

# Libya daily security analysis report

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Prepared by:  
Risk Analysis Team, Libya

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# Latest Developments

## Political Developments

- In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, SRSG Bathily outlined his continued vision for elections in 2023 and emphasized that he supports any consensus that leads Libya to the path of recovery. Bathily explained that his initiative aims to build on the agreements that have already been reached between the HoR and the HCS, while also aiming to expand the “circles of Libyan participation in the elections.” However, he also stated that the current issues should not be left in the hands of the two legislative councils as they have taken enough time already without reaching tangible results. He stressed that “everyone will have a say in paving the way to the elections alongside the parliament and High Council of State,” including effective political and security powers, parties, civil society groups and representatives of women and the youth. Furthermore, his initiative puts forward a flexible and non-traditional work mechanism known as shuttle diplomacy. He stressed that he will personally ensure that the approach is successful to help the Libyans reach a national understanding. **COMMENT:** The interview does little to clarify the path ahead in terms of the role of the High-Level Panel for Elections (HPLE) and his comments appear to foresee the failure of the 6+6 to draft consensual election laws, which may then see Bathily resort to the “alternative mechanisms.” Although there is likely a more formulated strategy to be adopted by the HPLE, in the event that the 6+6 fails, this interview does nothing to allay the criticisms of a lack of a defined role or structure for the HPLE, which was even highlighted in the UNSC endorsement of the initiative. Bathily has already confirmed that the HPLE will not be constituted as a sitting body, but rather a collection of contributors, between which he would conduct shuttle diplomacy and while this does remove (to a degree) the negative comments comparing the HPLE to the LPDF, it appears to also water down the possible impact that the HPLE could represent. **COMMENT ENDS.**

## Security Developments

- The 5+5 JMC, alongside eastern and western military commanders, met in Benghazi on Apr 07. SRSG Bathily was also present at the meeting and delivered the opening remarks.

## Oil and Gas Developments

- The Minister of Planning, Mohammed al Zaidani and the Minister of Oil, Mohammed Aoun, met to discuss the developmental budget for the Ministry of Oil and Gas for 2023. The meeting also discussed the plans of the Ministry of Oil and Gas to rehabilitate and train oil graduates, in preparation for enabling them to work in oil companies.
- Aoun also publicly accused the NOC leadership of imposing the company Isnad as a local partner on Halliburton, claiming that Isnad is owned by the UAE’s Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). The allegation was rejected by the NOC, which asserted that Isnad is a Libyan company which was registered in the Libya commercial register in Feb 2021. **COMMENT:** The allegations and subsequent rejections relate to the regeneration of the Dahra and Bahi fields, which were initially destroyed in IS attacks, and then subsequently looted. The re-entry of Halliburton to Libya has been widely publicized as a sign of progress in the O&G industry as the return of specialist foreign oil service companies is critical if the ambitious target of 2 million barrels per day is to be achieved in 3-5 years. However, the engagement of Isnad, by Waha Oil Company (the NOC subsidiary) as a local partner has still raised questions due to the lack of a significant past performance record. Furthermore, the dispute also highlights continued tension between the MoO and the NOC. In part, this is derived from the secondary role that the Ministry plays to the NOC, whose Chairmen, both the former, Mustafa Sanalla and the current, Farhat Bengdara are both the face of the Libyan state oil and the signatories on key contracts and agreements. **COMMENT ENDS.**

# Assessment

## 5+5 Meets in Benghazi

The 5+5 JMC, alongside eastern and western military commanders, met in Benghazi on Apr 07. SRSB Bathily was also present at the meeting and delivered the opening remarks. In keeping with his previous addresses to the 5+5 JMC Bathily's speech was very much in the positive, noting that the meeting had seen even more participation than Tripoli, and welcoming the spirit of inclusiveness and reconciliation that this represented. He framed the meeting as a "symbol of unity and a symbol of a new Libya – a sovereign Libya" and called on those present to ensure the creation of a conducive security environment, for voters and candidates, as well as the acceptance of election results.

Bathily also addressed the gathering on his recent visits to Sudan, Niger and Chad, explaining that there was agreement from the leaders of all three nations for the "synchronized and balanced withdrawal of foreign fighters, foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya ensuring that there are no adverse impacts on the countries of origin."

As with the previous meeting, the primary achievement of the meeting was the bringing together of both the JMC 5+5 as well as military leaders from both the west and east in Benghazi. While primarily symbolic, there is a practical aspect to such meetings, with the exchange of views, strategies and stances, between commanders potentially reducing preconceived notions about the nature of various commanders. While this has been going on at the operational level for some time, with 166 Battalion, 444 Brigade, CTF from the GNU, and LNA's TBZ Brigade and 128 Brigade coordinating their activity and at times conducting joint operations, the recent meetings have potentially accelerated the level of cooperation between those invited. However, of equal importance are those that were not present, and while lower-level security actors would not be expected at such a meeting, prominent commanders such as Osama Jweli are notable for their absence.



*Photo: GNU 5+5 plus military commanders arriving at Benina Airport on Apr 07 – Source Social Media*

Following the meeting the JMC 5+5 published the outcomes of the meeting:


- Support the efforts of the 5+5 Joint Committee and the Communication Committee in releasing the mercenaries and foreign fighters.

Start practical procedures to address the problems of displaced people and migrants and ensure their safe return in various parts of the country.

- Exchange of information of detainees of both parties and initiate steps to exchange them as soon as possible.
- We appreciate the initiative of the General Command by releasing 6 of the detainees of the Western Region on security issues.
- Re-affirm the readiness of the attendees to provide all forms of support to secure all stages of the elections.

# Significant Incidents

## Tripolitania Region



**1. Armed Attack - Apr 07 19:00, Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiya:** Unconfirmed local sources report the destruction of a private property in a Zawiya. The incident is believed to relate to the former incarceration of the perpetrator (Mamdouh Hammad) who was seeking compensation from the property's owner, Abdul Hamid al-Rih for his time in detention. Hammad was reportedly arrested in connection with the disappearance of Miloud Hassan following an accusation by Rih.

**2. Arrest - Apr 07, Tripoli Province, Tajura:** GNU Mol and Tajura CID arrested an African and a Libyan national on charges of the kidnap for ransom of an African national.

## Cyrenaica Region



**3. Arrest - Apr 07, Benghazi Province, Benghazi:** Several sources reported the arrest/kidnap of Maher al Ghariani. Reportedly Ghariani is the manager of a social media page which had recently questioned the actions of the Reconstruction and Stability Committee in Benghazi.

## Fezzan Region

NSTR

## Offshore

NSTR

# Outlook

## Short Term Outlook

- Libya remains locked in a political impasse with two governments, both of which are slowly weakening. The House of Representatives (HoR) and the High Council of State (HCS) continue to dominate the current political scene, with their efforts to resolve key issues like the constitution taking centre stage. SRSB Abdoulaye Bathily is attempting to wrest some control away from the two entities in a bid to make progress towards elections in 2023, however, they continue to enjoy the support of key regional and international backers. Various factions are beginning to position themselves for expected change in 2023 as the UN continues to push towards elections, while regional and global issues, not least the Ukraine offensive, continue to shape the international communities' agendas in Libya.
- The security situation in and around Tripoli remains fundamentally unstable. After significant changes to the capital's security makeup in August and September 2022, new faultlines are emerging as militia commanders continue to consolidate their positions. This includes expanding their influence through ministries and other state apparatus. In addition, plans to reconstruct Tripoli International Airport threaten to destabilise the delicate balance of power in the city with Misratan entities looking to claim significant influence over the location. The resurgence of Jihadist Salafism in Tripolitania is also a potential source of destabilisation, one which is currently being felt in Tajura and along the north-west coastline. This instability along the coastline may be positively impacted by efforts in Zawiyah to reorganise armed groups which could increase cooperation. Armed groups in Tripoli continue to be empowered via financial, military, and political means, ensuring they will continue to exert significant influence over the political situation.

## Medium to Long Term Outlook

- The solution to Libya's political impasse remains elections for many stakeholders with UNSMIL attempting to develop a new pathway. Realistically, the path to elections in 2023 will be fraught with difficulties however, there is a real chance that much-needed groundwork could be achieved. While UNSMIL heads efforts towards elections, other international stakeholders are prioritising more short-term objectives as they look to shape not just Libya, but regional and global issues.
- Terrorist groups remain active but contained in Libya. Islamic State (IS) will continue to present a threat to security forces, primarily in the south, and may re-establish the capability to mount sporadic attacks along the coastline in the future. The group continues to suffer from years of attrition and is more likely focused on providing support for more active IS theatres in sub-Saharan Africa. Al-Qaeda-aligned groups remain active in the country with their integration into societies in the south and some armed groups in the Tripoli area potentially posing a longer-term issue for Libya.

# Key Dates

Date	Occasion	Comment
April 22 - 24, 2023	Eid Al-Fitr (+/-)	Public Holiday
May 01, 2023	May Day	Public Holiday
June 27, 2023	Arafat Day	
June 28 – 30, 2023	Eid Al-Adha	Public Holiday
July 19, 2023	Islamic New Year	Public Holiday

September 16, 2023	Martyrs' Day	Public Holiday
September 27, 2023	The Prophet's Birthday	Public Holiday
October 23, 2023	Liberation Day	Public Holiday
December 24, 2023	Independence Day	Public Holiday



# Acronym List

AQ - Al-Qaeda  
BDB – Benghazi Defense Brigade (Al Qaeda-aligned – AAS and RSCB associated/umbrella group)  
CBL – Central Bank of Libya  
CESF - Constitution and Election Support Force  
CNI – Critical National Infrastructure  
DACOCT - Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism (SDF)  
DDR - Disarmament, demobilising and reintegration  
GASO – General Administration of Security Operations  
GACS – General Administration of Central Support  
GECOL – General Electricity Company of Libya  
GMMR – Great Man-made River  
GNA – Government of National Accord (2016)  
GNC – General National Congress (2012)  
GNS – Government of National Stability (2021)  
GNU – Government of National Unity (2021)  
GTUC - Greater Tripoli Union Council (Tripoli militias and others, established in June 2020)  
HCS – High Council of State (Tripoli-based)  
HNEC – High National Elections Commission  
HoR – House of Representatives (Tobruk-based)  
IDF – Indirect Fire (mortars/rockets)  
IDP - Internally Displaced Persons  
IED - Improvised Explosive Device  
IOC - International Oil Company  
IS - Islamic State  
JMC – Joint Military Commission  
LIFG – Libyan Islamic Fighting Group  
LNA – Libyan National Army  
LPA – Libyan Political Agreement (2015)  
LPDF - Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (2020)  
LROR - Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room  
MoD - Ministry of Defense  
MoF - Ministry of Finance  
MoFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
MoI - Ministry of Interior  
MoJ - Ministry of Justice  
MoO - Ministry of Oil  
MoT - Ministry of Transportation  
NFDK - No Further Details Known  
NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation (aid/charity)  
NOC – National Oil Company  
NSG – National Salvation Government (GNC)  
NSTR - Nothing Significant To Report  
P3+2 – France, Germany, Italy – UK, US  
PC – Presidency Council  
PG – Presidential Guard  
PFG - Petroleum Facilities Guard  
RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade  
RTA - Road Traffic Accident  
TIP – Tripoli International Airport  
SSA – Stability Support Authority  
SAF - Small Arms Fire  
SDF – Rada Deterrence Force/ Special Deterrence Force/ Rada  
UXO - Unexploded Ordnance

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### Country address:

RMT House, Turkish School Road  
Sarraj  
Tripoli  
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

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