

# Libya weekly security analysis report

April 02, 2023

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# Executive Summary

- On Mar 27, the UN Independent Fact Finding Mission in Libya (FFM) released a report on Human Rights abuses and failures in Libya. The report was damning in its condemnation of widespread and flagrant abuses of Human Rights against all sections of society, conducted by both state and non-state actors, and at times with the assistance, whether knowingly or not, of international partners. The FFM report concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity have been committed against Libyans and migrants in all parts of Libya since 2016, warning of the infiltration of armed groups into state structures, and the persistence of impunity.
- On Mar 26 and 27, the 5+5 Joint Military Commission met in Tripoli. The meeting saw the participation of SRSG Bathily and a wide array of military commanders from both the east and west of the country. The meeting represented the largest gathering of eastern and western armed group commanders for a decade and while attendance at the same meeting does not necessarily correlate with a shared position, that such individuals met at all is considered positive and extremely symbolic at a time when tangible evidence of national reconciliation is sorely lacking.
- The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Mikhail Bogdanov briefed Russian state media TASS, that the Russian Ambassador Aydar Aghanin was en route to Libya where the Russian diplomatic mission would be restored to full capacity. This statement was later proved to be premature with the Aghanin attending meetings later in the week with a delegation from the HoR. The reopening of the Russian Embassy in Tripoli has been discussed since the ending of hostilities at the end of 2020, however, this latest announcement appeared to see these discussions becoming a reality, even if not as immediate as Bogdanov would have suggested. Russia continues to increase its level of direct political engagement, with this so far being focused on the HoR and eastern institutions, given the already existing relationship between the two. It is notable that this comes at a time of a significant increase in US engagement in Libya, and continued speculation of the imminent opening of a US Embassy.
- SRSG Bathily met with the head of the HCS Khaled Mishri and urged him and the council's leadership to name their representatives for the 6+6 committee, following the successful naming of their six members by the HoR. The HCS then unexpectedly appointed their six members for the 6+6 HoR/HCS committee. The appointment of the six members was conducted with a reduced closed HCS meeting, with no reported full HCS gathering, as would normally be the case. In the following days those opposed to the 13th amendment and the subsequent 6+6 committee, voiced their rejection of the decision, however, this will be to little avail with the 6+6 meetings likely to proceed regardless of the lack of HCS procedure in the appointment of its representatives.
- In an interview with the British newspaper The Financial Times, the head of the NOC, Farhat Bengdara said he had the support of both the government in Tripoli and the Commander of the LNA, Khalifa Haftar. He added that "I can travel to any place in Libya, south, east, west, north, anywhere, and I used to work with all parties, as this type of support is very important for the National Oil Corporation to continue production" and that his goal was to raise production to two million barrels per day over three to five years. It is considered of note that Bengdara divided the nation's seats of power in terms of the GNU and Haftar, with no reference to either the GNS or the HoR. While this is a correct representation of the ground truth, it is seldom that such a clear differentiation is made in such terms to the international press.
- On Mar 26, Zallaf Oil (NOC subsidiary) and Honeywell signed the first contract for the construction of the Southern Oil Refinery. In a statement, Zallaf announced that "Honeywell – UOP will carry out the initial engineering works for the refining units, and grant technical licenses to the licensed units." The entire project consists of two phases, the Front End Engineering Design (FEED) with the second phase being the installation and final tests. The second phase will be negotiated as a separate contract. In an interview on the subject, NOC Chairman Farhat Bengdara asserted that the refinery would be operational in 36 months and would have the capacity to refine 30,000 bpd from the Sharara Field.

# Outlook

## Short Term Outlook

- Libya remains locked in a political impasse with two governments, both of which are slowly weakening. The House of Representatives (HoR) and the High Council of State (HCS) continue to dominate the current political scene, with their efforts to resolve key issues like the constitution taking centre stage. SRSB Abdoulaye Bathily is attempting to wrest some control away from the two entities in a bid to make progress towards elections in 2023, however, they continue to enjoy the support of key regional and international backers. Various factions are beginning to position themselves for expected change in 2023 as the UN continues to push towards elections, while regional and global issues, not least the Ukraine offensive, continue to shape the international communities' agendas in Libya.
- The security situation in and around Tripoli remains fundamentally unstable. After significant changes to the capital's security makeup in August and September 2022, new faultlines are emerging as militia commanders continue to consolidate their positions. This includes expanding their influence through ministries and other state apparatus. In addition, plans to reconstruct Tripoli International Airport threaten to destabilise the delicate balance of power in the city with Misratan entities looking to claim significant influence over the location. The resurgence of Jihadist Salafism in Tripolitania is also a potential source of destabilisation, one which is currently being felt in Tajura and along the north-west coastline. This instability along the coastline may be positively impacted by efforts in Zawiyah to reorganise armed groups which could increase cooperation. Armed groups in Tripoli continue to be empowered via financial, military, and political means, ensuring they will continue to exert significant influence over the political situation.

## Medium to Long Term Outlook

- The solution to Libya's political impasse remains elections for many stakeholders with UNSMIL attempting to develop a new pathway. Realistically, the path to elections in 2023 will be fraught with difficulties however, there is a real chance that much-needed groundwork could be achieved. While UNSMIL heads efforts towards elections, other international stakeholders are prioritising more short-term objectives as they look to shape not just Libya, but regional and global issues.
- Terrorist groups remain active but contained in Libya. Islamic State (IS) will continue to present a threat to security forces, primarily in the south, and may re-establish the capability to mount sporadic attacks along the coastline in the future. The group continues to suffer from years of attrition and is more likely focused on providing support for more active IS theatres in sub-Saharan Africa. Al-Qaeda-aligned groups remain active in the country with their integration into societies in the south and some armed groups in the Tripoli area potentially posing a longer-term issue for Libya.

# Threat Matrix

Region	Political	Terrorism	Militancy	Crime	Kidnap	Civil Unrest
Tripolitania	High	Moderate	High-Extreme	High	High	High
Tripoli	High	Moderate	High-Extreme	High	High	High
Cyrenaica	High	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Benghazi	High	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Fezzan	High	High	High	High	High	Low-Moderate
Sabha	High	Moderate	High	High	High	Moderate

Threat Scale	Minimal	Low	Moderate	High	Extreme
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# Political Developments

## Symbolic Progress on Military Track

On Mar 26 and 27, the 5+5 Joint Military Commission met in Tripoli. The meeting saw the participation of SRSG Bathily and a wide array of military commanders from both the east and west of the country. The following points were the published outcomes of the meeting:

- The dialogue should be Libyan–Libyan and inside Libya.
- Rejection of foreign interference in Libyan affairs.
- Full commitment to the outcomes of the dialogues between the military and security commanders that were decided during their first and second meetings held respectively in Tunis and Tripoli.
- Rejection of fighting and all forms of violence throughout the entirety of Libya’s territory.
- Continuation of work towards unifying the military institutions through the Chiefs of Staff; unifying the security institutions; and the rest of the state institutions.
- Forming a unified government for all Libyan state institutions.
- Increasing efforts to address the challenges facing those displaced and those affected by fighting and wars.
- Completion of national reconciliation and reparation efforts.
- Commitment to pursue elections and the need for the House of Representatives and the High Council of the State to complete the tasks entrusted to them.

The outcomes themselves do not represent any significant developments or achievements and are primarily stating an already declared position.

However, the success of the event cannot be judged on the outcomes alone. The meeting differed from the traditional 5+5 meetings in that it was significantly expanded, with political and armed group leaders also being present, with a breakfast event on Mar 27 seeing numerous armed group commanders, not directly involved in 5+5 matters attend.

In this regard, it represented the largest gathering of eastern and western armed group commanders for a decade and while attendance at the same meeting does not necessarily correlate with a shared position, that such individuals met at all is considered positive and extremely symbolic at a time when tangible evidence of national reconciliation is sorely lacking.

This was not lost on SRSG Bathily who stated that the meeting was “a great trust-building exercise for Libyan security & military actors. I commend the spirit of patriotism participants demonstrated & hope they can be an example to others.”

SRSG Bathily maintained the momentum on the security track following the 5+5

meeting by conducting official visits to Chad, Niger and Sudan. The series of talks were described as being aimed at the continued implementation of the October 2020 ceasefire accords, which includes the withdrawal of foreign fighters from Libya.

In a tweet, Bathily asserted that the foreign presence “poses a critical risk to peace and stability in the country and the region. We need to work with our partners to address this challenge without negatively impacting Libya’s neighbouring countries.” Bathily’s first stop was Sudan where he met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ali Al-Sadiq, where the two agreed on the need to address common challenges, including the Libyan-Sudanese border. Bathily also met with the Sudanese

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SRSG Bathily – Mar 29

Minister of Defence, Yassin Ibrahim, who affirmed his ministry's commitment to pursue joint cooperation and support for a coordinated withdrawal of all these elements and their reintegration into regular forces.

SRSB Bathily then conducted meetings in Chad meeting with the Transitional President of Chad, General Mahamat Idriss Déby in N'Djamena. During the meeting, Déby expressed his full support for the UN-facilitated peace process in Libya, and that he considered Libyan stability to be beneficial to Chad. Bathily expressed his gratitude for the support Chad has provided through the Chadian Liaison Committee, charged with coordinating the withdrawal of fighters from Libya without adversely impacting their countries of origin.

Niger, Chad and Sudan have all previously pledged to withdraw their nationals from Libya, however, as personnel currently in Libya are not deployed at the behest of their governments this has had limited impact. However, the possible threat of prosecution or some form of punishment upon their return to their home nations does present an obstacle to widespread repatriation. Therefore pledges to ensure some form of amnesty or even reintegration into their home nation's military may prove as an incentive to foreign fighters, many of whom are no longer in the paid service of either eastern or western forces.

## **Russia Counter Increased US Diplomatic Engagement**

The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Mikhail Bogdanov briefed Russian state media TASS, that the Russian Ambassador Aydar Aghanin was enroute to Libya where the Russian diplomatic mission would be restored to full capacity. This statement was later proved to be premature with the Aghanin attending meetings later in the week with a delegation from the HoR. The reopening of the Russian Embassy in Tripoli has been discussed since the ending of hostilities at the end of 2020, however, this

latest announcement appeared to see these discussions becoming a reality, even if not as immediate as Bogdanov would have suggested.

Later in the week a delegation from the HoR headed by the Second Deputy Speaker, Abdel-Hadi Al-Saghir, travelled to Moscow where they met with a Russian delegation led by Bogdanov and including Aydar Aghanin. The group reportedly discussed the need to continue to strengthen constructive dialogue with the participation of all political forces in order to ensure the country's unity and sovereignty. Russia continues to increase its level of direct

**Wagner Group presence is not as simple as a foothold in Libya as a nation for Russia, with its presence in Libya being a key component of a wider regional structure. Jufra Airbase is providing a key logistical hub required to provide support to forces operating in the Central African Republic, Mali and elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa.**

political engagement, with this so far being focused on the HoR and eastern institutions, given the already existing relationship between the two. Notably, this comes at a time of a significant increase in US engagement in Libya, and continued speculation of the imminent opening of a US Embassy. Furthermore, the US has continued to openly call for the removal of Wagner group forces, from Libya, viewing this as a critical requirement of the eastern authorities and being dealt with (by the US) as a separate, and more urgent, issue that the removal of other foreign fighters from the country.

The US efforts will be of concern to Russia as the removal of Wagner group would see one aspect of their capability removed from Libya. Moreover, reporting indicates that the

issue of Wagner Group is not as simple as a foothold in Libya as a nation for Russia, with Wagner Group in Libya being a key component of a wider regional structure. Reporting indicates that Jufra Airbase is providing a key logistical hub required to provide support to forces operating in the Central African Republic, Mali and elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. Notably, Wagner Group has a presence at several airbases in southern Libya aside from Jufra, with their presence also being reported in Tamahnint and Wigh airbases.

With such stakes, it is therefore likely that these US efforts to disrupt and remove the group will be countered by increased diplomatic efforts on

Russia's part, with the US opting for a similar strategy to maintain and increase the pressure.

While this may be framed as simple diplomatic competition for influence, the complication of Wagner group, and Libya's key role in its regional aspirations muddies the waters as to the possible strategies that could be adopted by the US and its allies to attain their removal without resorting to direct military action on Libyan soil. This has led to comments from certain Libyan quarters where discussions on the removal of Wagner Group from the country, that have seen no Libyan involvement, amount to an effort to use Libyans as 'hired guns' to implement western foreign policy.

The issue of both Wagner Group and Russian influence is likely to remain live, and unresolved for some time, unless the eastern authorities, most notably the LNA and its Commander Khalifa Haftar, can see some advantage to abandoning the existing strategy of accepting foreign assistance in the maintenance of their powerbase. As no physical military support, in terms of either equipment, personnel or training is likely to be forthcoming from the US or its allies, it remains to be seen if other incentives will prove successful in achieving the goal of limiting Wagner and ultimately Russian military influence in the east and south of the country or Russian diplomatic influence at a national level.

## **The Political Process Edges Forward**

Early in the week SRSG Bathily met with the head of the HCS Khaled Mishri and urged him and the council's leadership to name their representatives for the 6+6 committee, following the successful naming of their six members by the HoR.

Following the meeting, Bathily posted on his official social media account. "Once again, I urge the Houses of Representatives and the

**"Once again, I urge the Houses of Representatives and the State to fulfil their obligations to the Libyan people to conduct the elections within a clear time frame."**

SRSG Bathily – 29 Mar

State to fulfil their obligations to the Libyan people to conduct the elections within a clear time frame." Bathily has remained resolute in applying pressure to both the HoR and the HCS to uphold their institutional obligation for the constitutional basis for elections and election laws. This most recent meeting and subsequent comments on social media from Bathily followed public announcements from HCS members who rejected the 13th amendment and now intend to prevent the HCS from naming representatives for the HoR/HCS committee, which itself is a product of the 13th amendment.

The HCS then unexpectedly appointed their six members for the 6+6 HoR/HCS committee. The members were named as Ahmed Juma Al-Awjali, Hamad Muhammad Brikao, Omar Muhammad Abulifa, Fathallah Muhammed Hussain, Fawzi Rajab Al-Oqab, and Mama Suleiman Bilal. Following the naming of the representatives, the HCS called for the first meeting of the committee to be held in the coming week. The appointment of the six members was conducted with a reduced closed HCS meeting, with no reported full HCS gathering, as would normally be the case. In the following days, those opposed to the 13th amendment and the subsequent 6+6 committee voiced their rejection of the decision, however, this will be to little avail with the 6+6 meetings likely to proceed regardless of the lack of HCS procedure in the appointment of its representatives.

However, such selective appointments, likely under the instruction of Mishri, will probably have resulted in the appointing of individuals of a similar political stance to Mishri, which has tended towards greater candidate inclusion and a relaxing of the rules for presidential candidates. Given that candidate eligibility has been one of the key bottlenecks in the entire political process, this may result in some progress, at least on one outstanding issue..

## Independent Fact-Finding Mission Report draws denials.

On Mar 27, the UN Independent Fact Finding Mission in Libya (FFM) released a report on Human Rights abuses and failures in Libya. The report was damning in its condemnation of widespread and flagrant abuses of Human Rights against all sections of society, conducted by both state and non-state actors, and at times with the assistance, whether knowingly or not, of international partners.

The FFM report concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity have been committed against Libyans and migrants in all parts of Libya since 2016, warning of the infiltration of armed groups into state structures, and the persistence of impunity, as well as documenting “The involvement of individuals and officials from the security and military agencies and the groups affiliated with them at all levels of their hierarchy in these abuses and violations.”

During the presentation of the report in Geneva on Mar 27, the head of the mission, Mohamed Aujar, said that they had prepared “a list of individuals allegedly responsible for the documented violations and abuses, and it will be deposited with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights as part of the evidence.”

The FFM report claimed that the EU had “aided and abetted” in the commission of crimes against migrants in Libya. The report stated that “The support given by the EU to the Libyan coast guard in terms of pull-backs, pushbacks, (and) interceptions led to violations of certain human rights.”

The EU defended their position with Peter Stano, lead spokesperson for the EU external affairs service, stating that “one thing which is very important to bear in mind, we are not

financing any Libyan entity. We are not giving physical money to partners in Libya, exactly for these reasons.” He added that the EU is “taking seriously the concerns” raised by the UN fact-finding mission and that “Our objective, our joint objective, is to help to improve the situation of the people stranded in Libya. And there are results. Of course, there are incidents, there are issues which are a source of concern. We try to address them with the partners in Libya, with the international partners.”

The HoR has also expressed its rejection of the FFM findings. The Chairman of the Internal

Affairs Committee, Suleiman Al-Hariri said the report is “biased, lacks objectivity, and deliberately distorts the image of Libya. The report also holds Libya alone responsible for illegal migration flows.” Hariri added that the report ignored the difficult conditions that Libya faced and that the fragility of Libyan institutions presents a challenge when catering for the needs of 100,000s of illegal migrants. On EU support, Hariri pointed out the absence of EU support in the protection of Libyan borders, especially in the

south where the majority of migrants enter Libya.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement rejecting the FFM. The statement noted that “the report of the fact-finding mission did not include meetings with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice on facilitating the mission's work in confronting crimes against humanity...we have monitored a clear coolness from the mission with the programs presented by officials at the Ministry of Justice in the face of human rights violations.” While the MoFA’s comments are correct with the report not covering successful initiatives, this is made clear in the summary which states the report is “focused on the exploitation of migrants and repression of dissent in Libya since 2016” and therefore is not an evaluation of migrant programs in place within the country.


## The report documents “the involvement of individuals and officials from the security and military agencies and the groups affiliated with them at all levels of their hierarchy in these abuses and violations...”

Head of FFM mission Mohamed Aujar – Mar 27




# Weekly Statistical Overview

Graph: Breakdown of weekly statistics including incident count, fatalities, injuries, kidnaps and arrests by region



Graphic: Number of weekly security incidents across the country by province




Activity levels decreased this week from 53 last week to 38 this week.

Tripolitania saw levels fall even further, as Ramdan impacts across the country. The most significant incidents were clashes over two evenings in the Harsha area to the immediate west of Zawiyah. Three individuals were injured in the first evening with 1<sup>st</sup> Support Force (Al Far) intervening on the second evening. Kidnapping increased in Tripoli with four incidents, with two involving senior former members of the ISA.

Cyrenica saw a decrease this week from 8 to 5 with anti immigration operations ongoing.

Activity increased this week in Fezzan with two incidents reported compared to seven last week. All incidents were low level and in Sabha



# Weekly Significant Incidents

## Tripolitania




Image: Weekly security incidents reported across Tripolitania

## Security Incidents

- Mar 26** | Murder/ Execution - Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah: The body of an African female was found wrapped in a blanket in the es-Sabria area.
- Mar 26** | Security Operation - Nuqat Al-Khams Province, Zuwara: Ras Ajdir-Zuwara SSA raided several locations used for prostitution and arrested an unknown number of prostitutes who were transferred to DCIM Tripoli.
- Mar 26** | Sabotage - Al-Murqub Province, Khoms: The MMR was damaged by an attempted illegal connection in the Khoms area. The incident resulted in the loss of several hundred of cubic metres of water.
- Mar 26** | Murder/ Execution - Misrata Province, Misrata: Two siblings from the Danafari family were killed in a family dispute related to an inheritance.
- Mar 26** | Armed Attack - Sirte Province, Sirte: An armed attack on a Sirte Security Directorate VCP was reported.
- Mar 26** | Armed Clash - Tripoli Province, Tajura: Internal tensions within opposing factions in the Tajura Lions resulted in the use of medium weaponry. The tensions are between two factions based in the Airforce Camp and the Rawasad Camp.
- Mar 26** | Demonstration - Tripoli Province, Tajura: The employees of the Real Estate Registration Authority closed their offices in demonstration of the non-implementation of the unified salary scale.
- Mar 26** | Demonstration - Tripoli Province, Castelverde: The employees of the Real Estate Registration Authority closed their offices in demonstration of the non-implementation of the unified salary scale.
- Mar 26** | Demonstration - Misrata Province, Bani Walid: The employees of the Real Estate Registration Authority closed their offices in demonstration of the non-implementation of the unified salary scale.

Mar 26 Arrest - Misrata Province, Misrata: The GASO Special Task Department and DCIM security response arrested 254 African Nationals who were then referred to the deportation office in Zliten.

Mar 26 Security Operation - Al-Murqub Province, Khoms: Khoms security directorate arrested 65 migrants and a Libyan driver during an operation.

Mar 27 Security Operation - Tripoli Province, Rixos: Increased security related to the 5+5 meeting was reported in the area of the Rixos involving RADA SDF and Brigade 111.

Mar 27 Security Operation - Tripoli Province, Tajura: GASO LEF in coordination with Tajura Security Directorate conducted operations to remove illegal structures and reopen the Godesh-Hattab road path.

Mar 27 Armed Robbery - Tripoli Province, Ain Zara: A fatal armed robbery was reported against a Nigerian national with cash being stolen.

Mar 27 Demonstration - Tripoli Province, Suq al-Juma: The employees of the Real Estate Registration Authority began a sit-in demonstration against the non-implementation of the unified salary scale.

Mar 28 Assault - Al-Jabal Al-Gharbi Province, Gharyan: A male was assaulted and arrested by suspected police/security forces. The individual was alleged to have carried out a traffic offence.

Mar 29 Security Operation - Az Zawiyah Province, CP 27: During VCP operations 52 Brigade seized over 2 million Pregabalin capsules. CID investigations into a possible narcotics network are reported as ongoing.

Mar 29 Security Operation - Tripoli Province, Janzour: The Rescue and Control Department of Janzour Security Directorate was reported as conducting VCPs.

Mar 29 Demonstration - Misrata Province, Abu Grain: The employees of the Real Estate Registration Authority began a sit-in demonstration against the non-implementation of the unified salary scale.

Mar 29 Murder/ Execution - Al-Jabal Al-Gharbi Province, Zintan: An assassination attempt was reported against a male named as Abdelrazaq al Bakush by unknown perpetrators.

Mar 29 SAF - Tripoli Province, 7 April Camp: A worker from the General Services Company was attacked by SAF in the area of 7 April Camp as a result of an alleged dispute relating to rubbish. The individual was shot in the neck and hospitalised.

Mar 29 Kidnap - Tripoli Province, Hay Andalous: Unconfirmed sources reported the arrest/abduction of Major General Rashid al Rajbani of Internal Security from his home in Hay Andalous. Reportedly several armed individuals in three vehicles with blacked-out windows arrived at Rajbani's home before taking him to an unknown location.

Mar 29 Security Operation - Misrata Province, Bani Walid: 444 Brigade conducted a raid against premises being used in narcotic activity. During the raid 2nd Lt Muhammad Harb was killed. A member of the target group was also killed. 444 Brigade increased their presence following the operation and were reported to be on a high state of alert in Bani Walid.

Mar 30 Kidnap - Tripoli Province, Abu Saleem: A former Interior Security officer, named as Abdul Hakim al-Warfli was kidnapped by unknown perpetrators at his house in the Damascus neighbourhood.

Mar 30 Kidnap - Tripoli Province, Brega Oil Tanks: A male was kidnapped during an apparent armed carjacking in the area of the Brega Tanks.

Mar 31 Security Operation - Misrata Province, Bani Walid: A increased presence of 444 Brigade was reported in the Bani Walid area. The increased presence follows a raid against premises that was used in the supply of illegal narcotics which resulted in the killing of a 444 Brigade officer.

Mar 31 Demonstration - Az Zawiyah Province, Zawiyah: Local residents conducted a demonstration, calling for the dismantling of armed groups and denouncing recent criminal activity, including killings in Zawiyah.

Mar 31 Kidnap - Al-Jabal Al-Gharbi Province, Alrujban: A suspected kidnapping was reported in the wider Alrujban area. The alleged victim was named as Abdi al-Bakoush.

Mar 31 Armed Attack - Tripoli Province, Janzour: An armed attack by a Zawiyah-based group was reported against the courthouse. Reportedly the incident was an attempt to free a prisoner.

Apr 01 Armed Clash - Az Zawiyah Province, Harsha: An armed clash was reported between the Walad Mira and Bin Hassan families in the Harsha area.

Apr 01 Armed Clash - Az Zawiyah Province, Harsha: An armed clash was reported in the Harsha area. Although details are contradictory the Walad Mira, Bin Hassan and elements of 1st Support Division (al Far) are all believed to have been involved.

# Cyrenaica




Image: Weekly security incidents reported across Cyrenaica

## Security Incidents

- Mar 26** | Arrest - Benghazi Province, Benghazi: Al Fakat Police established VCPs resulting in the arrest of 20 undocumented migrants.
- Mar 26** | Murder/ Execution - Al-Marj Province, Marj: An attempted assassination was reported against Military Police Captain Hussein Abdel Ali. Ali and his colleague, Attia al Qatrani were both injured in the incident.
- Mar 26** | Security Operation - Benghazi Province, Suluq al-Qaminis: ISA were reported as conducting operations in the Suluq Qaminis area.
- Mar 28** | Other - Benghazi Province, Benghazi: 106 Chadian and Sudanese nationals were deported from Benghazi through the Kufra Shelter and deportation centre.
- Mar 28** | Arrest - Benghazi Province, Benghazi: Several Egyptian nationals carrying fake military ID cards were arrested while they were mobile in a vehicle with no licence plates.

# Fezzan




Image: Weekly security incidents reported across Fezzan

## Security Incidents

- Mar 28** | Demonstration - Sabha Province, Sabha: A demonstration by employees for the General Company for cleaning services was reported. The workers are protesting due to unpaid salaries for seven months.
- Mar 28** | Armed Robbery - Sabha Province, Qurdah: An attempted armed robbery was conducted by a group in a vehicle. The vehicle was intercepted by military forces with the occupants then engaging the military resulting in one injury.

# Acronym List

AQ - Al-Qaeda  
BDB – Benghazi Defense Brigade (Al Qaeda-aligned – AAS and RSCB associated/umbrella group)  
CBL – Central Bank of Libya  
CESF - Constitution and Election Support Force  
CNI – Critical National Infrastructure  
DACOCT - Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism (SDF)  
DDR - Disarmament, demobilising and reintegration  
GASO – General Administration of Security Operations  
GACS – General Administration of Central Support  
GECOL – General Electricity Company of Libya  
GMMR – Great Man-made River  
GNA – Government of National Accord (2016)  
GNC – General National Congress (2012)  
GNS – Government of National Stability (2021)  
GNU – Government of National Unity (2021)  
GTUC - Greater Tripoli Union Council (Tripoli militias and others, established in June 2020)  
HCS – High Council of State (Tripoli-based)  
HNEC – High National Elections Commission  
HoR – House of Representatives (Tobruk-based)  
IDF – Indirect Fire (mortars/rockets)  
IDP - Internally Displaced Persons  
IED - Improvised Explosive Device  
IOC - International Oil Company  
IS - Islamic State  
JMC – Joint Military Commission  
LIFG – Libyan Islamic Fighting Group  
LNA – Libyan National Army  
LPA – Libyan Political Agreement (2015)  
LPDF - Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (2020)  
LROR - Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room  
MoD - Ministry of Defense  
MoF - Ministry of Finance  
MoFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
MoI - Ministry of Interior  
MoJ - Ministry of Justice  
MoO - Ministry of Oil  
MoT - Ministry of Transportation  
NFDK - No Further Details Known  
NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation (aid/charity)  
NOC – National Oil Company  
NSG – National Salvation Government (GNC)  
NSTR - Nothing Significant To Report  
P3+2 – France, Germany, Italy – UK, US  
PC – Presidency Council  
PG – Presidential Guard  
PFG - Petroleum Facilities Guard  
RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade  
RTA - Road Traffic Accident  
TIP – Tripoli International Airport  
SSA – Stability Support Authority  
SAF - Small Arms Fire  
SDF – Rada Deterrence Force/ Special Deterrence Force/ Rada  
UXO - Unexploded Ordnance

# The GardaWorld Difference



**122,000+**

employees

**45**

countries with  
operations &  
infrastructure

**\$3B+**

in revenues

**22,000+**

clients

## About GardaWorld

**At GardaWorld, we're security people. Which makes us peace-of-mind people.**

We're the trusted partners you count on, when it really counts. We're the guards, patrollers, support staff and consultants who uphold the highest standards to protect what matters to you. Getting it right the first time, every time. Providing high-quality service on a global scale, with local insights —so we know what to anticipate and how to respond, at any level of risk. We're the eyes and ears and minds who are ready to act smart and act fast, with the vast experience and extensive training to plan and prepare, to monitor and manage, on your terms, on your turf, to your satisfaction, earning our reputation by earning your trust. Bringing reliability, consistency and transparency to your security operations. We're the experts who attend to the smallest details, so you can focus on the bigger picture. The security people who work hard so you can rest easy —and confidently look forward to every day.

## SECURE EVERY DAY

Country address:

RMT House, Turkish School Road  
Sarraj  
Tripoli  
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

**GARDAWORLD**

[garda.com](http://garda.com)