces) has been posted on

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Russian UN Permanent Representative - Apr 12.

social media sites, with coverage indicating that fighting is widespread and intense.

The RSF is a paramilitary force established in 2013 in response to anti-government rebel movements in Darfur and has been accused of human rights abuses in Darfur and elsewhere. In the four years since the ouster of al-Bashir, the RSF has been involved in over 155 civilian targeting incidents and over 300 reported civilian fatalities. In one incident, a violent crackdown on protesters on Jun 3, 2019 by security forces, including the RSF, over 100 civilians and hundreds were injured.

Its commander Gen Mohamed Dagalo, the deputy head of Sudan's ruling council has been a mainstay in the military and increasingly in the political landscape, having a prominent role in the Omar al-Bashir regime, the transitional civilian administration between 2019 and 2021 and the subsequent military administration (Sovereign Council) which seized power in the military coup in October 2021.

The development is likely to impact the situation in southern Libya given the relationship between the RSF and the LNA, with the former providing forces to the latter in the form of the Janjaweed units. UN investigations detailed the deployment of at least 1000 Janjaweed forces by Dagalo 2019 to secure key sites in the east of the country to free up LNA forces for the then ongoing conflict. It is believed that other Sudanese forces are likely to have entered Libya over the same period, however, no reliable figures on numbers are available.

Sudanese forces have remained in the country in one form or another in the intervening years, with the relationship between the Haftar family and Dagalo remaining strong, as evidenced by the meeting of Siddiq Haftar and Dagalo on Apr 12, 2023, following his appointment of honorary President of a Sudanese football club. However, the immediate impact on Libya may not be negative, with the prospect of either a swift victory or the more likely prolonged civil conflict, expected to pull the remaining Janjaweed forces back to Sudan.

There are of course less predictable medium and long-term considerations. These include a significant increase in Sudanese illegal migrant smuggling in the southern region thereby impacting the shadow economy of the south and increasing social pressures and the movement of the forces of the defeated side into southern Libya. The latter is less likely in the event of a

victory for the RSF and the expulsion of Government forces from Khartoum. However, given the existing relationship between Dagalo and Haftar, should the RSF be roundly defeated, southern Libya may be viewed as a natural safe haven from where to either recuperate or continue an insurgency campaign against the Sudanese Government forces. While such outcomes would represent a significant negative impact, they remain wholly dependent on how the very unpredictable situation in Sudan develops.

GNU & LNA CoS' Meet in Benghazi



The GNU CoS, Lieutenant General Mohammed Haddad travelled to Benghazi on Apr 13 where he met with his LNA counterpart Lieutenant General Abdel Nadhour. In a change to the normal format of such meetings, much of the proceedings were recorded and shared on traditional and social media. Haddad made several statements, underlying their willingness to preserve the sanctity of the Libyan state and provide protection for the elections. Nadouri added that the military establishment was one of the most important pillars of the state and was not subject to "tribal, partisan, and political affiliations."


The coverage came from what can be described as an organised media event, rather than actual technical discussions, at which cameras would not be present. Both Nadouri and Haddad appear genuine in their efforts to reform and unify their respective military commands, however, both are also subject to higher authorities who may still resist such a move if it is perceived as lessening their influence or ability to react militarily if required.

However, the meeting represents one further step on the road to reunification, and while the last two meetings of the JMC 5+5 were hailed as a success, they were primarily symbolic in their scope. This meeting appears to be an initial step at confronting both the administrative challenge of reunification as well as the ever-contentious issue of the chain of command. While no tangible details were released following the meeting this should not be read as a failure to move the process forward, but rather that the technical nature of the work does not lend itself to public scrutiny in an unfinished state.

Weekly Statistical Overview

Graph: Breakdown of weekly statistics including incident count, fatalities, injuries, kidnaps and arrests by region






Activity levels decreased this week from 36 last week to 32 this week.

Tripolitania saw levels fall even further, as Ramadan impacts across the country. The majority of reported incidents in the region related to a variety of security operations. Of these, the most notable was a series of operations by the Zawiyah Joint Operations Room. The organisation was created in response to a family killing in late December 2022, however, this week saw the unit becoming more active, albeit only by targeting illegal fuel stations.

Cyrenca saw an increase this week from eight to nine with anti immigration operations still continuing.

Activity increased this week in Fezzan with seven incidents reported compared to six last week. The majority of reporting related to security operations in the border areas by LNA units



Weekly Significant Incidents

Tripolitania




Image: Weekly security incidents reported across Tripolitania

Security Incidents

- Apr 09** Security Operation - Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah: Zawiyah Joint Security Room conducted operations against illegal fuel vendors operating on the coastal road between Zawiyah and Es Sabria.
- Apr 09** Armed Robbery - Tripoli Province, Qaser Bin Ghashir: An individual was arrested by Four Areas Security Directorate CID following the armed robbery of a guard and an arson attack at the al-Shifa General Surgery Clinic.
- Apr 10** Armed Attack - Az Zawiyah Province, Surman: A vehicle was involved in an unspecified SAF incident at the Askari traffic island in Surman.
- Apr 11** Arrest - Az Zawiyah Province, Abu Issa: A Libyan fuel station vendor, a Chadian worker and three customers were arrested at an illegal fuel station.
- Apr 11** Crime - Tripoli Province, Edraiby: The theft of 105 gas cylinders resulted in the arrest of one perpetrator. The suspect later admitted that the operation had been organised by a Nigerian national
- Apr 11** Assault - Misrata Province, Misrata: Rival football fans of the Ah-Swehly and Al-Ahly clubs clashed in Misrata resulting in several injuries and some material damage.
- Apr 11** Kidnap - Az Zawiyah Province, Surman: A child was allegedly kidnapped by an unidentified armed group.
- Apr 12** Arrest - Tripoli Province, Tripoli: A US citizen was arrested by ISA.
- Apr 13** Security Operation - Tripoli Province, Tajura: The GASO LEF seized and cleared three hectares and returned them to their legal owner.
- Apr 13** Security Operation - Misrata Province, Washka: The Misratan Oil Assets Unit conducted patrols on oil infrastructure in the Krarim, Hisha and Washka areas.
- Apr 13** Security Operation - Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah: Personnel from Zawiyah Joint Operations room closed three petrol stations in the Bir Tarvas area and ordered that

- they no longer be supplied by the supply companies. The operation is part of a wider crackdown along the northwest coast targeting illegal fuel supply.
- Apr 13** Arrest - Tripoli Province, Ain Zara: Rahba al Duru Battalion (Bogra) arrested several African nationals accused of home invasion.
 - Apr 14** Security Operation - Al-Jabal Al-Gharbi Province, Nasmah: SSA Nasmah Branch conducted patrol operations resulting in the seizure of a vehicle smuggling 10,000 litres of diesel, reportedly sourced in Bani Walid for onward sale in Ash Shwayrif.
 - Apr 15** HMG - Tripoli Province, Najila: HMG was reported in the Najila area.
 - Apr 15** Accident - Misrata Province, Dafiniyah: The roof of Dafiniyah CP collapsed after a truck collided with it.
 - Apr 15** Arrest - Al-Jabal Al-Gharbi Province, Zintan: A suspect in a targeted killing engaged Zintan Security Directorate forces during an arrest operation.

Cyrenaica




Image: Weekly security incidents reported across Cyrenaica

Security Incidents

- Apr 09** Arrest - Al-Butnan Province, Bir al Ashhab: Bir al Ashhab Security Directorate arrested a Libyan driver and eight illegal Egyptian immigrants.
- Apr 10** Arrest - Benghazi Province, Benghazi: Benghazi CID arrested an Egyptian national who was wanted by the Egyptian authorities on murder charges.
- Apr 10** Arrest - Benghazi Province, Qaminis: 29 illegal migrants were arrested on a fishing boat by Suluq Qaminis Security Directorate.
- Apr 10** Security Operation - Al-Jabal Al-Akhdar Province, Bayda: Tobruk and Bayda branches of 106 Brigade and the Khaled Bin Wqaled Battalion were reported as conducting joint operations in the Bayda area.
- Apr 11** Crime - Al-Wahat Province, Maradah: Vehicles and equipment belonging to the Marada al-Aquila Road Company were stolen by suspected armed group personnel.
- Apr 12** Arrest - Benghazi Province, Benghazi: The General Department of the Electric Police chased a car which subsequently crashed into the wall at the Benghazi North Power Plant. A quantity of copper wiring was seized.
- Apr 12** Other - Al-Butnan Province, Emsaed Gateway: 21 Egyptian illegal immigrants were deported through the Emsaed Border Crossing.

- Apr 13 | arrest - Al-Jabal Al-Akhdar Province, Bayda: 45 illegal migrants of Bangladeshi origin were detained in the Faiadiyah area to the south of Bayda.
- Apr 13 | Arrest - Derna Province, Derna: Al-Dhakali Branch conducted mobile and security operations in the Derna area.
- Apr 15 | Troop Movements - Al-Marj Province, Marj: Wagner Group Forces were reported as moving through the Republic Market in Marj.

Fezzan



Image: Weekly security incidents reported across Fezzan

Security Incidents

- Apr 09 | Security Operation - Ghat Province, Libya - Algeria border: The LNA's 173rd Infantry Battalion were reported as conducting border patrols on the Algerian border in order to combat smuggling and illegal migration.
- Apr 09 | Security Operation - Murzuq Province, Libya - Niger Border: The LNA's 73rd Brigade, 128 Brigade and the Wigh Company were reported as conducting border security operations in the Salvador border triangle.
- Apr 09 | Security Operation - Murzuq Province, Umm Al-Aranib: The LNA's 676th Infantry Battalion was reported as conducting mobile security operations, commencing at Umm Aranib and passing through Qatrun, Jabal Asida and Wigh.
- Apr 11 | Demonstration - Wadi Al-Hayaa Province, Obari: A demonstration was reported at the Jumhuriya Bank with demonstrators protesting the lack of liquidity at the branch.
- Apr 11 | Security Operation - Murzuq Province, Libya - Niger Border: The LNA's 128 Brigade, TMZ Brigade, 73rd Brigade and the 155th, 10th and 676th Battalions were reported as continuing operations in the Southern Border Strip.
- Apr 14 | Troop Movements - Murzuq Province, Libya - Chadian Border: Unconfirmed sources reported an increase in LNA preparedness in the Chad border region. This follows extensive reporting on the increase in LNA border operations in the Salvador Triangle bordering Chad and Algeria.
- Apr 15 | Security Operation - Murzuq Province, Libya - Chadian Border: LNA Reinforced 128th Brigade and Southern Region 'National Security Operations Force' security operations near the border area, thwarting an attempt to smuggle illegal narcotics (450,000 tablets) into Libya. Upon monitoring the movement of the alleged

smugglers, the security forces attempted to stop and verify identities, resulting in an armed clash, with the smugglers fleeing the scene and leaving some of the items

Acronym List

AQ - Al-Qaeda

BDB – Benghazi Defense Brigade (Al Qaeda-aligned – AAS and RSCB associated/umbrella group)

CBL – Central Bank of Libya

CESF - Constitution and Election Support Force

CNI – Critical National Infrastructure

DACOCT - Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism (SDF)

DDR - Disarmament, demobilising and reintegration

GASO – General Administration of Security Operations

GACS – General Administration of Central Support

GECOL – General Electricity Company of Libya

GMMR – Great Man-made River

GNA – Government of National Accord (2016)

GNC – General National Congress (2012)

GNS – Government of National Stability (2021)

GNU – Government of National Unity (2021)

GTUC - Greater Tripoli Union Council (Tripoli militias and others, established in June 2020)

HCS – High Council of State (Tripoli-based)

HNEC – High National Elections Commission

HoR – House of Representatives (Tobruk-based)

IDF – Indirect Fire (mortars/rockets)

IDP - Internally Displaced Persons

IED - Improvised Explosive Device

IOC - International Oil Company

IS - Islamic State

JMC – Joint Military Commission

LIFG – Libyan Islamic Fighting Group

LNA – Libyan National Army

LPA – Libyan Political Agreement (2015)

LPDF - Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (2020)

LROR - Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room

MoD - Ministry of Defense

MoF - Ministry of Finance

MoFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MoI - Ministry of Interior

MoJ - Ministry of Justice

MoO - Ministry of Oil

MoT - Ministry of Transportation

NFDK - No Further Details Known

NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation (aid/charity)

NOC – National Oil Company

NSG – National Salvation Government (GNC)

NSTR - Nothing Significant To Report

P3+2 – France, Germany, Italy – UK, US

PC – Presidency Council

PG – Presidential Guard

PFG - Petroleum Facilities Guard

RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade

RTA - Road Traffic Accident

TIP – Tripoli International Airport

SSA – Stability Support Authority

SAF - Small Arms Fire

SDF – Rada Deterrence Force/ Special Deterrence Force/ Rada

UXO - Unexploded Ordnance

The GardaWorld Difference



122,000+

employees

45

countries with operations & infrastructure

\$3B+

in revenues

22,000+

clients

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SECURE EVERY DAY

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GARDAWORLD

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