

# Libya daily security analysis report

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# Latest Developments

## Threat Warnings

- Local sources report that fuel queues, which had been prevalent throughout the city, and a source of significant tension, have now subsided with normal services being provided.

## Political Developments

- HoR Speaker Aquila Saleh met with the 6+6 committee members on Apr 02 and stressed the need to swiftly formulate the election laws. **COMMENT:** The meeting appears to have been an initial briefing of sorts, with Saleh being keen to create a narrative which indicates a genuine process which would see the adoption of election laws without the intervention of UNSMIL or any other non-Libyan entity. **COMMENT ENDS.**

## Security Developments

- An LNA delegation including the Director of LNA General Haftar's Office, Khairy al Tamimi, Commander of the TBZ Brigade, Tariq Bin Zaid Omar Imraja', Colonel Basem al Bu'ishi, Haftar's son-in-law and the GNS Deputy Minister of the Interior, Farraj Iqaim visited the Zintan Commander General Jweili on Apr 02. The Zintan force is a Government National Stability (GNS) supporter which led to the ejection of the Jweili units from Tripoli in Aug 2022. **COMMENT:** The meeting, which was heavily publicized, signals clear support from the LNA command and is also showing clear backing for unity with the west, albeit with a non-GNU element. The meeting reinforces that Jweili is part of the national infrastructure and remains extremely relevant. Conversely, the meeting may be perceived as the allying of Jweili to Haftar, even if as a junior partner, thereby providing Haftar with a subordinate supporter who secures the southern entry to Tripoli. The attendees at the meeting from eastern Libya were also part of the recent 5+5 JMC in Tripoli. **COMMENT ENDS.**
- The European Union appointed Italian Rear Admiral, Valentino Rinaldi as the new Commander of Operation IRINI (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI). In a statement, the EU-led naval mission said that Rinaldi "took over tactical command of the European Naval Force operating in the central Mediterranean, succeeding Greek Rear Admiral Stylianos A. Dimopoulos."

## Regional Developments


- President Abdel al-Sisi arrived in Saudi Arabia on Apr 02 to conduct a series of meetings with KSA officials. The Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman received Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on his arrival in Jeddah with the two then conducting talks. The Saudi national security adviser Musaad bin Mohammed al-Aiban and Egypt's intelligence chief Abbas Kamel were also in attendance. **COMMENT:** The meeting follows recent comments from Saudi Arabia's finance minister in which he stated that the KSA was changing the way it was providing financial assistance to allies, having previously given direct grants unconditionally. Essentially this signalled the start of condition-based loans and grants, which has significant implications for Egypt. The Sisi regime has been heavily dependent on Saudi, UAE and Qatari financial assistance, with all three making large deposits in the Egyptian central bank and pledging to make further investments in the country. Sisi's visit is seen as an attempt to increase the level of KSA investment, with the Egyptian pound being under extreme pressure, having lost half its value against the \$US in the past year. However, now that such investments appear to be condition-based, geo-political considerations may be traded for financial assistance by the KSA. The attendance of Kamel at the meetings is therefore notable, with Kamel being the primary Egyptian interlocutor in Libya, where the KSA may wish to see Egypt's stance align with their own. Likewise, the recent thawing of Egyptian relations with Turkey and the initial steps of the normalisation of relations with Syria may all play a part in the rationale behind any decision to provide assistance. **COMMENT ENDS.**

## Oil and Gas Developments

- On April 02 OPEC + announced that it would cut production by approximately 1 million barrels a day, with Saudi Arabia cutting oil production by 500,000 a day, Iraq by 211,000 barrels per day, and the United Arab Emirates by 144,000 barrels per day. Kuwait, Algeria and Oman will also lower production by 128,000, 48,000 and 40,000 barrels per day, respectively. The production decreases are to be implemented from May and continue until the end of the year. The announcement triggered an oil price rise of between 5.31% and 5.48% across the market. **COMMENT:** The production cuts come on top of the 2 million barrels per day cuts announced by OPEC + in October 2022 and are likely to trigger consternation in Europe and the US. The cuts by OPEC +, which includes Russia, in October saw the US warn Saudi Arabia that there would be consequences for their actions, however, the US took no action against the KSA at that time. However, for Libya, this presents an opportunity, as the nation is exempt from OPEC quotas as part of an agreement to allow the nation to regenerate financially following years of turmoil. The announcement may prompt an even greater impetus to increase overall production towards the 2 million bpd target to maximise the benefits of the increased global oil price. **COMMENT ENDS.**

# Significant Incidents

## Tripolitania Region



**1. Demonstration - Apr 02, Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah:** A demonstration was reported at the Zawiyah Courts complex with demonstrators calling for their inclusion in the unified salary scale.

**2. Murder/ Execution - Apr 01, Tripoli Province, Kremiya:** The body of a Sudanese national was recovered in the Kremiya area. A subsequent investigation led to the arrest of a Sudanese national on Apr 02.

**3. RPG - Apr 03 02:00, Al-Murqub Province, Khoms:** A private residence was attacked with an RPG. The home of the perpetrator was then raided, leading to his arrest and the recovery of a large weapons cache.

**4. Armed Robbery - Apr 03 02:30, Misrata Province, Misrata:** A residence housing Nigerian workers was robbed by a Nigerian group. The incident resulted in the arrest of three Nigerians and the recovery of a pistol.

## Cyrenaica Region

NSTR

## Fezzan Region



**5. Security Operation - Apr 02, Wadi Al-Shatii Province, Brak al-Shati:** ISA activated their Brak Shati Branch and launched operations. The activation is part of an ISA effort to expand their operations in the southern region.

**6. HMG - Apr 02 02:00, Sabha Province, Sabha:** HMG was reported in Sabha.

## Offshore

NSTR

# Outlook

## Short Term Outlook

- Libya remains locked in a political impasse with two governments, both of which are slowly weakening. The House of Representatives (HoR) and the High Council of State (HCS) continue to dominate the current political scene, with their efforts to resolve key issues like the constitution taking centre stage. SRSB Abdoulaye Bathily is attempting to wrest some control away from the two entities in a bid to make progress towards elections in 2023, however, they continue to enjoy the support of key regional and international backers. Various factions are beginning to position themselves for expected change in 2023 as the UN continues to push towards elections, while regional and global issues, not least the Ukraine offensive, continue to shape the international communities' agendas in Libya.
- The security situation in and around Tripoli remains fundamentally unstable. After significant changes to the capital's security makeup in August and September 2022, new faultlines are emerging as militia commanders continue to consolidate their positions. This includes expanding their influence through ministries and other state apparatus. In addition, plans to reconstruct Tripoli International Airport threaten to destabilise the delicate balance of power in the city with Misratan entities looking to claim significant influence over the location. The resurgence of Jihadist Salafism in Tripolitania is also a potential source of destabilisation, one which is currently being felt in Tajura and along the north-west coastline. This instability along the coastline may be positively impacted by efforts in Zawiyah to reorganise armed groups which could increase cooperation. Armed groups in Tripoli continue to be empowered via financial, military, and political means, ensuring they will continue to exert significant influence over the political situation.

## Medium to Long Term Outlook

- The solution to Libya's political impasse remains elections for many stakeholders with UNSMIL attempting to develop a new pathway. Realistically, the path to elections in 2023 will be fraught with difficulties however, there is a real chance that much-needed groundwork could be achieved. While UNSMIL heads efforts towards elections, other international stakeholders are prioritising more short-term objectives as they look to shape not just Libya, but regional and global issues.
- Terrorist groups remain active but contained in Libya. Islamic State (IS) will continue to present a threat to security forces, primarily in the south, and may re-establish the capability to mount sporadic attacks along the coastline in the future. The group continues to suffer from years of attrition and is more likely focused on providing support for more active IS theatres in sub-Saharan Africa. Al-Qaeda-aligned groups remain active in the country with their integration into societies in the south and some armed groups in the Tripoli area potentially posing a longer-term issue for Libya.

# Key Dates

Date	Occasion	Comment
April 22 - 24, 2023	Eid Al-Fitr (+/-)	Public Holiday
May 01, 2023	May Day	Public Holiday
June 27, 2023	Arafat Day	

June 28 – 30, 2023	Eid Al-Adha	Public Holiday
July 19, 2023	Islamic New Year	Public Holiday
September 16, 2023	Martyrs' Day	Public Holiday
September 27, 2023	The Prophet's Birthday	Public Holiday
October 23, 2023	Liberation Day	Public Holiday
December 24, 2023	Independence Day	Public Holiday

# Acronym List

AQ - Al-Qaeda  
BDB – Benghazi Defense Brigade (Al Qaeda-aligned – AAS and RSCB associated/umbrella group)  
CBL – Central Bank of Libya  
CESF - Constitution and Election Support Force  
CNI – Critical National Infrastructure  
DACOCT - Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism (SDF)  
DDR - Disarmament, demobilising and reintegration  
GASO – General Administration of Security Operations  
GACS – General Administration of Central Support  
GECOL – General Electricity Company of Libya  
GMMR – Great Man-made River  
GNA – Government of National Accord (2016)  
GNC – General National Congress (2012)  
GNS – Government of National Stability (2021)  
GNU – Government of National Unity (2021)  
GTUC - Greater Tripoli Union Council (Tripoli militias and others, established in June 2020)  
HCS – High Council of State (Tripoli-based)  
HNEC – High National Elections Commission  
HoR – House of Representatives (Tobruk-based)  
IDF – Indirect Fire (mortars/rockets)  
IDP - Internally Displaced Persons  
IED - Improvised Explosive Device  
IOC - International Oil Company  
IS - Islamic State  
JMC – Joint Military Commission  
LIFG – Libyan Islamic Fighting Group  
LNA – Libyan National Army  
LPA – Libyan Political Agreement (2015)  
LPDF - Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (2020)  
LROR - Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room  
MoD - Ministry of Defense  
MoF - Ministry of Finance  
MoFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
MoI - Ministry of Interior  
MoJ - Ministry of Justice  
MoO - Ministry of Oil  
MoT - Ministry of Transportation  
NFDK - No Further Details Known  
NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation (aid/charity)  
NOC – National Oil Company  
NSG – National Salvation Government (GNC)  
NSTR - Nothing Significant To Report  
P3+2 – France, Germany, Italy – UK, US  
PC – Presidency Council  
PG – Presidential Guard  
PFG - Petroleum Facilities Guard  
RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade  
RTA - Road Traffic Accident  
TIP – Tripoli International Airport  
SSA – Stability Support Authority  
SAF - Small Arms Fire  
SDF – Rada Deterrence Force/ Special Deterrence Force/ Rada  
UXO - Unexploded Ordnance



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