

KEY DEVELOPMENTS



07 April 2023

Tripoli

- PC Deputy Head receives Norland
- Gaddafi-era FM allegedly returns

Nationwide / General

- Misrata: Dbeibah convoy reportedly shot at
- Benghazi: 5+5 JMC western members postpone visit
- Qaryat: Juwaili-affiliated military movements
- CBL distributes over 25 B LYD to commercial banks

Oil & Gas Update

Crude output at 1.223 M bpd

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SUMMARY

Key Points

- UN proposes new initiative
- Political tensions to escalate
- HCS accepts HoR Constitutional Amendment

Political

The absence of a solution to the political deadlock and continuing legitimacy crisis over the GNU's mandate continue to define the context of heightened political uncertainty. In the current context, there are two political initiatives at odds with one another. The pro Al-Meshri bloc within the High Council of State (HCS) recently voted in favour of the House of Representatives' (HoR) 13TH constitutional amendment, while key international actors have announced support for the political initiative proposed by UN SRSG Abdoulaye Bathily.

Intense political manoeuvring will likely define the next few weeks against the backdrop of Bathily's proposed formation of a High-level Steering Panel for Libya. Key contentious issues such as the eligibility of dual nationals and military officials to run for president will continue to divide Libyan stakeholders and undermine progress towards a solution to the stalemate.

The UN SRSG's proposal is already facing resistance from key domestic actors such as the HoR. Consequently, Whispering Bell assesses actors opposed to the UN-led initiative will double down on their campaigns to form a new unified government as a hedge against the UN push to establish a new dialogue forum. In turn, renewed efforts to form a new government will mount the pressure on the GNU and PM Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. Amid US pressure to hold elections, Dbeibah may be compelled to reshuffle his cabinet and/or organise limited legislative elections. Of note, Dbeibah announced the formation of a government committee to implement and coordinate elections on 09 March, while Bathily provided further details on his proposal to form a High-Level Steering Panel for Libya in a press briefing on 11 March.

Security

Tripoli is operational and continues to present a relatively permissive operational environment. Sporadic incidents will continue to define security atmospherics in the western region. From a security standpoint, the status quo and stable atmospherics are set to remain as is in Tripoli. Low-impact and localised flashpoints outside government offices are possible but are unlikely to escalate or impact business operations. Targeted attacks against HoR MPs, HCS members, and other political figures are likely as political tensions peak over the next few weeks.

Oil & Gas

Disruptions to production are likely despite evidence the LNA is yet to support a coordinated oil blockade. In his latest visit to Libya, US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Burns allegedly reiterated to Haftar the importance of safeguarding oil and gas facilities and production.

TRIPOLI

Report nº6224: PC Deputy Head receives Norland

US Special Envoy to Libya Richard Norland discussed with Presidential Council (PC) Deputy Head Mosa Al-Koni the US' new strategy to prevent conflict and promote stability in Libya on 06 April. Norland reaffirmed his country's support for the efforts of UN SRSG Abdoulaye Bathily to organise elections in 2023, while noting that the US' new strategy will focus on historically marginalised areas in Libya.

Analysis/Comment: No further information.

Location: PC Office **Incident Date:** 06 April Timestamp: Unknown Source: Local Media

Veracity: B

Actors: US Special Envoy;

PC

Impact: Low

Recommendations:

Assess the impact of the US' renewed focus on Libyan

affairs.

Report n°6225: Gaddafi-era FM allegedly returns

Unconfirmed reports allege former Foreign Intelligence Chief and Foreign Minister in the Gaddafi regime, Moussa Koussa, returned to Tripoli on 05 April. Of note, Koussa defected from the Gaddafi regime in protest of attacks on civilian protesters by the Gaddafi regime during the 2011 Libyan uprising.

Analysis/Comment: No further information.

Location: Unknown **Incident Date:** 05 April Timestamp: N/A

Source: Untested Social

Media Veracity: C

Actors: Gaddaf-era FM

Impact: Low

Recommendations:

Assess the impact of the return of senior Gaddafi-era

figures to Libya.

NATIONWIDE / GENERAL

Misrata: Dbeibah convoy reportedly shot at

Reports indicate an unidentified assailant fired a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) on a convoy carrying GNU Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah while en route to Ibrahim Al-Mahjoub Mosque to attend the Holy Quran Competition in Misrata's Zawiyat Al-Mahjoub area in protest

of his visit to the city in the evening on 06 April. Dbeibah was unhurt and no confirmed casualties were recorded. Conflicting reports suggest the sounds of gunfire and RPGs were heard during a dispute between two families in the city. Of note, the incident has yet to be widely reported across media channels.

Comment: If confirmed as a direct attack on the PM's convoy, the incident does not stand favourable to Dbeibah's posture particularly as it took place in his hometown of Misrata.

• Benghazi: 5+5 JMC western members postpone visit

Western representatives of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) have delayed their scheduled visit for 06 April to Benghazi until 07 April. The western delegation was due to meet with eastern officials to build on the Tunis and Tripoli security meetings.

Qaryat: Juwaili-affiliated military movements

Reports indicate military convoys including technicals and armed vehicles (AVs) affiliated with Zintan military commander Osama Juwaili headed southwards towards Qaryat on 05 April. There are no further details available.

Comment: It will be recalled that a military convoy affiliated with Juwaili's hometown of Zintan mobilised towards Qaryat on 08 March after residents demanded the intervention of Zintan forces in response to the security campaign targeting criminal hideouts by the 444 Fighting Brigade, Law Enforcement Department, and Criminal Investigation Department (CID).

CBL distributes over 25 B LYD to commercial banks

The Central Bank of Libya (CBL) announced the distribution of over 25 billion Libyan dinars (LYD) to commercial banks across Libyan cities as part of its strategy to provide liquidity to all of the banks' branches. The latter was announced in the CBL's expenditure report covering the period 01 Jan until 31 March. Among the statistics documented, the GNU Council of Ministers and its affiliates spent 26.593 million LYD while the Presidential Council (PC) spent 12.663 million LYD and its affiliated security agencies spent 124.581 million LYD.

OIL & GAS UPDATE

Terminal Status

Es-Sider	Operational
Ras Lanuf	Operational
Mellitah	Operational
Zawiya	Operational
Zueitina	Operational
Marsa	Operational
Brega	
Marsa	Operational
Hariga	
Bouri	Operational
Jurf	Operational

Es-Sider: Stable terminal operations and security atmospherics reported as of 1700hrs LT.

■ Report n°6227: Crude output at 1.223 M bpd

The National Oil Corporation (NOC) reported that current crude production levels stand at 1.223 million barrels per day (bpd) and condensate production amounted to 53k bpd as of 06 April.

Analysis/Comment: N/A.

Location: N/A Incident Date: 06 Apr Timestamp: N/A Source: NOC Veracity: A Actors: NOC

Impact: N/A

Recommendations:

Continue to monitor Libya's crude output

levels.

VERACITY SCALE

A - Reliable:

This information is almost certainly true. A is Reliable, "No doubt of authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency; has a history of complete reliability". It is reported by one or more credible publications, and if an author is listed we have no reason to suspect them to be biased. The reporting is sourced based on widely available or verifiable information. The information is consistent with everything our team knows about this subject.

B - Fairly Reliable:

This information is probably true. This information is possibly true. B is "Fairly Reliable" for "minor doubt". It is reported one or more mostly credible publications, and if an author is listed we have no reason to suspect them to be biased on this subject. The reporting is primarily based on verifiable information. The information is mostly consistent with everything our team knows about this subject, but may contain new or surprising information given credibility on the strength of the publication or author.

C - Unreliable:

This information is probably false. This information is almost certainly false. "not usually reliable" for "significant doubt," and "unreliable" for "Lacking in authenticity, trustworthiness, and competency; history of invalid information". It appears in social media or an unreliable publication, and may be written by an author that is not known to us or is known to be less reliable. The reporting is thin, largely dependent on anonymous sources or unverifiable accounts from social media or limited access areas. The information is consistent enough with our knowledge of the subject to be possible, but contains sufficient discrepancies to make it seem unlikely. The information is mostly or entirely inconsistent with our knowledge of the subject.

ACRONYM LIST

AQ Al-Qaeda

BAM Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous BCP Border Crossing Point

BEN Benghazi International Airport
BDB Benghazi Defence Brigade

BPMC Brega Petroleum Marketing Company
BRSC Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council

CBL Central Bank of Libya

CESF Constitution and Elections Support Force

CNI Critical National Infrastructure
CDA Constitutional Drafting Assembly

DACOCT Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism

DDR Disarmament, demobilising and reintegration

DF Direct Fire

DMSC Derna Mujahideen Shura Security Council
GACS General Administration of Central Support
GASO General Administration of Security Operations

GECOL General Electricity Company of Libya

GMMR Great Man-Made River

GNA Government of National Accord
GNC General National Congress
GNS Government of National Stability
GNU Government of National Unity
GTUC Greater Trpoli Union Council

HCS High Council of State

HNEC High National Election Commission (HNEC)

HoR House of Representatives

IDF Indirect Fire

IED Improvised Explosive Device IDP Internally Displaced Persons IOC International Oil Company

IS Islamic State

JMC Joint Military Commission LAB Libyan Audit Bureau

LIFG Libyan Islamic Fighting Group

LNA Libyan National Army
LPA Libyan Political Agreement
LPDF Libyan Political Dialogue Forum

LROR Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room

MJI Mitiga International Airport

MoD Ministry of Defence MoF Ministry of Finance

MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOGC Mellitah Oil and Gas Complex

Mol Ministry of Interior
MoJ Ministry of Justice
MoO Ministry of Oil

MoT Ministry of Transportation
MRA Misrata International Airport
NEE No Expected Exposure

NIEE No Immediate Expected Exposure

NFDK No Further Details Known

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

NOC National Oil Company

NSTR Nothing Significant To Report P3+2 France, Germany, Italy, UK, US

PC Presidential Council

PFG Petroleum Facilities Guard

RASCO Ras Lanuf Oil and Gas Processing Company

RPG Rocket-Propelled Grenade RTA Road Traffic Accident SAF Small Arms Fire

SSA Stabilisation Support Agency
SDF Special Deterrence Force
TPF Tripoli Protection Force

UNSRSG United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General

UNSMIL United Nations Support Mission in Libya

UXO Unexploded Ordnance WOC Waha Oil Company