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Libya daily Security analysis report

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Latest Developments

Political Developments

- Jalal al-Shahudi, an HoR member of the 6+6 committee claimed in an interview that SRSG Bathily's approach is an attempt to strain the relationship between the HoR and the state. He stated that "The UN envoy, and all the intervening countries, must be aware that we are keener than everyone else to serve our country, but each entity has its own vision on the matter." He added that the insistence of UNSMIL and intervening countries to commit to a date for completing the election laws risked a repeat of the failure of the LPDF roadmap and the failed December 2021 elections.
- A similar sentiment was made by HCS 6+6 member Ahmed al-Awjali, who stated that "We cannot, from now on before we start, set a date in advance for the completion of our work, but we all look forward to the discussions going smoothly, and at that time we may be able to agree on the laws even before next June." He criticized Bathily's request during his UNSC briefing for the committee to speed up its work and asserted that it amounted to an attempt to exert pressure. Finally, Al-Awjali confirmed that the committee has not yet discussed in any way the controversial articles regarding the conditions for running for the presidency, including the candidacy of military personnel and dual nationals. **COMMENT**: Both the comments from Shahudi and Awjali appear to show an increasing rejection of UNSMIL's perceived intervention in what they view as a Libyan matter. The committee, itself an outcome of the 13th constitutional amendment has been viewed by many as yet another stalling tactic from both the HoR and the HCS. In reality, the passing of the amendment, and the subsequent formation of the 6+6 committee has already taken three months, with the core issues relating to candidate criteria not even having been discussed. Expectations for the committee are low, and while statements claiming some form of progress can be expected to counter increasing criticism, the likely outcome is a compromised set of election laws which may be used as a premise by powerful political elites to further delay elections on the basis that they would result in instability. COMMENT ENDS.

Security Developments

A series of clashes were reported on the night of Apr 23, with renewed fighting on Apr 24. Initial reporting indicates that the clashes broke out after an attempted targeted attack against Salah al Azraq and Hamidi Bin Nasser which was itself retaliation for the murder of Abdo Zait on Apr 22. Zait is alleged to have been affiliated with Hassan Abu Zariba's SSA Western Region. The clashes were reported to be between Abu Zait's affiliates and Hazem Arhim (aka al-Awais). A mobilization of forces under Mohmamed Bahroun (al-Far) was later reported, and a ceasefire was negotiated bringing calm to the area. The ceasefire appears to have collapsed on the afternoon of Apr 24 with renewed clashes between the al Ziat and al Awais factions. Open sources reported that four persons were killed on the night of Apr 23, including two civilians who were killed when an RPG struck their home. The Red Crescent also reported that they had evacuated 30 families from areas directly impacted by the fighting. <u>COMMENT</u>: The demands of the Zait-aligned faction are not known, nor are the terms of the initial ceasefire. As a resolution appears some way off, the continuation of periodic clashes can be expected in the area. <u>COMMENT ENDS</u>.

Regional Developments

- Sources reported the movement of Janjaweed forces (approximately 100) from Jufra airbase towards Sudan. <u>COMMENT</u>: The movement of remaining Sudanese forces from Libya to Sudan had been expected, with Janjaweed forces moving to support the RSF. While an initial positive for Libya, this situation could be reversed depending on the developing conflict within Sudan. The history between LNA Commander Khalifa Haftar, and RSF Commander Dagalo may result in RSF forces viewing the southern region of Libya as a potential safe haven should the conflict develop negatively for them. <u>COMMENT ENDS</u>.
- Siddiq Haftar, son of Khalifa Haftar, announced that his recent visit to Sudan was not political in nature. During his visit, he met with RSF Commander, Mohamed Dagalo with the meeting being

the source of much speculation as it took place two days before fighting broke out in Khartoum. In statements to Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, Al-Siddiq said that he visited Sudan at the request of Sudan's Al-Merrikh Football Club, which chose him as honorary President. Separately, the leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces and President of the Sovereign Council, Abdel al Burhan, claimed that Khalifa Haftar had contacted him to assure him that the recent claims of LNA support for the RSF were untrue.


 A group of 105 Libyan nationals were evacuated from Sudan to Jeddah in Saudi Arabia. The group travelled by sea from Port Sudan.

Migrant Developments

 The bodies of 34 drowned migrants were recovered from the Sabratha area. The incident follows the recovery of 23 bodies in two separate groups in the previous week.

Significant Incidents

Tripolitania Region




1. Security Operation - Apr 23, Nuqat Al-Khams Province, Al-Assah: The Mol Border Guard conducted patrolling operations between Ras Ajdir and al-Assah.

2. Armed Clash - Apr 23 22:00, Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah: Armed clashes broke out in the area of Ghanudi traffic island resulting in four fatalities, including two civilians. The clashes started after the attempted assassination of Salah Azraq and Hamdi Bin Nasser, which itself was a retaliation for the killing of Abdo Zait on Feb 22.

3. Armed Clash - Apr 24 15:30, Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah: Renewed clashes were reported in Zawiyah following the collapse of a truce which had ended the fighting on 23/24 Apr.

Cyrenaica Region



4. Security Operation - Apr 24 01:00, Al-Wahat Province, Ajdabiya: GACS Ajdabiyah Branch and 152 Bn conducted a raid which recovered an unspecified amount of stolen copper wire.

5. Kidnap - Apr 24 04:00, Al-Jabal Al-Akhdar Province, Bayda: A female minor was kidnapped by a male. Bayda al-Madina police later arrested the individual and released the captive.

6. Murder/ Execution - Apr 24 00:30, Al-Jabal Al-Akhdar Province, Shahat: The burned body an 8-yearold girl was recovered.

7. Murder/ Execution - Apr 24 02:00, Al-Butnan Province, Tobruk: The body of Hafez Arhuma al Zaidani was discovered.

8. Armed Attack - Apr 24, Kufra Province, Libya - Sudan Border: An unidentified group attacked a border checkpoint manned by 110th Battalion personnel. An exchange of fire was reported before the group returned to the Sudanese side of the border.

Fezzan Region



9. Troop Movements - Apr 23, Al-Jufra Province, Jufra: A group of approximately 100 Janjaweed were reported as mobilizing from Jufra airbase towards Sudan.

Offshore

NSTR

Outlook

Short Term Outlook

- Libya remains locked in a political impasse with two governments, both of which are slowly weakening. The House of Representatives (HoR) and the High Council of State (HCS) continue to dominate the current political scene, with their efforts to resolve key issues like the constitution taking centre stage. SRSG Abdoulaye Bathily is attempting to wrest some control away from the two entities in a bid to make progress towards elections in 2023, however, they continue to enjoy the support of key regional and international backers. Various factions are beginning to position themselves for expected change in 2023 as the UN continues to push towards elections, while regional and global issues, not least the Ukraine offensive, continue to shape the international communities' agendas in Libya.
- The security situation in and around Tripoli remains fundamentally unstable. After significant changes to the capital's security makeup in August and September 2022, new faultlines are emerging as militia commanders continue to consolidate their positions. This includes expanding their influence through ministries and other state apparatus. In addition, plans to reconstruct Tripoli International Airport threaten to destabilise the delicate balance of power in the city with Misratan entities looking to claim significant influence over the location. The resurgence of Jihadist Salafism in Tripolitania is also a potential source of destabilisation, one which is currently being felt in Tajura and along the north-west coastline. This instability along the coastline may be positively impacted by efforts in Zawiyah to reorganise armed groups which could increase cooperation. Armed groups in Tripoli continue to be empowered via financial, military, and political means, ensuring they will continue to exert significant influence over the political situation.

Medium to Long Term Outlook

- The solution to Libya's political impasse remains elections for many stakeholders with UNSMIL attempting to develop a new pathway. Realistically, the path to elections in 2023 will be fraught with difficulties however, there is a real chance that much-needed groundwork could be achieved. While UNSMIL heads efforts towards elections, other international stakeholders are prioritising more short-term objectives as they look to shape not just Libya, but regional and global issues.
- Terrorist groups remain active but contained in Libya. Islamic State (IS) will continue to present a threat to security forces, primarily in the south, and may re-establish the capability to mount sporadic attacks along the coastline in the future. The group continues to suffer from years of attrition and is more likely focused on providing support for more active IS theatres in sub-Saharan Africa. Al-Qaeda-aligned groups remain active in the country with their integration into societies in the south and some armed groups in the Tripoli area potentially posing a longer-term issue for Libya.


Key Dates

Date	Occasion	Comment
April 21 - 24, 2023	Eid Al-Fitr (+/-)	Public Holiday
May 01, 2023	May Day	Public Holiday
June 27, 2023	Arafat Day	
June 28 – 30, 2023	Eid Al-Adha	Public Holiday
July 19, 2023	Islamic New Year	Public Holiday
September 16, 2023	Martyrs' Day	Public Holiday
September 27, 2023	The Prophet's Birthday	Public Holiday
October 23, 2023	Liberation Day	Public Holiday
December 24, 2023	Independence Day	Public Holiday

Acronym List

AQ - Al-Qaeda BDB – Benghazi Defense Brigade (Al Qaeda-aligned – AAS and RSCB associated/umbrella group) CBL - Central Bank of Libya **CESF** - Constitution and Election Support Force CNI - Critical National Infrastructure DACOCT - Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism (SDF) DDR - Disarmament, demobilising and reintegration GASO – General Administration of Security Operations GACS - General Administration of Central Support GECOL - General Electricity Company of Libya GMMR - Great Man-made River GNA – Government of National Accord (2016) GNC – General National Congress (2012) GNS – Government of National Stability (2021) GNU – Government of National Unity (2021) GTUC - Greater Tripoli Union Council (Tripoli militias and others, established in June 2020) HCS – High Council of State (Tripoli-based) HNEC – High National Elections Commission HoR – House of Representatives (Tobruk-based) IDF – Indirect Fire (mortars/rockets) IDP - Internally Displaced Persons IED - Improvised Explosive Device IOC - International Oil Company IS - Islamic State ISA – Internal Security Agency JMC – Joint Military Commission LIFG – Libyan Islamic Fighting Group LNA – Libyan National Army LPA – Libyan Political Agreement (2015) LPDF - Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (2020) LROR - Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room MoD - Ministry of Defense MoF - Ministry of Finance MoFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mol - Ministry of Interior MoJ - Ministry of Justice MoO - Ministry of Oil MoT - Ministry of Transportation NFDK - No Further Details Known NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation (aid/charity) NOC - National Oil Company NSTR - Nothing Significant To Report P3+2 - France, Germany, Italy - UK, US PC – Presidency Council PG - Presidential Guard PFG - Petroleum Facilities Guard **RPG** - Rocket Propelled Grenade **RTA - Road Traffic Accident** TIP – Tripoli International Airport SSA - Stability Support Authority SAF - Small Arms Fire SDF - Rada Deterrence Force/ Special Deterrence Force/ Rada UXO - Unexploded Ordnance

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